TRANSPORT IN THE GREAT WAR
IN this volume of the Official History of the Great War a departure has been made from the glamour and bloodshed of battles, and the story is told for the first time of the organisa- tion behind the lines, which conveyed the troops to the battle zone, transferred them to and from the various sectors, supplied and maintained them with food, ammunition, rein- forcements, and finally brought those that survived back to their homes.
The Field Service Regulations of the British Army, in force at the outbreak of war, appear to have been based on the experience gained in the South African campaign of 1899-19oz. The organisation for the control of railways in that campaign was, however, based on the French organisation, which in its turn, after the terrible experiences on the French railways in 187o-71, was founded on the German organisation. It is to be regretted that when the re-organisation of the British Army took place after the South African War, at a time when Lord Haldane was imbued with the thoroughness of the German organisation, opportunity was not taken of compiling and issuing comprehensive instructions for the control and working of railways in war. Ample material already existed on the subject both in the French and German Regulations, and many of the ablest general staff officers in both these armies were employed in peace time in the study of transportation problems in con- junction with the technical railway officials. Nothing corre- sponding to this situation existed in the British Army. Any work in connexion with railways was looked upon as of a technical nature, and it was not appreciated that it might be staff work.
The general ignorance on the subject shown both by the staff and departmental officers of the Expeditionary Force appears to have been considerable, and an unfortunate commentary on this is shown, when the French Director of Railways (the D.C.F.) found it necessary to issue his letter of September 19th, 1914, to the address of our Inspector General of Communications (the I.G.C.) quoted in Chapter I. This letter, the situation to which it referred, the arrival of Brig.-Gen. Sir Percy Girouard in October, 1914, and his subsequent report, brought to a head the clash in the functions of the I.C.G. and the Q.M.G. as laid down in our Field Service Regulations, and culminated in the control of all railways, so far as the British Army was concerned, being vested in the hands of a Director of Railways at G.H.Q. under the direct orders of the C.-in-C. through the Q.M.G.
This arrangement lasted till the arrival of Sir Eric Geddes, at the end of 1916, and his appointment as Director General of Transportation, reporting direct to the C.-in-C., i.e., not through the Q.M.G.—but the original and undoubtedly correct situation was reverted to in 1918, when the D.G.T. once more came under the orders of the Q.M.G.
With the appointment of a Director of Railways at G.H.Q., steps were then taken to frame an organisation parallel as far as possible to the French organisation. This organisation is based on three main principles—unity of command, constant collaboration between the military and technical elements of the Commissions which controlled the stations and systems, and the appointment of the Commissions as the sole inter- mediaries between the Army and the technical railway authorities. The organisation illustrates in a remarkable degree the principle of unified command adopted in the later phases of the War in the case of the fighting troops of the Allied Armies. From the outset it was impossible to allow the British C.-in-C. any control over any portion of the French railway system, even in the area in which he was operating. The sole authority had of necessity to be vested in the hands of French G.H.Q., as at any moment the French C.-in-C. might find it necessary to utilise the lines of communication passing through the British zone, and consequently he must be in a position to know at all times the position thereon. Not only was unification and allotment of facilities required at French G.H.Q., but a subsidiary unification of all transport requirements had first of all to be made at British G.H.Q. before demands were put forward on the French. This latter unification was effected at a daily transportation conference held by the Q.M.G. It may be noted that these principles have apparently been recognised to a large extent in the regulations now in force.
It probably is true, as General Edmonds points out in his Introduction, that " the system devised by the D.G.T. was suitable for peace or stationary warfare in which the enemy neither advanced or retired," and much of the book is devoted to a description of the works deemed necessary for staging great attacks. The light railway system was formed practically for the sole purpose of conveying ammunition as near as possible to the breeches of the guns, thus eliminating the use of lorries and roads. These gigantic preparations were invariably staged with the idea that very strong frontal attacks might result in a breach in the iron lines in front. But, as no general break through ever took place, • the net result was that when any ground was gained, as in the case of the German withdrawal in the Somme area in 1917, the works hitherto constructed became more or less useless, or had to be extended or transferred nearer the front. On the other hand when ground was lost, as in the case of the German attacks in March and April, 1918, all the light railways, normal gauge railheads and sidings, and enormous quantities of material and stores disappeared.
An important part of the organisation was the Railway Transport Establishment, the R.T.E., a branch under the Director of Railways (later the D.R.T.). The R.T.E. was the recognised liaison, throughout the War, between our army and the French military railway authorities and its officers parallel to the French general staff officers employed on the Commissions de Ligne and de Reseau and as Corn- missnres Replatei.us. Tae R.T.E. were the sole inter- mediaries between the British Army in all its branches and these commissions.
An account of the origin and development of the Railway Operating Division is given in chapter X. Before the end of the War the strength of the R.O.D. rose to some 18,000 officers and men. It did the most valuable work throughout the War, particularly during the concluding periods when it came to the assistance of the Nord Railway.
One of the most interesting chapters (Chapter VII) gives an account of the method of arranging and controlling the various kinds of troop moves. It is shown how at the com- mencement of the War trains of varying composition were provided for the individual units of the Expeditionary Force, and how by the end of the War, a train of one type only was used for the carriage of all units, resulting in enormous sim- plification of the railway problem, and practically no incon- venience to the troops.
The difficulties experienced in transportation after the Armistice are recounted in Chapter XXIII. The establishment of through-communication over the devastated area, and the passing of the supply and maintenance trains to occupied territory appears to have been one of the most difficult transportation problems of the War and its satisfactory solu- tion was due practically entirely to the untiring efforts of the railway construction troops and to the efficiency and devotion of the R.O.D. But the real trouble arose in providing leave and demobilisation trains, and, without a personal knowledge, it is almost impossible to believe the account given at the end of Chapter XXIII. The question, it may be remembered, formed the subject of several inter- pellations in Parliament at the time, but no practical solution was ever found possible.
It is difficult in a review of this nature to refer to all the interest- ing and important points arising in the book. The outstanding feature is the unified and centralised control necessary in all military transportation questions, and it is to be hoped that all parts of this book relating to the subject will be carefully studied not only by all students of military transportation employed in the British Army but also by the technical officers of the British railways. It would appear eminently desirable that courses of instruction in transportation in wartime be instituted both at the Staff College, Woolwich and Sandhurst and at the new School of Transportation recently established by the L.M.S. Railway at Derby.
V. MURRAY.
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