THE FUNCTIONS OF A SECOND CHAMBER.
TI1E functions proper to a Second Chamber form so im- portant a constitutional question, especially in this country, where the House of Lords has admittedly been left by the Parliament Act in a provisional state, that any readable account of the Second Chambers of other democratic countries must be of interest. Mr. Lees Smith, who is lecturer on Public Administration at the London School of Economies, has, in Second Chambers in Theory and Practice, set forth, with the skill of an experienced instructor, some interesting facts about the composition, powers, and working of the Second Chambers of the Dominions, of the United States, of Norway, and of Prance. But he is also a Labour Member of Parliament, and it.is impossible not to feel that when he turns to consider what should be the power of a Second Chamber, the con- clusions he arrives at reflect a political rather than an aca- demic outlook. Truth to tell, his book on that point is mere propaganda, for he makes it quite plain that he is an advocate of what is, under a very thin disguise, Single Chamber Govern- Second Chambers in Theory and Pradiee. By H. B. Lees Smith, M.A., M.P. London: George Allen aid T.i.9 014
meat. Thus he specially commends the Norwegian system, under which the representative Chamber, immediately after a General Election, elects a fourth of its own members to form the Second Chamber, recalling them, in case of a dispute, to sit with it as one Chamber.
It is interesting to note Mr. Lees Smith's conclusions. The chief is that "as there is no means of securing a Second Chamber of a non-party character, it is best that it should be selected by each new House of Commons, as it is preferable that it should reflect the strength of parties rather than act as an instrument of those who have lost public confidence." Having thus assumed that a Second Chamber must blindly reflect the views either of the majority or of the minority of the First, he proceeds to "accept the consequences. The main consequence is that Second Chambers are not suitable instruments for referring legislation from the Lower House back to the people, the chief function usually assigned to them ; for the performance of this duty on party lines adds to, instead of correcting, the misrepresentation of the people's will." Then he declares that "no Second Chamber, there- fore, should be entrusted with the right to defeat legislation," and finally decides that the right to suggest amendments and delay legislation for one year is the only power a Second Chamber should have, suggesting, it is true, a reduction in the length of Parliament as an additional constitutional safeguard.
All this is a lamentably shallow contribution to the dis- cussion of a vital question. Mr. Lees Smith fails completely to distinguish between the right to defeat legislation and to refer it to the electorate for final approval, while he makes no attempt to explain or support his statement that reference to the people by a party majority in the Second Chamber is "misrepresentation of the people's will." The true objection, for what it is worth, to a Second Chamber having the power to refer legislation to the country is that, if the party in power has also a majority in the Second Chamber, legislation of the first importance may not be referred to the people. Reference, if made, however, can in no conceivable circumstances result in misrepresentation of the people's will. It would indeed be unfortunate if we were forced to accept Mr. Lees Smith's con- clusions as sound, for it is clear that the nearer Democracy comes to unbridled Single Chamber government, the greater the risk that it may end in Dictatorship. But, in fact, Mr, Lees Smith's method of approaching the _question of the functions of a Second Chamber is not calculated to inspire confidence. It is certainly not very scientific, for it assumes that certain defects are inherent in Second Chambers, that these are a complete bar to the exercise of any important functions, and that, in consequence, the only role for a Second Chamber is to be a pale reflection of the First. The more fruitful method would seem to be to inquire what functions a Second Chamber should exercise, on the assumption (and none other would be made by anyone in England) that it is desired to insure the efficacy and safety of democratic institutions, and when that question has been answered, then to approach tbe, consideration of how to constitute a Second Chamber so that it can best exercise these functions. A number of in- stances show that the electors of a country do not necessarily approve of the legislative proposals of the party which they have returned to power, as the interesting Appendix on the Referendum in Australia given by Mr. Lees Smith makes clear. For in the selection of a party to govern the country the electorate is guided by a variety of considerations—the record of the previous Government, the personality of the party leaders, the attractiveness of their programmes and policy, sometimes the mere desire for change. But promise and performance may not coincide, and proposals, alluring' when stated in vague terms, may present a different aspect when turned into actual Bills. It is on this account that it is essential (to quote the words of the Bryce Conference) that there should be a constitutional means of interposing "so much delay (and no mere) in the passing of a Bill into law as may be needed to enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately expressed upon it."
For legislation affecting the fundamentals of the Constitu- tion, introducing new principles or raising issues whereon the opinion of the country may appear to be almost equally divided, the only adequate expression of the country's opinion is its vote. Anything short of that involves the risk that such legislation may be passed against the wish of the people., Reference to the people is then the only absolute safeguard of.i democratfe iastitutions. And clearly this, if it be the function of either House, must fall to the Upper to perform ; for, ex hypothesi, iha legislation has the approval of the Lower. This, moreove:, is so incomparably the most important function which the Urp2r Chamber can perform that it must dominate the question of how a Second Chamber should be composed. Above all else, the Second Chamber must be one fitted to refer, when mceisary, proposed legislation to the electorate. For this, aloofr es; from the party strife in the Lower House, a habit of mind im-iartial and disinterested, are the essentials. To secure them s'iould not be impossible in Britain, and a House charged with the duty of reference, indeed, would hive a natural te rdency to develop these qualities. But whatever the diffcu`ties, the attempt to construct a Second Chamber fit for this task must be made ; for where the safety of democratic Government is at stake, no easy assumption that the task is impossible can be permitted. Mr. Lees Smith, however—a "too-quick despairer "—brings no assistance, though his book, despite certain surprising omissions—as, for instance, of any reference to the Swiss Constitution—is interesting not only from the facts collected in it, but because it gives an illuminating exhibition of the constitutional views of at least one Labour -Member of the present House of
Previous page
