THE WAR SURVEYED : REASSURING SIGNS
By STRATEG ICUS
WHETHER Bardia will be our Christmas present or not there are several grounds for reassurance in the conduct of the cam- paign in the Near East. The Italians used to describe the Mediterranean as mare nostrum ; " and when we say Mediterranean," stated Mussolini, on the twentieth anniver- sary of the Fascist regime, " of course we include that gulf which is called the Adriatic and in which Italian interests are pre-eminent." But the ships of Sir Andrew Cunningham's squadrons have penetrated the Adriatic without the Italian Fleet attempting to hamper them, and they remained long enough to pour tons of shell into the harbour of Valona. This daring blow will be of considerable advantage to the Greeks, although we cannot prevent reinforcements across the perilous stretch of 4o miles of the Straits of Otranto. It is, of course, obvious that the Italian Fleet has adopted an inglorious strategy; but it should not be forgotten that by avoiding action it is detaining from the Atlantic ships which would be of immense value to us and an immense obstacle to Hitler's designs.
This forcing of the Straits of Otranto, however, is not the only daring and brilliant action by naval ships in these waters. The penetration of the inner harbour of Bardia throws into sharp contrast the difference between our two strategies. It also makes clear the fact that Graziani had not installed shore batteries on these coasts. It cannot be an oversight, since he must have been as well aware as anyone of the risks to his left flank from exposure to attack from the sea. It appears to suggest that his advance into Egypt was meant to be final and decisive; and his delay becomes the more remarkable. It may be that it is capable of an explanation that should add to our reassurance. It will be remembered that, on June 9th, Signor Ansaldo said that the Allies would not be able to withstand the attack which the Germans were then delivering in France. " Then," he continued, " will come the second phase in the German plan, an attack upon England—it is during this second phase that you will see Italy at her peak. It is then that she will be fighting her strongest and best, so that Germany and Italy together will liberate Europe. . . ."
This is not the only evidence that the attack upon Egypt was intended to coincide with the assault upon Britain ; and it will be remembered that when Germany was delivering her August attack Italy was clearing Somaliland. It was, however, the air-offensive at the end of the first week in September that Marshal Goering said he had gone to the front to direct ; and it is pretty clear now that it was meant to have a decisive character. The attack began on the 7th and on the 12th Graziani crossed the Egyptian frontier. The next day he was at Sollum. A few days later he was at Buq Buq ; and, then, on the 18th he occupied Sidi Barrani. By that time the German air-campaign against London had resulted in such heavy loss that it was clear it could have no decisive effect. The enemy puts a good face upon his defeats before the world; but he knows the facts himself, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the Egyptian advance was halted because Italy recognised that Germany had shot her bolt. Clearly Graziani did not intend to retreat, or he would have installed shore batteries at Bardia and Sollum to protect his flank; after the check to Germany over London he did not intend to advance. We cannot expect his published apologia to err on the side of frankness.
There is another point about the advance of the Imperial troops in Egypt which is the most reassuring of all. The Near East force could not think of offensive operations until it was heavily reinforced. It was numerically wholly inferior to the Italian army in Libya, and it was still more inferior in material. On paper, at least, Italy had a strong Air Force. In peace her airmen have been among the best in the world. The aero- planes in possession of General Wavell, nobly as they have fought, were old. They proved capable, oddly enough, of making such profit from their lack of speed that it was they which established the ascendency of the Royal Air Force in the Near East. But it was impossible to think of offensive opera- tions unless the Army possessed squadrons of the latest aero- planes and at least some of the latest tanks. It needed resolute daring to send out to Egypt, when our safety at home was being so critically challenged, the very machines upon which our only hope of success must be based. That the risk was taken is one of the most heartening facts the war has disclosed. Graziani, who had every reason to believe that the way was clear for him, refused to take the risk of advancing; we, who had every reason to fear the risk of abandoning any element of our force, took it.
The attack could not have been mounted without the material which was making its long-drawn-out journey round the Cape while the tremendous battles of August and Septem- ber were taking place over England. That is one of the aspects of fighting in so distant a theatre that is so frequently ignored. It is not only that we lose the service of the reinforcements we send: for some weeks they are lost to the world. We lose them and no one gains them. When one is fighting against an enemy operating on interior lines that is a fact of critical importance. Fortunately in this case the British Navy was keeping an effective check upon Italy reinforcing her armies ; and, as a consequence, General Wavell was able to secure the men and material he required without to enemy being able to prevent it or send a corresponding reinforcement to his own troops. Some part of the strength of the army has come from the East. The battle was in fact a truly Imperial affair, with Highlanders, Australians, New Zealanders and Indians all involved.
A. further point is to be noted, as it is of outstanding import- ance. What is the precise number of the prisoners taken and the amount of material captured cannot at present be stated. But the captures have been very heavy ; and it is in this connexion one may pertinently enquire into the cost. It has been ridiculously slight up to the attack upon Bardia. In the first week of the operations which yielded some 30,000 prisoners and carried the armies up to the outskirts of Bardia the total casualties of all ranks was less than a thousand. This disparity in the gain and the price is a characteristic of the suc- cessful armoured attack. It may not always be so great as it was on this occasion ; but even at Cambrai and on August 8th, 1918, it was most marked ; and the moral is plain. The army which is being built at this moment must be of this type which has restored surprise to military operations, which has restored thought to its rightful place in them and above all the type which breaks the deadlock cleanly and cheaply.
The Prime Minister made a final point that deserves atten- tion. He said that the army had proved itself ; and that is undeniable. There is, of course, a sense in which mere size makes an immeasurable difference to the conduct of operations ; and there is generally latent in this country some fear that British Generals cannot be trusted with big armies. It is odd that that distrust has weathered the campaign which ended the Great War. Haig's campaign has received in service circles the recognition which is not so generally granted outside them. But it is the fact that he had the bulk of the German divisions in front of him and, with little if any numerical superiority, he defeated them continuously and drove them from one strong position to another until the final defeat was admitted. The operations in Egypt were not of those dimensions. But they were versatile, daring, well planned, and well executed. It is wholly unnecessary to imagine that General Wavell alone pos- sesses the qualities that can devise and direct such operations. There are other officers, particularly the Commander-in-Chief, who are quite capable of operations of the same character and of ampler scale.
The one danger is that we should exaggerate the dimensions of the operations and imagine that this was itself an immense action, to be reckoned as of the same order as the battles in France. In it our soldiers established enough without our attributing to it qualities it does not possess. There were many battles in Belgium and France which involved greater numbers, a heavier mass and a more formidable momentum. If this battle has shown disproportionate results, it is because of its curiously complex and unreal setting. Mussolini had so filled the air with boasting about what he was about to do to the British Empire that a small blow must damage him gravely ; and, of course, as it has developed, this has not been a small blow. The Greek campaigns and the clearing of Egypt show one thing that cannot be concealed: his military men are capable of making errors of a grossness that almost passes belief. We have profited by this weakness and have staged a counter-demonstration that is of value ; no one can take risks with us.
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