TOPICS OF THE DAY.
VENEZUELA.
WE cannot profess to be entirely content with this Venezuelan business. The expedition may be a necessity—we think it is one—but it is a disagreeable necessity, and not without an element of danger. It seems clear from the speeches of Count von Billow and Lord Cranborne—who, by the way, was much too reticent—that we have a good case. The Government of Venezuela, either because they are pressed as usual by want of money, or because they mistake the meaning of the Cleveland precedent, or because they hate foreigners, have taken advantage of the anarchical—or shall we say revolutionary ? —condition of their internal affairs to oppress Englishmen and Germans. They have levied unfair Contributions on . them, have refused to pay debts admitted to be owing to them, and have generally shown a disposition to treat their claims to justice as at best negligible. When remonstrances are made they answer by promising justice when Venezuela is at peace, that is, at the Greek Kalends, or by indulging in rhetorical rubbish like the following :—" Honourably," says President Castro, "I cannot do more. I put honour first, and will not seek to disarm foolhardy enmities by accepting humiliations which would offend the dignity of Venezuelans and which would not be in accord with my public life. The cause of our national dignity is based upon our rights, our possession of justice, and on our relations of friendship and mutual respect with foreign nations." It is im- possible for self-respecting States to put up with such treat- ment, not only because that would involve the betrayal of their subjects in Venezuela, but because revolutionary factions in other South American States might take heart from Venezuelan immunity, and an important section of the world be thrown into a condition of commercial anarchy. The collective stake of Europe in Spanish America is, it must be remembered, very large, while there exists in all those States a great jealousy and secret dread of Europeans. A bit of world-policing has, in fact, to be done, and we do not know that the method to be adopted is either unjustifiable or unwise. The idea is apparently to seize any Venezuelan fleet discoverable—which has been done—and to levy the duties payable at the ports on behalf of the Allies until at last the sums claimed from the Venezuelans have been actually obtained. It is supposed that President Castro, rather than give up so large a portion of his available revenue, will submit to terms, will arrange some kind of a loan sufficient to pay off "Europe," and will in future leave European subjects alone. It may be so, and then all will be well, with the exception that other Spanish-American States will be expecting similar visitations. But matters may go somewhat differently. President Castro may leave the Allies to pay themselves, which will take nine months at least, trusting that at some time or other they will quarrel, either between themselves or with other Great Powers, more especially the American Republic. His grand object is that this latter contingency should occur, and towards this object he will strain every nerve, forbidding, for example, the collection of duties except at the capital, and so compelling us to land, or inducing Americans in busi- ness to contest every item in the duties charged against them. His action, perhaps, would not signify but that it might be looked upon with secret approval by the German commanders. It must not be forgotten that the entente cordiale between Great Britain and America is regarded in Berlin with very suspicious, if not angry, eyes, and that anything which weakened it would be welcomed by Count von Billow, if not by his master, asa politicalgodsend. Still better would it be for their policy, which is very properly exclusively German, if a quarrel should arise in which Germany and Great Britain, whether reluctantly or willingly, would be compelled to hold together, for then there would be a chance of defying the Monroe doctrine without immediate ruin. We do not in the very least expect or suspect foul play on the part ofISt rmany ; \but s great States are governed by their interests, and it is so clearly the interest of Germany that the t o English- speaking peoples should be at variance that we view any attempt at common action between Great Britain and Germany against a South American State with a certain amount of apprehension. It is so difficult when allied fleets are in motion to assure oneself that their common purposes will always be identical, and that we shall never be reduced to the dilemma of having to choose between committing a colossal folly and appearing to abandon a comrade and ally. We see no way of avoiding the con- joint expedition ; but its management may require much greater diplomatic skill than the public as yet appears to apprehend, and we are not confident that our diplomatic skill is equal to that at the disposal of William II.
Some of our contemporaries appear inclined to exult in the weakness of Venezuela for effective defence ; but it is worth while to remark, for the world will have bor and 'by to remark it in much more dangerous circumstances, that the external weakness of the Spanish-American States is becoming one of the most serious of political dangers. They possess, but cannot fully use, the only territories left in the world which could seriously excite European ambitions. Their areas are enormous—Venezuela, for in- stance, is more than twice the size of France—their potential resources are boundless, and their populations are com- paratively so scanty as to be practically non-existent. Brazil or Argentina or Uruguay would be almost as valuable to Germany or Italy or Austria as India is to us, not only for the vast trade which they supply, but because they could absorb, feed, and render prosperous that increment of population which is so rapidly becoming a terror to the statesmen and economists of Europe. The possession of any one of the regions named would, for example, at once extinguish the Socialist party of Germany, which, though organised in pursuit of an idea, is really based upon the suffering caused by the insufficiency of the natural wealth of the Empire. At the same time, the Spanish-American fleets are feeble, their armies, as the Mexican example showed, scarcely ready to encounter the trained armies of Europe, and their social cohesion weakened by internal but radical differences of race. Spain impressed her dark subjects with " Fspailolismo " in a very wonderful way, but she never really won their affection. And lastly, they have but one ally, and with that ally they have, owing to inherent and unalterable differences of temperament, the greatest difficulty in keeping on cordial terms. Such a position offers a strong temptation to cupidities which are yearly grow- ing stronger, not so much from the ambitions of the Continental Courts as from the gradually increasing social pressures which in many respects absolutely dictate their policy. We, therefore, instead of exulting in the weakness of the South American States, deeply regret it ; and should hear with pleasure either that immigration had altered their defensive position, as may possibly prove the case in Argentina, or that they had formed a strict and effective defensive alliance among themselves, or that the great Republic which now protects them from invasion had assumed over them that direct protectorate which, to all human appearance, must ulti- mately be established, and which would. involve direct diplomatic responsibility. One such State, it should not be forgotten, already exists, for the arrangement with Cuba deprives Cuba of independence in managing her foreign affairs. It is most unfortunate that in all the other Spanish or Portuguese speaking States the deeply rooted Iberian pride prevents their governing castes from recognising what nevertheless are facts. The circumstances were different a century ago, but with the introduction of steam the isolation of the Spanish-American world, which was its chief protection, finally disappeared.
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