• NIETZSCIIE'S MORALITY.
(To TIIE EDITOR OH THE "SescrAvon.1 SIR,—It is a pity that so many inaccuracies about important matters should appear even in high-class periodicals. A case in point is the criticism of Nietzsche which appeared in the Spectator of September 1st, which though perhaps less culpable than some of its contemporaries, cannot be said to have done its duty properly in this matter. The writer of the article, notwithstanding his presumptuous judgments, is altogether mistaken in supposing that Nietzsche thought Rome was "made up of the non-moral neber-menschen." It is precisely because Rome was so moral in the true sense of the term, because it believed in master-morality, in "good and bad," and possessed the virtues of the ascending life, that Nietzsche admires it in contradistinction to Christianity with its slave-morality, its "good and evil," and its spurious virtues which involve deterioration and Nihilism. The writer of the article is evidently unaware of the sense in which Nietzsche uses the expression "good and evil." He uses it, as indicated above, to designate respectively the so-called virtues and vices of slave-morality, in contradistinction to "good and bad," by which he designates respectively the genuine virtues and vices of aristocratic morality. Nietzsche is "beyond good and evil," beyond Christian morality ; but he takes a firm stand on "good and bad," on pagan morality at its best, as in the early days of ancient• Rome. He says expressly in his • "Genealogy of Morals," at the end of the first part of the book, entitled" Good and Evil, Good and Bad," with reference .to "the dangerous watchword" inscribed on his previous work, "Beyond Good and Evil" :—" At any rate it does not mean . beyond good and bad." Thefacts of the case are actually the very • reverse of what the writer of the article supposes. Nietzsche is one of the few exceptional men who refuse to go beyond "good and bad," while the great mass of mankind engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits, in fact every one who conforms without protest to the so-called principles of political economy, really advances into questionably moral territory beyond good and bad. Carlyle, Ruskin, and many others have shown conclusively enough that Adam Smith's gospel does not harmonise with moral law, and the American economist, the late General Walker, was honest enough to ' state at the commencement of his works on political economy ' that the science has nothing whatever to do with morals,— that is, in fact, it disregards true morality. Nietzsche and a • few others take their stand on true morality, "beyond good and evil," in opposition to the world, which, led astray by ' Adam Smith's gospel, has been advancing ever since into a more and more questionable moral domain. The statues of the Christian virtues, placed higher than the statues repre- senting the pagan virtues on the Albert Memorial in Kensington Gardens, are supposed to symbolise the attitude of modern men with reference to morals; they esteem the Christian virtues more than the pagan virtues. Nietzsche, however, would cast down the statues representing the Christian virtues, but would elevate the figures of the pagan virtues to the highest position. Consequently morality would still remain, though of a different kind. The Albert Memorial &es not, however, represent correctly the true state of things at present. The Christian virtues serve only to con- ceal more hideous idols than any worshipped in pagan times. It is Adam Smith's gospel, with its craft and deceit, and its lust for gold, which holds sway at present; the hideous idols thereof are hidden behind the beautiful Christian virtues.
112 George Street, Edinburgh.
[We publish our correspondent's letter as he appears to think we have misrepresented Nietzsche, but we cannot admit that he proves his case. On the contrary, his letter supplies proof of the contentions in our article.—En. Spectator.]