THE RADICAL REVIVAL IN FRANCE. T HE explosion of temper in
the French Chamber on Saturday may easily prove to be of grave European importance. The true source of the great recent improve- went in the position of France, of which her statesmen are so keenly aware, of her new confidence in her fighting-power, and of her new relation with Russia, is the new stability of her Government. After years of rapid changes which seemed to destroy all prospect of a durable Administra- tion, the De Freycinet-Constans Cabinet has felt confident of a majority, and has, therefore, dared to suppress Boulangism, to moderate all Socialist proposals by leaving them practically to the Senate, and to modify foreign policy in the direction of an informal league against the Triple Alliance. The foundation of this confidence is a compact between the Left Centre and the Extreme Left— that is, between the Opportunists and the Jacobins—to work together for a time, sometimes defined as " until the elections," and at other times as " until the great war has been commenced and completed." So long as that compact endures, the Government in Paris is practically absolute ; can repress rioting by military force; can go on with its policy fearlessly ; and can even make secret agreements, which may refer to China, or to arrange- ments much more vital for the future of France. The compact has, on the whole, been very fairly kept, and the Government was sailing along with a fair wind, when on Saturday last the " unity of Republicans" was rudely and unexpectedly broken. The Government, it is alleged, had promised to release all Socialist leaders accused of rioting who had not been guilty of sanctioning the use of dynamite ; but for some reason, possibly evidence in their own hands, possibly because of pressure from the Russian police, but at all events for some serious secret reason to which they adhere, they still retain M. Lafargue, condemned for his share in the riot of Fourmies on May 1st. M. Lafargue is standing for Lille, and will, it is believed, be elected ; and as he has thus become important, M. Ernest Roche pro- posed that he should be released, avowedly as a concession to the dogma of freedom of election. The Minister of Justice refused, and thereupon M. Clemenceau, in an un- concealed access of fury and agitation, rushed to the tribune, taxed the Cabinet with breaking its compact, declared it was always conciliating its enemies instead of its friends, and finally forced a division. The Government won by 228 to 148, a majority of 80; but that, according to French Parliamentary ideas, is equivalent to defeat, for the Reactionaries, 170 in number, abstained, and had they voted with M. Clemenceau, as they repeatedly did before General Boulanger's flight, they would have overturned the Cabinet by a majority of 90. The feeling in Paris is, therefore, that the Government is shaking, that M. Clemenceau has declared war, that in the absence of the compact the Cabinet may be defeated at any moment, and that the only possible remedy is to ask the Senate for a dissolution, with all its unknown results.
It is not likely that the quarrel will be immediately pushed to any extreme lengths. The most natural explanation of the incident is, that M. Clemenceau, who has been quiet for an unusual time, was afraid of being taunted with Conservatism, that he eagerly seized on the opportunity offered him by an apparent breach of contract, and that he knew the Reactionaries would not vote for pardon to a riotous Socialist leader. He is not ambitious of being " used up " as Gambetta was, and is not yet master of anything approaching to a majority upon which he can rely. He will hardly persist in his antagonism, all the more because the weapon of a dissolution is undoubtedly in M. Carnot's hands, and might be used on this occasion with fatal effect against the Extremists. Not only is the " strong-fisted" M. Constans still in possession of the portfolio of the Interior—a most dan- gerous circumstance, for he is popular even with the Reds whom he crushes—but the whole party would be accused of lack of patriotism in overthrowing the Government. They were, it would be said, sacrificing the Russian alliance to a momentary and resultless gratification of spite. The Czar would certainly recede if he saw the Government once more shaking ; and with the Extremists in opposition and the Reactionaries untrustworthy, it must either shake, or consent to purchase support by concessions to the clericals which would alienate one-half at least of its Opportunist supporters, who on education and kindred subjects are as angrily Red. as almost any Extremist. Such a charge would be a most dangerous one with the electors, for it would irritate all townsmen who are everywhere shouting for the Russian alliance, and most of the Northern rural workmen, who, as they have repeatedly shown, are "Internationali" upon every sub- ject except the restoration of the lost provinces. A disso- lution with such a cry might almost wipe the Extremists for one Parliament out of existence ; and they will not run the risk, or allow M. CMmenceau, who remains per- tinaciously anti-Russian, to run it either. He will there- fore, we conceive, cool down, and allow the Government to go on, suffering M. Lafargue to be released, if released at all, by his election, which will of course open his prison- doors,—an etiquette never broken even under the Second Empire.
Nevertheless, the incident may, as we have said, assume a grave importance. The present Czar is no mere politician intent on reaping advantages for Russia at any sacrifice either of conviction or principle. He is an autocrat of the old type, honestly believing that his power comes from God, and holding that every Revolutionary Government, especially if hostile to religion, is in principle a mere embodiment of evil. It is with the utmost difficulty that he brings hirmielf to work with the French Government at all ; and if it showed signs of instability, or of allowing a man like M. CMmenceau to rise to the top, he would undoubtedly recede, declare that such an ally was value- less to Holy Russia, which has a mission beyond defeating German pretensions, and that he and Russia must await tranquilly the appointed hour. No power within Russia itself could alter such a decision, for a majority of his sub- jects would agree with him ; and once made and announced, all existing combinations would fall to pieces, and not only would the Triple Alliance be safe against attack, but Russia would be free to pursue her own policy, and make any bargain she could for her own separate advantage. The politics of Europe would, in fact, be profoundly modified, and all that France has gained within the last six months would once more be lost. There are quite sufficient people near the Czar who desire that result to tell him what has happened, and to point out that no Government so unstable could fight a successful war, or insist on keeping promises to its ally if they happened to be unpopular. He may not take heed, but he also may ; and if he does, M. Cl6menceau will in a single afternoon have done more to thwart the policy of France than all the German diplomatists.
Most Englishmen would say that such an incident as that of Saturday, which at all events shows how unsafe any alliance with Extremists must always be, would almost compel the Government to come to some arrangement with the Reactionaries, who have only to support the Cabinet steadily to place it beyond attack. The Englishmen are right, but they are thinking of opinion as it is in England, and not as it is in France. In the latter country, such an alliance, even if temporary and for a great patriotic object, is shown by experience to be nearly if not quite impossible. The cleavage between the parties is too deep. The moment a clerical question came up, the Oppor- tunists and the Reactionaries would fly asunder again; and in the meanwhile, both would be suspected by their constituents of something very like treachery, and would, when the immediate object had been successfully accom- plished, be dismissed from their seats. We see, or at all events the Gladstonians see, this difficulty every day in Ireland ; and in France the electors, with suspicions as deep as those of Irishmen, have also an instinctive logic which tends to make of every separate party an irreconcilable one. Why is it a party, it is asked, if it does not seek its special aims, and allies itself with its own enemies i It is that feeling which M. Cl6menceau displays when he sud- denly shatters compacts just to show that he is as separate as ever, and which M. de Freycinet recognises when, to the contempt of the Times' correspondent., he regards an up= rising like that of Saturday with unconcealed alarm. He is not dreading a Red Revolution, but the proved impossi- bility of making Reds work permanently with anybody else.
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