LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

THE GOVERNMENT CASE AT ITS WORST.

rTO THE EDITOR Or THE "SpEorkrort."]

Sia,—The accusation against the Government is that it has negatived all Gordon's proposals, and then abandoned him to his fate. Let us examine this accusation in the light of the published Parliamentary papers.

1. Gordon's first vetoed proposal was made on his way to Khartoum,— an important fact, as indicating the rapid changes of his moods. That proposal was that Zebehr should be ap- pointed as his successor in the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan. And this appointment, says Gordon, " must be direct from her Majesty's Government," with a ." promise ". of that Government's " moral support" Zebehr "should," moreover, "be made K.C.M.G., and given presents." Now, who was this Zebehr ? Gordon himself had previously described him as King of the slave-hunters, who devastated the country border- ing on the White Nile, and committed atrocities on a gigantic scale. During Gordon's previous sojourn in the . Soudan Zebehr stirred up a rebellion through the agency of his son,

who, at the head of 10,000 troops, ravaged the country and murdered 200 negro troops in one of his slave-hunting raids. For this crime-Gordon had Zebehr's son tried by court-martial; and shot. Gordon had previously confiscated Zebehr's property. Zebehr is, therefOre, Gordon's deadly enemy. In 1879 it was

proposed to send Zebehr back to the Soudan. Gordon, who was at the time Governor-General of the Soildan, indignantly refused his consent. When Gordon was on his way to the Soudan this year he heard that the Egyptian Government had proposed to employ Zebehr at Suakim. Gordon objected on the following grounds :—

"My. objection to Zebehr is this,—He is a first-rate general; and a man of great capacity, and he would in no time eat up all the petty Sultans and consolidate a vast State, as bis ambition is bound- less. I would, therefore, wish him kept away, as his restoration would be not alone unjust, but might open up the Turco-Arabic question. Left independent, the Sultans will doubtless fight among themselves, and one will try to annex the other ; but with Zebehr it would be an easy task to overcome these different States, and form a large independent one." -

Colonel Stewart, who knows the Soudan well, and accompanied Gordon, with whom he now is, expressed a similar opinion.

He says :— •

" Zebehr's 'return would undoubtedly be a misfortune to the Soadanese; and also a direct encouragement to the slave-trade. As he would be by far the ablest loader in the Soudan, he would easily overturn the newly-erected political edifice, and become a formidable power."

On the eve of his leaving Cairo for Khartoum, Gordon was present at a council- consisting of Nnbar Pasha, Sir Evelyn Wood, and Colonel Stewart. It was there stated that " natives thoroughly conversant with •both men (Gordon and Zebehr) were of opinion " that the presence of both in the Soudan- " would entail the death of one or other of them." Yet in face of this, and of his own and Colonel Stewart's strong objections to Zebehr, Gordon makes the extraordinary pinposal about Zebehr which I have quoted above.

How was the proposal received in England? With universal disfavour. Mr. Forster made himself the spokesman of the Liberals against it; and Conservative Members of Parliament,

even 'before the Government had announced its decision on.the subject, began to hold indignation meetings against the nomination of Zebehr as Gordon's successor. The Pall Mall Gazette now denounces the Government for declining to agree to Gordon's proposal. Yet at the time no journal denounced so ener- getically as did the Pall Mall Gazette the bare idea of nominating Zebehr as Gordon's successor, the alternative suggested being

the " Sarawaking " of Khartoum, with Gordon as Sultan,—a

suggestion quite unauthorised by Gordon himself. Gordon's proposal about Zebehr was as if Mr. Gladstone had, within a week of denouncing Chefket Pasha, proposed, that the English

Government should appoint that miscreant as GoVernor-General of Bulgaria, with promise of moral support, presents, and an English knighthood. By accepting Ctordon's proposal, the Government would have covered itself • with infamy. The Government may, therefore, claim a triumphant acquittal for refusing to send Zebehr.to the Soudan.

2. The second accusation is that the Government vetoed Gordon's proposed visit to the Mandi. Gordon never made that proposal to the Gbvernment. He left a message for Mr. Clifford Lloyd that he intended to make that hazardous expedi- tion ; that the Mandi would probably make him prisoner a,nd hold him as "a hostage for Zebehr," and that he (Gordon) might possibly thus disappear from the scene for two months. Then, and then only, was his mysterious disappearance to be made known by Mr. Clifford Lloyd. Mr. Clifford Lloyd, very properly, revealed this project on the first opportunity. If Gordon had been made captive by the Miffidi, as he anticipated, the Government would have been held -responsible, and a clamorous demand would have been-made for a British expedi- tion of some 20,000 men to march on El Obeid to rescue Gordon. Surely the Government needs no defence for vetoing so Quixotic an adventure as that.

3. The third accusation is that the Government refused Gordon's request that two squadrons of cavalry should be sent from Suakim to Berber. The military authorities thought such an expedition " possible," but considering the season, and the nature of the country, perilous in the extreme. Meanwhile, Gordon sent repeated assurances that Khartoum was quite safe for some months. I submit, therefore, that the Government was more than justified in refusing their consent to this and similar proposals, equally liable to the same serious objections:

4. Gordon now exclaims against the infamy of abandoning him. But how is he abandoned ? From his own account, Khar- toum is quite safe till the Nile has risen. From ,m his own account, also, he can even now leave the Soudan, with any Europeans who may like to accompany him, by way of the Equator. The explanation of his somewhat wild telegram about his " abandon ment " may be found on pp. 161-2 of the Blue-book just pub- lished (Egypt, No. 12). In a despatch from Gordon dated March 9th, he suggests one of two alternatives. First, a "diversion to Berber." (of British troops), coupled with an acceptance of his proposal about Zebehr; in which ease "it is worth while to hold on to Khartoum." 'Secondly, the imm& diate evacuation of Khartoum. In the latter case; says Gordon "I' would propose to send down all the Cairo employes and white troops with Colonel Stewart to • Berber, where. he would await your orders. I would also ask her Majesty's permission to accept resignation of. my com- mission, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle Provinces, and consider these provinces as under the King of the Belgians. You would be able to retire all Cairo employes and white troops with Stewart, from Berber to Dongola, and thence to Wadi Halfa. If, there- fore, you-determined on immediate evacuation of Khartoum, this is my idea. If you object, tell me." "Yon must give prompt reply."

On March 13th, Lord Granville telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring giving Gordon permission to choose which of the two alternatives he preferred, with, of course, the exception that there was to be no British expedition to Berber accompanied by Zebehr; but expressing a hope that he would not resign his commission, and that in the event of his pre- ferring immediate evacuation he should himself conduct the operation. This telegram never reached Gordon. Hence his indignation. Hence, also, the reticence of the Government, in the vain expectation of hearing from Gordon. This was tat fortunate ; batit affords no justification for sanctioning Gor- don's present scheme of "smashing' up the Mandi."—I am, Sir, &c.,