OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.
TO THE EDITOR OP THE SPECTATOR.
Edinburgh, 28th December 1841: Sta—As long as the imperfections of the present state of society render the profession of arms necessary, so long must every individual who takes an interest in the welfare of his country feel anxious that a force which he is so heavily taxed to maintain should be officered and equipped in the most efficient manner.
I trust this may be a sufficient apology for troubling you with the following remarks on the mode of promotion now established in the British Army.
Were a Greek or Roman commander to rise from his grave, and be shown s body of British troops marching to take up their position on a field of battle, although his approbation might not be entirely unqualified, yet no one can doubt that he would be filled with astonishment and admiration. But were he informed that the direction of this splendid materiel was intrusted to men selected not according to their professional skill, but according to the length of their purses, it is doubtful if he would even have patience to listen to any explanation of what he would at once pronounce so infatuated and criminal a. system. Habit, however, so completely reconciles men's minds to what is daily passing before their eyes, that in place of assuming professional ability to be the true criterion of promotion, it must be proved to be so.
This will, perhaps, be most conveniently done by adverting, in the first place, to the arguments which the supporters of the present system have advanced; and which may he reduced to the following heads 1. The present system has worked well, and it would therefore be dangerous to alter it.
2. The monotonous and mechanical duties of the Army during peace render it almost impossible to discover the relative good qualities of the officers: anychange, therefore, would throw us back either upon family or political influence or seniority, which are modes of selection as arbitrary and uncertain na purchase.
3. It would deprive the aristocracy and monied classes of society of a great inducement to join the Army, and fill its ranks with poor and needy adventurers, who might be apt to be swayed either by an undue attachment to the Royal prerogative, or to the cause of insubordination, as extraneous dircurnstances might direct.
From all these reasons, a general inference is drawn, that it is safer to abide by a system which has been so long tried and so thoroughly matured as the present, rather than plunge into the difficulties and dangers of a new.
In reply to the first of these arguments, it may be stated that it has yet tor be proved that the system has worked well. Success has indeed almost invariably attended the British Army, but it does not follow that the cause of this has been that commissions are sold; it might with equal propriety be ascribed to the love of intoxication among the common soldiers. But comparative results taken by themselves, form an extremely defective mode of testing excellence. It has never been admitted into any art or science which can be based upon fixed or well-defined principles ; and to allow such a test as the sole criterion, amounts to an acknowledgment either that no fixed principles have been discovered, or that they do not exist. Who can doubt that the worst-constructed steam-boat that ever navigated an inland river would make gad havoc among the Chinese junks ? yet mechanicians are ever endeavouring to improve upon the most perfect models. The soldiers of Great Britain, armed with the flint-musket, conquered at Waterloo and overran India; yet there is not an individual in the Army who does not acknowledge its imperfections and call for its immediate abandonment. The Government of Great Britain, previous to 1688, was as muds superior to that of China as our Army is at present to the Chinese ; yet this conviction did not prevent either the Revolution or the Reform Bill. But even adopting the criterion of comparative results, it is very doubtful if it will tell in favour of the argument it isbrought to defend.
It is impossible for the most superficial observer to overlook the fact that, however brave British officers may be, yet they do not evince the SiMIC pleasure in the details of their profession as their brethren in the Navy. It is the height of bad taste to interrogate a military man in general society upon any subject connected with his profession, excepting the rapidity of his promotion or the cut of his coat; whereas a sailor enters into the most minute details with a readiness which proves how much his mind is occupied with them. 1 am aware that there are many who have reduced the art of war to such a species of transcendentalism as to comprise all that can be known or learned in regard to it in the accounts of the battle of Waterloo and some of the engagements in the Peninsula ; while others, regarding these as fortunate ders, base the whole of the science -.pen NAPOLEON'S successful campaigns. What I am now going to say may not have much influence with such persons, yet 1 do not think it ought to be wholly disregarded. King Jamas the Second, in his Memoirs published by Dr. Czaanc, makes the following remark. " 'Tis observed that of all nations the English stick the closest to their officers; and 'tis hardly seen that our common soldiers will turn their backs if they who commanded them do not first show them the bail example, or leave them unofficered by being killed themselves upon the place."
Have British soldiers ever since forfeited that character, or done any thing to remove the strong presumption that when unsuccessful the fault must be with their officers') Marshal SAXE, who still maintains the unapproached distinction of having been thrice victorious over British troops in pitched battles, acknowledges that the French soldiers were unable to meet the British in open fight ; and that it was the skill of the French officers, who reduced the engagements to affairs of position and posts, which gave them the advantage. But what is to be said of the skill of British officers, who thus suffered themselves to be entrapped ?
It IS the constant boast of military writers on the Continent, that although British troops may not be beaten, yet they can be outmanceuvered ; and many passages in history lend too much colour to this assertion.
But the exertions of British soldiers during the last war proved decisively that their activity and powers of endurance of fatigue were equal if not supe
rior to the very best Continental troops ; and any idea of inferiority in these qualities must have arisen solely from their capabilities never having been called into action ; and of this the officers must bear the blame.
It was the capacity and conduct of the American officers, taken from the counter and the desk, that achieved the independence of their country ; for in actual conflict the British soldiers maintained their superiority. The Americans were indeed playing for a higher stake than the British; but they had the satisfaction of finding their professional exertions duly rewarded, and their patriotism was spared the shock of seeing a dull intellect and heavy purse preferred to a clear head and a heavy hand.
BONAPARTE, who must be admitted to have been a good judge of character, was seldom in company with an English naval officer without praising his pro
fessional knowledge and skill; but the remarks made by him upon our military officers do not tend to the conclusion that his opinion of them was equally high. Having thus shown that it is extremely questionable if the professional skill of our officers ha always enabled them to do justice to their troops, the next question may be discussed ; as the risk incurred by innovation may more suitably be adverted to afterwards.
In regard to the difficulty of discriminating between officers, it may simply be remarked, that those who are under officers invariably find no difficulty in
perceiving great and palpable diversity of character ; and how this should be so completely 'hidden from their superiors, I am at a loss to imagine. I have bad the experience of serving her Majesty as a full private in a Yeomanry corps, and have also been drilled as a Special Constable; and, however, military men may sneer at such experience being brought forward, it has convinced me that there is the greatest possible difference between the character of officers-a difference which is perhaps more easily felt than described, yet not the less evident : the age, the bearing, the manner of speaking the few sentences of explanation or advice, given in the most monotonous drill, all tend most powerfully to inspire the men with confidence, or the reverse ; and I can safely say the efficiency of a corps is tripled under an able officer. I do not underrate the difficulty of making a proper discrimination ; but when so much is to be gained it ought to be attempted; and if those in
power would but, as CROMWELL advised, "make a conscience of what they do," the difficulty would be most materially diminished. The distinction of seniority, which can always be resorted to in narrow cases, is certainly much less invidious than wealth or rank.
in answer to the third argument, I can only say, that if the aristocracy resort to the profession of arms from no better motives than that of obtaining by their wealth and influence more rapid promotion than their merit entitles them to, the sooner the Army gets rid of them the better. The idea of poor but able officers becoming dangerous to the liberty of the country, is so perfectly preposterous that it scarcely deserves refutation ; but it admits of this simple answer-that the middle classes, and what may be termed the upper ranks of the lower, have always proved themselves the firmest friends of liberty, order, and good government ; and it is from these classes, in this view, that officers would be chiefly selected. In politics I am a decided Conservative; but this I will say, that had it not been for the firmness of the classes above alluded to, all the influence of the aristocracy could not have prevented this country from becoming the theatre of a great and bloody revolution. Every class in the community has specific duties to perform, some imposed by the primary laws of society, and others by particular forms of government. If the original constitution of Great Britain has made the aristocracy here ditary legislators, it has also placed them in the "fore front of the battle "; and if they from unworthy motives shrink from the one duty, can they long expect to be permitted to exercise the other? They might, perhaps, in this as in other cases, bud that the People could do better without the Peers than the Peers without the People. But I do not believe that any such effects would follow : the duties of war would still have different attractions; and certainly in other matters the aristo cracy have shown no desire to shrink from fair tests of talent. Is not the bar a most aristocratic profession ? yet can any be more independent of monied or family influence ?
It ought to be remembered, that the advocates for a different system of promotion are contending for no new or untried scheme. Was promotion by purchase known in CROMWELL'S time ? and when were British arms more formidable, or her name more respected ?
Is promotion by purchase at present practised in the Navy, in the Artillery, in the Engineers, or in our Indian Army ? And are not these bodies at least quite equal to the Regiments of the Line in point of professional excellence ? Indeed, the whole annals of European warfare may in vain be searched for instances of skill and warfare similar to those displayed by subaltern officers in the plains of Ilindostan. lam quite aware that many circumstances, independent of the mode of promotion, assisted in forming the characters of the conquerors of India; but surely there can be nothing practically erroneous or dangerous in a system under which such great results were effected.
The exigency of the moment might indeed have put the sword into the hand of such a man as Cnivz ; but would such a stern and powerful mind have submitted to a service where poverty barred his advancement ? If we could for a moment suppose such a system to have existed and such a roan to have been purchased over, would not the most pampered minion of wealth and political influence have trembled beneath the bitter scowl of indignation and hatred with which the swarthy heroes of Arcot and Plassy would have regarded the man who superseded their beloved chief, and shrunk from the withering glance of scorn and contempt with which he would have been received by the then formidable and warlike Mahratta chiefs, alternately our allies and foes ?
Some supporters of the present system, indeed, candidly admit that it must in a great measure be laid aside during war, but that it would be dangerous to abandon it in peace: but such an argument refutes itself.
It is certainly admitted that the annals of other nations, where a different system of promotion is adopted, contain instances of the most disgraceful incapacity on the part of the officers ; but it by no means follows that, because they did not purchase their promotion, they were promoted according to their
merit. Although purchase be a bad system, yet it is not the only defective one ; and there is none which can hope always to make a perfect selection. The feelings of a commander who, after the most careful examination, finds himself disappointed in his choice, are not much to be envied. Yet they ought to be nothing in comparison to those of him who bestows his patronage without the slightest examination into personal qualifications.
I am quite aware that the British Army contains an immense number of able and talented officers ; and so it would were the selection made by ballot in place of purchase ; for no one will assert that the one is in the least more discriminating than the other.
A Militia regiment contains many fine men ; yet the veriest martinet will admit that he could make a better regiment by selecting the men, after personal inspection, than by taking their names from the ballot-box; and the same principle holds true in regard to promotion.
I remain, Sir, your most obedient servant, CITIZEN.