SAFEGUARDING SUEZ
COLONEL NASSER's seizure of the Suez Canal provides a fitting climax to the disasters which have recently overtaken British policy in the Middle East. It is not the nationalisation itself that is serious—the concession Would in any case have lapsed in 1968—but, judging by the Colonel's speeches and the Egyptian press and radio, it seems that the present Egyptian Government has decided to ride the storm of hatred and xenophobia which were always potentially present in the fanatical and under-nourished Egyptian masses. To divert the attention of a people from its own economic hardships by abuse of some foreign country or minority is a traditional tactic of dictatorships, but the danger of it is that forces can more easily be conjured up than controlled by the demagogues that evoke them.
It is now impossible to believe the reassuring tones of Colonel Nasser's statement on freedom of navigation through the canal, and those who, like the Prime Minister, believed that a deal could be done with him have been decisively proved wrong. Great Britain is now in the position of having the main artery of her oil supplies dominated by an irresponsible govern- ment which has shown itself indifferent to international agree- ments and which is at the mercy of a rabidly nationalist public opinion. This is not a situation which any power could tolerate. The Suez Canal is an international waterway. Its status is quite different from that of the Abadan oil refinery, and moreover, any attempt to use it as an integral part of the Egyptian economy would result either in essential maintenance work being neglected or else in the dues paid by shipping being raised to an extravagant level.
In the face of this threat to Western interests what action can be taken? Various economic measures have already been carried out, but their effect is problematical. The Prime Minister now seems to have resolved on a conference to discuss international control of the canal. From these discussions, so it is hoped, a scheme will be evolved which Colonel Nasser and his Government will then be asked to accept. If they do not, then presumably other action will be taken. What Sir Anthony Eden seems, in fact, to have in mind is the old nineteenth- century plan of a consensus of the powers presenting a united front in the face of an extortionate demand and ready to back their rights by military force.
The last element is, indeed, essential. In the present mood of Egyptian opinion there seems no very good reason why Colonel Nasser should give satisfaction to a mere diplomatic demarche. Even if he wanted to, it is unlikely that he could withdraw from his extreme position by making any concessions to the idea of international control. Whether military action does, in fact, take place depends in part on the American attitude. Mr. Dulles's sudden flight to London would seem to indicate alarm in Washington over tough action by Britain and France. But the American Government should be made to understand that, even in an election year, the vital interests of Britain and France should be given at least as much consideration as, say, those of the Formosa Government.
Whatever the result of the present consultations in London, one thing is certain. Events in the Middle East have made a reorientation of long-term British policy a matter of urgency. Those who claimed that Egypt and other Arab States were in the grip of a paranoid nationalism which made reliance on them impossible have been proved right time and time again. The most monstrous stupidity and bad faith have been and are being displayed by those who would prefer any solution in the Levant rather than the natural association between the West and the West's one sure ally. To say, as The Times said on Monday, that, before taking action, Britain and her partners would have to 'gauge . . . whether Israel . . . would take advantage of even the briefest of trouble' is an example of wild misjudgement of the situation. It is to talk as though we were the arbiters of the Middle Eastern scene, whereas we are, in fact, in desperate need of sure allies. Would Colonel Nasser have done what he has done if there were British bases in Israel and two British divisions in the Negev? Would he have done what he has done, if a firm stand had been taken earlier over his blockade of Israeli shipping through the canal? There is a good deal of poetic justice in what has happened, but that does not make the fact that our Arab fanciers have botched it once more any the less bitter.
The case for giving Israel the arms and the support she wants is now, if possible, more conclusive than ever. Colonel Nasser has broken pledge after pledge, but his determination to attack Israel is certainly unaltered. He is, after all, in the position of a man riding a tiger and, rather than be eaten himself, will turn it loose on his neighbour. Britain may fear for the Trucial sheikdoms and her oil interests, but it seems fairly clear that Israel is next on the list of pan-Arab expansionists. Britain should therefore supply her with the arms she needs to defend herself and conclude an alliance, if necessary providing for the maintenance of a British base on Israeli territory. The fear that this might endanger our position in Iraq is frequently exag- gerated, and we have seen what happened in Jordan, our oldest ally in the Middle East, in spite of every feasible concession being made to Arab feelings on the subject of Israel. In any case, our need for a point d'apptii and a reliable ally is over- riding. A close understanding with Israel would be the best long-term retort to Colonel Nasser's blackmail, as well as the surest way of preserving peace in the Levant.
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