Britain and the Cockpit of Europe
By GEOFFREY PARKER Ttin great lowland which forms the composite delta of the Rhine before it empties into the North Sea has been called the 'cockpit of Europe.' It has for centuries possessed a vital significance, both strategic and economic', for the nations around it, and because no great power would see it in the hands of another it has re- mained chopped up into the micro-States of Belgium and the Netherlands. They and their neighbours have divided an area so unified by nature and caused its development to take place in inward-looking nationalist segments.
With the birth of the European Community in 1951 the pattern started to change. For long the underlying unity had been obscured by the formidable national walls with their built-in tariff and quota discriminations, but now over the lowering barriers the complete picture began to emerge. With the jigsaw, being held together by a mesh of new motor roads and waterways, one realises that the Ruhr is a mere thirty miles from the Netherlands, and that Rotterdam is a natural entrepot for half Europe. This dramatic volte-face has been in fact more destructive than constructive, ridding continental Europe of those impediments to its efficient economic functioning.
The nucleus of the emerging region is a triangle linking the Ruhr, the Nord of France and Rotterdam. Within this are situated the main centres of heavy industry and the greatest, den- sities of population in north-west Europe. The centres of fast-developing consumer industry are found within a larger area joining Le Havre, Paris, Strasbourg, Hamm and Amsterdam, and within its boundaries rapid and important inter- nal changes are occurring. These would probably have taken place EEC or not, but economic unifi- cation is drawing them in altogether bolder fashion. The most fundamental cause of these changes is the decreased role of the coalfields due to the increased mobility of power, coal- derived and otherwise. Added to this are the very real disadvantages of many coalfield locations. If man had been given any say over the where- abouts of the carboniferous deposits, it is im- probable that the French would have chosen Le Nord, nor, for that matter, the British the Pen- nine fringes. Now that it has become possible to move out of such areas, more congenial locations are being favoured. Lighter industries have not as a rule been tied to the sources of power, and have tended to grow up around large and prosperous centres of population, such as Paris and Frankfurt. The aggregate of this in north-west Europe is a movement outwards to- wards the edges of the great industrial zone, leaving many of the old and constricted indus- trial sites as depressed areas in the centre.
The new pattern appears to follow three major economic axes, which are, respectively, the Rhine, the coast, and the coalfields. The Rhine valley between the Netherlands and Switzerland is incontestably the most important commercial highway in Western Europe. Besides the river, it is followed by roads, railways and associated canal systems which combine to drive' a massive communications artery into the centre of the Continent. Up until recently it has suffered the crippling disadvantage of proximity to so many hostile frontiers, but, as they disappear, it is coming into its own. The coast, particularly those parts nearest to the main centres of industry, is becoming the EEC's window on the world. Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg are the Con- tinent's largest ports, and the rate of industrial expansion in the %area suggests a 'flight to the north' in the Community. Finally, there is the coal belt, which stretches eastwards from the north of France, through Belgium and southern -Holland to the Ruhr. Although it has declined from its pre-eminent position, its significance con- tinues to be great, especially in the lowest-cost areas such as the Ruhr.
In addition to these three axes, there exists a fourth attraction' to industry, this being popu- lation. More often than not this factor supple- ments and modifies the others, but in certain areas, notably the Paris region, it is itself a major determinant of light manufacturing.
Thus the most favoured sites for industrialists wishing to cash in on the enlarged market are those which can benefit from the greatest num- ber of advantages, notably cheap power, fast transport, service industries and large popula- tion. These are to be found particularly in the Low Countries and nearby parts of France and Germany, a great cornucopia mounting the Rhine valley and widening to reach the North Sea between the Somme and the Zuider Zee.
The most spectacular developments in the area seem likely to take place at the meeting points, or points of juxtaposition, of the axes. At these points—or rather zones—the combination of ad- vantages is most favourable. Already the signs of growth here are unmistakable. Rotterdam handles twice as much tonnage, as any other port in continental Europe, and has doubled its turnover since 1938 (London over the same than at any time since the eighteenth century. period increased its trade by one-third). The building of Europort on the Niew WaterWeg will further a91d to the capacity of the port complex. The weseern Ruhr, where the coalfield meets the Rhine, is increasing both its population and its industrial diversification, and it is linked to the great waterway through what has become the EEC's largest inland port, Duisberg-Ruhrort. Britain's trade with this new colossus is in- creasing more rapidly than that with any other part of the world. Whatever we or the EEC may think or want, this country is becoming more closely involved with the European Continent We must face squarely the fact that the pistol in the Low Countries is now an economic one, but none the less dangerous for all that. The changes within the EEC are being brought about by similar economic pressures t6 those respon- sible for our own 'Drift to the South.' Because of the smallness of Britain's area and the deep penetration of estuaries, internal routes' are of only local importance to heavy industry. Coastal and estuarine sites can therefore be expected to have an even greater significance here than on the Continent. Moreover, all our external trade is of necessity maritime, and this, together with the increased role of Europe, must put a pre- mium on south coast sites. It is between Milford Haven and the Thames, that there are most signs of that type of port-industrial development of which Rotterdam is the most notable European example. Avonmouth, Southampton and the Thames estuary have growing industries based on petroleum, chemicals and other raw materials, and other areas may follow.
The most significant internal communications link in this country is that which joins the Mersey and the Thames, and this route is followed by the most used rail and road systems. This means that the most favoured meeting point of the country's internal and external communi- cations is the south-east.
Professor M. J. Wise has grouped the Midlands and parts of southern England, together with the adjacent parts of north-west Europe, in what he has called the 'Golden Triangle,' with apexes at Birmingham, Paris and Hamm. Within this are some of the most favoured localities for indus- tries which aim to serve the new European market. But whether these are realistic boun- daries or not, the British part is a severed out- lier which suffers the usual disadvantages of a location peripheral to the main centres of ac- tivity. This need not mean decline in the accepted sense, but it inevitably means a radical adjustment of our industrial structure. It will mean making maximum use of individual national advantages for industry, such as the excellent importing sites provided by exception- ally deep estuaries, the often underrated in- digenous mineral resources, and labour possessing special skills. A mere duplication of continental consumer industries will be more calculated to reveal our weaknesses rather than our strengths. For vis-d-vis Europe, Calais must remain for the foreseeable future a better site than Dover, and Rotterdam a better port than Liverpool.
As Britain's imperial power finally disappears beneath the waves, so we are reverting econo- mically to what we have never ceased to be geographically, a peripheral part of Europe. A full realisation of our circumstances in relation to the new Europe and of the inevitability of what is taking place across the Channel can help this country to avoid the manic-depressive phase which so often afflicts nations who cannot find their 'role in the world.' We are near enough to north-west Europe's cornucopia to play a very real part in its development. We labour under the disadvantage of having been in the middle of things for so long now that the national mythology has tended to assume a divine sanction. In Europe, to which we must now belong, we are not in the middle, nor indeed likely to be. Perhaps the edge of the middle is the most we can now reasonably expect.
Previous page
