TOPICS OF THE DAY.
M. DE NELIDOFF'S NOTE.
THE Note banded in to the Porte by the Russian Ambassador on December 23rd, 1896, is a striking symptom of one of the diseases which now cripple the political body of Europe. It was rumoured in the begin- ning of that month that the Sultan, who is in despair for ready money both for the enormous expenses of the Palace and to pay the establishments in the capital, in- tended to raise a loan, and proposed in order to make it acceptable, either to give its subscribers precedence, or to grant them a mortgage on some of the revenues already pledged to the creditors of the State. Instantly the Ambassadors, who are so slow and so hesitating when massacres are to be prevented, became hurried men of businesslike decision. There were consultations by tele- graph; London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were at once united ; and on the 23rd M. de Nelidoff handed to the Porte for transmission to the Sultan a Note which, as far as finance is concerned, is a definite ultimatum. His Majesty is informed that if he infringes the rights of the Council of the Public Debt, or meddles with the revenues conceded to the holders of Turkish securities, Russia, together with the other Powers, will demand an Inter- national Commission of financial inquiry ; that the original rights of the creditors, now suspended by agreement, will revive ; and that the Sublime Porte will understand how "fatal that eventuality might become." In plain English, the Sultan was informed that if he meddled with money on which great financiers in foreign capitals are relying. Turkey would be put in commission as Egypt has been. The Sultan, of course, made his inquiries, found that the Powers were unanimous, and at once yielded to their dictation. The project was abandoned, and comfort was restored to the parlours of the great financial houses which either hold the Turkish Debt or have advanced great sums of money on the security of Turkish Bonds.
Just think for one moment what that incident means. All the humanitarians of Europe, backed by the British Government, and in a certain degree by that of France, have been urging that the Sultan should be punished for his massacres of Christians, or at all events that he should be prevented by definite threats of intervention from ever pursuing the same " policy " again. Their urgency has been so extreme that they have been willing to incur the risks which would be produced by the Sultan's resistance, to entrust the execution of the mandate to a Power sus- pected of grand ambitions, and even to allow a change in the possession of Constantinople which has been resisted by force, or the menace of force, for the greater part of the century. The answer, the effective and paralysing answer, has been that the risks are too great; that the independence of Turkey is essential to the peace of the world ; and that while all the Powers condemn the conduct of the Sultan, pressure upon him must be limited to verbal remonstrance. So determined was this veto that it remained firm even when the massacres had extended to the capital, when all Christians were threatened by the excited mob, and when marines and sailors were landed to protect the Embassies and Consulates. No policy could be more firm or more peremptory; it shook the resolves of two British Premiers in succession ; yet the moment the great financial houses were endangered, or rather threatened, it was given up. The threats of resistance were treated as nugatory, the fears of war were dismissed, the jealousies of the Powers disappeared, and the Sultan was informed in words—about the diplomatic meaning of which there could be no mistake, and which the Sultan himself inter- preted as a threat "to make of the Khalif another Khedive,"—that he could not and should not commit this monstrous outrage. To slaughter out the Armenian nation was one thing ; to touch Bonds, those sacred depositaries of financiers' wealth, was quite another and more considerable thing. The wrath of Europe, which in the first case would, it was alleged, light up a flame big enough to consume the world, would in the second case do no harm,—would, in truth, act as a drenching influence upon the gunpowder lying all about. Even, however, if it did not, the risk must be run. The pale cheeks of Foreign Ministers were filled with a rush of blood. Whatever happened money must not be lost, and 80 with a rough wrench the semi-sacred Sultan, who is never to be menaced with coercion, was brought suddenly to his bearings. The independence of Turkey is the palladium of Europe, provided Turkey continues to pay a composi- tion on her debts. If not, then, indeed, independence may be exchanged for control of a kind which, as we have all learned in Cairo, would speedily extend to the minutest details of administration, to the cleansing, for instance, of the sewers of Constantinople, and the regulation of the boats which ply for hire. The Sultan is a grand person in the eyes of Europe 80 long as he pays his way, but the moment he ceases to do that he can be placed in fetters as strong as those against which the Khedive so vainly pro- tests and kicks.
This is not the first time that the financiers have dis- played their influence in international politics. The whole situation in Egypt is based on their resolution to have their interest. The condominium and the British occupa- tion were alike, in the first instance, devices to secure the Bonds, and Mr. Gladstone stated in Parliament that if he would have consented to pay off the Egyptian Debt at par he might have annexed Egypt without European opposi- tion. The Raid into the Transvaal, which has separated Great Britain and Germany, and thrown much of the politics of Europe, especially in the Mediterranean, into an inextricable tangle, was ordered and arranged by financiers ; and there is reason to believe that the fate of Cuba has become a European question because great financial houses are so loaded with Spanish stock, that if Spain went to war with a Power like the -United States the first result might be a " crash " all over the Continent as severe as our own Black Friday in 1866, and probably not so remediable. As every such crash throws the indus- trial world out of gear, and leaves thousands of strong men who have been drilled, quite destitute, the Governments naturally regard such contingencies with acute dread, a dread enhanced by their own dependence upon the goodwill of the great houses. They are always wanting temporary advances, fresh loans, and " protection " for new undertakings ; they always want to obtain these things cheaply enough to excite no remarks in Parliament, and if the great houses which pull together are out of temper the Treasuries are thwarted and harassed in a hundred ways. Money must be had on many occasions, particularly for colonial purposes, before the credits are voted, and can be obtained only from the great bankers ; while if these gentlemen oppose one of the "conversion operations" now so frequent, that operation is certain to fail or to bang fire in a most embarrassing way. Every State, too, expects war, and though most States have a war-fund of one kind or another on which they can lay their hands, they most of them want the bankers' help too, and sedulously cultivate their goodwill. The re- presentations, therefore, of the "High Finance," as the whole body is usually described in newspapers, are always received with respect in European Treasuries, Foreign Offices must attend to Treasury representations, and the result we see in the conduct of Ambassadors of all countries everywhere. The moment money is in question they receive instructions which are clear, definite, and businesslike, and consequently they talk, write, and act with a decision and energy which in the remainder of their proceedings is often wanting. They are obliged, in fact, to be united, to be as clear as to what must be done as if they were arithmeticians, and to avoid any concession of indefinite time, and consequently their business is no sooner started than it is complete. Years hardly suffice to liberate an innocent Armenian—where, for example, is the dismissed Armenian Patriarch P—but days are suf- ficient, when Bonds are to be saved, to bring the Sultan and all around him to their senses. These latter want lives and money sorely ; but to take the former brings only remonstrances implying nothing, while to take the latter means an ultimatum which implies ships and shells.
We do not say, mind, that the influence of the great. financiers is necessarily exerted for ill ends. It is, on the whole, for the advantage of the world that all States should, regard the results of financial dishonesty with an acute dread, if only because that dread limits the readiness of Governments to pledge the future prosperity of their peoples. Nor can we deny that the great financiers have a responsibility towards the small investors who take loans off their hands, and consequently a right to protect them as far as they can by the exercise of their influence. Our object is rather to point out how irresistible that influence is as compared with the influence of humanitarians, or even, very often, of the most important statesmen. Mr. Gladstone, for instance, as humanitarian and Lord Salis- bury as statesman would have been much delighted if they could have extracted on behalf of the Armenians such a Note as M. de Nelidoff handed in on behalf of the financiers. They would, in fact, have thought themselves most successful, and have exulted publicly in their suc- cess. And we also desire to point out that some at least of the arguments to which we have all yielded in the case of the Armenians must have been just a little false. If the Powers to protect a money payment can coerce the Sultan so easily, surely they could also have coerced him to protect a nation from extirpation. Suppose the Sultan had been told that massacre would be as " fatal " as theft?
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