The Impossible Mr. Rhee
Most of the hard words used about President Syngman Rhee's order for the release of the anti-Communist prisoners held in South Korea were perfectly justified. But the chief danger still remains in that which he threatens to do rather than in that which he has done. The whole prisoners issue had been elevated by the long and largely artificial debate on the subject at Panmunjom to a status which it never quite deserved. Consequently the first shock of President Rhee's action was a little greater than it should have been. The fact that they have not broken off the truce talks completely may indidate that the Communists themselves see this point. But there can be no such reservation about Mr. Rhee's threat to ignore the armistice. If he kept his word in this matter the result would be disaster, But there is a small para- doxical comfort in the fact that his word can no longer be trusted at any time or on any subject. The trouble with Mr. Rhee is that he occupies a position of power and intends to exploit it in pursuit of a policy which is the exact opposite of that of the United Nations. Three years ago the North Korean armies crossed the 38th parallel with the avowed object of unifying Korea. Mr. Rhee still wants to cross the 38th parallel, from the opposite direction, to unify Korea. In 1950 the North Korean action was called aggression. The same term still applies to the action which Mr. Rhee con- templates. The only question is whether the United Nations should restrain him now or later. It is a practical question depending on the strength of the means available and a calculation of the risk that Mr. Rhee might be able to make the South Korean army do the foolish and destructive things he says he can make them do. The risk is great. But is it any greater than the risk of leaving at large this vicious old man who is willing to sacrifice his countrymen and his allies for an end that cannot possibly be achieved '?
Previous page
