W ITH a portion of the new Army scheme unfolded by
Mr. Arnold-Forster in the House of Commons on Thursday we are in agreement. With the other portion we strongly disagree, and sincerely trust that the Govern- ment may be induced to withdraw it. If not, and if it is carried into execution, a blow of the most serious kind will have been dealt to our military resources. We will take first that part of the scheme which, in our opinion, is sound and practical, and may, if carried out with reason and discretion, produce a real reform of the Army. Mr. Arnold-Forster spoke nothing but the truth when he said that our present Army is not properly organised for the requirements of the Empire,—is not, in fact, the Army that we need. As our readers know, we have frequently dealt with "the Army that we need," and have outlined it in the following terms. We want, first, an Army to police the Empire,—i.e., to supply the garrisons in India and the Colonies. This Army should be a long-service Army with a competent Reserve. Next we want a short. service Regular and professional Army, something on the lines of the Guards, which shall always remain in this country except in time of war. The short-service professional Army should provide our home garrisons and the Regular force which is required to keep order in case of civil tumult. In addition, we want a striking force kept ready for an emergency,— a force able to be used abroad without calling up the Reserves, and so creating employment difficulties for thou- sands of men. Besides these Regular forces we want, as we have always insisted, a body of civilian soldiers like the Militia and Yeomanry, but with a Reserve, which can be relied on to give help to the Regulars in case of serious wars like the Boer War, and when embodied, to fill the places of the short-service troops sent beyond sea in time of war. Lastly, we want a body such as the Volunteers, which shall form (1) a national school of arms ; (2) a reservoir from which partially trained men can be drawn as they were drawn during the Boer War ; and (3) a force to be relied on to supplement the other forces of the Crown in the very unlikely, but still conceivable, case of invasion. Finally, we want a General Reserve, formed from all the trained men in the kingdom who have passed out of the other Reserves, or who have had at some time in their lives a military training,—i.e., men who have passed out of the Army Reserve, the Yeomanry Reserve, and the Militia Reserve, or who have served in the Volunteers. Such an Army would be the Army that we need.
Mr. Arnold-Forster's scheme, so far as the Regular Army is concerned, is more or less on these lines. He divides the Army into two parts, and gives us along, or comparatively long, service Army for India and the Colonies, and a short- service Army, with a large Reserve, as a Home Regular Army. His long-service troops are to serve for eight years and six months with the colours; and his short-service troops for two years with the colours and six years in the Reserve. The home short-service Army is to consist of battalions 500 strong. Of these 100 are to be long-service men, and the rest men with two years' service with the colours and six in the Reserve. A striking force of 16,000 is to be kept at Aldershot always ready for active service, and this force is to be composed of long-service men. Depots for training men, similar to the Royal Marine depOts, are to be established throughout the country for the long-service Army. The cavalry and the artillery are to remain much as now, except that there are to be a certain number of short-service home batteries. Another alteration in con- nection with the Regular forces should be mentioned in this context. The Line is gradually to be reduced by four- teen battalions, and the five garrison regiments abolished altogether. In addition, the establishment of the Foot Guards is to be reduced by 94 men per battalion, and the infantry at home by 50 men per battalion. To these reforms we not only see no objection, but believe they might do much good if carried out, as we have said, with reason and discretion, and not with either recklessness or pedantry. We thoroughly approve of long service for the Oversea Army and short service for the Home 'Army, agree that the abolition of the linked- battalion system has become necessary, hold the formation of the depOts a great improvement, and think it most wise that a striking force should be kept ready mobilised at Aldershot and independent of the Reserve. In a word, we are glad to say that we are able to find ourselves in general agreement—we reserve judgment in many matters of detail. —with Mr. Arnold-Forster 's scheme for reorganising the Regular Army.
It is in its treatment of the Auxiliaries that Mr. Arnold- Forster's scheme, in our opinion, fails,—and failure here is a matter of vital importance, and fraught with possi- bilities of the utmost danger. Though in. appearance his proposals for the Militia and Volunteers are not so drastic as the forecasts of his scheme led us to sup- pose, we fear that if put into operation they will virtually destroy the Militia, and will eventually lead to the ruin of the Volunteers. Mr. Arnold-Forster, with a " slimness " which is, we are sure, not natural to him, tells us that he is going to take counsel during the autumn as to what should be done with the Militia. His very un- favourable description of that force, however, leaves little doubt as to what be intends shall be the result of his taking counsel, if he can persuade the nation to let him have a free band with the old constitutional force. The condition of the Militia, he told the House, was profoundly unsatisfactory. It was 35,000 below strength. That is to be regretted according as we want or do not want 126,000 Militiamen ; but whether or not below the figure somewhat arbitrarily fixed as the establishment, the fact remains that we have 91,000 Militiamen "on the strength." Of this force a considerable part consists of garrison artillery ; but the Militia garrison artillery Mr. Arnold-Forster condemns, because 70 per cent, of it is entirely supernumerary to any scheme of mobilisation. It is, he asserts, absolutely redundant. That is a pity ; but whose fault is it ? Certainly not the fault of the Militia garrison artillery. As to redundancy, was not, we should like to ask, the redundancy now complained of found very useful during the war ? The present writer remembers seeing Militia garrison artillery at Gibraltar, and a Militia regiment at Cairo, in 1900, which did not seem wholly without use. In a word, from the general tone of his speech, it must, we fear, be regarded as certain that Mr. Arnold-Forster means, if he is allowed, to kill the Militia during the autumn. Some regiments he will knock on the head as too small ; others he will turn into territorial regiments ; while the bulk of the garrison artillery he will " nick " with the happy word "redundant," and send them to his military scrap-heap. We sincerely trust that this policy of destroying the Militia in the autumn will be strongly resisted, and that before Parliament separates a pledge will be required of the Government that they will not destroy the Militia, but instead will keep it at least at its present strength, and will do their best to im- prove it by forming a true Militia Reserve, by raisin its pay and improving the conditions of service, and by treat- ing the force generally with the consideration which from its good service it deserves, but which it has never yet received. We want to treat the subject with no undue heat, but, in our opinion, if Parliament allows the Militia to be destroyed at the bidding of the present War Secretary, it will have betrayed its trust.
Though Mr. Arnold-Forster's proposals in regard to the Volunteers are not on the face of them so dangerous as the Militia proposals, they carry concealed in them the seeds of destruction. It is all very well to say that they only et rid of some 60,000 or 70,000 inefficients, and make the force which remains doubly valuable, but in practice it will be found that while reducing numbers they have also reduced efficiency. It is quite right of Mr. Arnold-Forster to give the Volunteers regimental transport, but in reducing the numbers of battalions he is making a great error. What is wanted is, if possible, to increase, not to decrease, the cadres. In times of stress it is far easier to fill exist- ing regiments than to raise new. But, says Mr. Arnold- Forster, we must cut off what is superfluous. We do not want so many Militiamen and Volunteers, and though they are not to be condemned as unfit per se, they must go as redundant. Truly a blessed word,—redundant! Here we must join issue with Mr. Arnold-Forster. The troops be declares to be superfluous are, as the South African War taught us, not in the least superfluous if we have to fight a great oversea war. Probably Mr. Arnold-Forster would reply that we shall never be called upon again to fight a war oversee, on so large a scale. If that is the answer, as obviously it must be, for if we contemplate such a war the plea of superfluity falls to the ground, all we can say is that we give it the most emphatic denial. It is by no means impossible, or even improbable, that in our next great war we may again need to send. some 300,000 men oversea. If we do, and if we have been mad enough to yield to Mr. Arnold-Forster's reckless schemes, we shall bitterly repent our folly. In the superfluous and re- dundant Militia we now have a force which gives our Army the elasticity it needs. If we were to improve the Militia as we ought, we should greatly increase that elasticity ; but even as things are now we obtain an im- mense advantage owing to the existence of this cheap and useful force. The Volunteers, too, as well as giving us a national school of arms, greatly increase the elasticity of our system, as was proved by the 20,000 men sent to South Africa in the service companies and the C.I.V. We want to improve on this record, not by reducing the Volunteers and by piling up more onerous conditions of efficiency, but by increasing their numbers.
In a word, we refuse to adopt the notion that we shall never want to send a great army oversea again, and there- fore need not trouble about making our Army elastic by means of the Militia, or by training the civil popula- tion to arms, and so making them more quickly useful when they come forward to fight their country's battles. If the Government are wise, they will realise the imperative need for the elasticity we have spoken of. But because we urge this so strongly we by no means assert that the Militia and Volunteers ought not to be improved and developed. There are scores of ways of making them more truly efficient than they are at present. But, in the name of common-sense, let us apply these remedies to the Militia, instead of in a fit of reaction making it impossible in tie future to fight a war like the Boer War. That, in plain words, is the meaning of their destruction.
Taken is a whole, and weighing the good we find in Mr. Arnold-Forster's scheme against the bad, we regret to say that we believe that it would be far better to do nothing than to assent to it as a whole. If the Government will allow the good to be taken and the bad left, a very con- siderable improvement may be accomplished. If the scheme as a whole is to be forced through Parliament, then, in our opinion, a most strenuous opposition must be offered to it. In such opposition we trust that the Unionists will not leave the work to be done by the Liberals, and so give the impression that they care more for party than for the Army. To give the nation that impression would be nothing short of disastrous.
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