Men of Steel
From SARAH GAINHAM
TEiE German steel strike could raise no blood pressure in an economy as strike-prone as the British, but it seems very serious to the Germans, who have the good fortune—in this, as in other matters—to have had the chance, agonising enough at the time, to modernise their trade unions. Strictly speaking, the situation was a lock-out—tile first since the Ruhr lock-out of 1928. This tactical move of the employers was dictated by political pressure to keep the wage level steady and by the knOwledge that they make the steelworkers' union unpopular nY putting thousands of other non-union Workers (one-third of the steelmen are or- ganised) out over a matter of 1+ per cent. b I° a long-term sense it may have been unwise, ecause the memory of the bitter class struggle of the Twenties is by no means dead, and the co-operation of men with masters which has been such a feature of post-war German prosperity may be damaged by the return to such forceful methods. The steelworkers, however, have been ill-advised, for their normal wages are well over the agreed tariffs; they have never had it so good, but they fear a return to tariff rates in an improbable future of underemployment, and the striking rise in food prices in the last year or so has shrunk their money. In February, 1962, agreement was reached for a 6 per cent rise and a reduction of hours which amounted to another 3+ per cent, bringing the total only per cent below the union's demand of 10 per cent. The recent demand was for a 6 per cent rise, originally 8 per cent, and a further reduction of hours .in April, 1964, the whole agreement to run for eighteen months. The employers raised their bid to 4+ per cent, but refused further time reduction.
These rises, though large, are not so forbid- ding as they would be in Great Britain, because the men do not normally oppose rationalisation and automation, and productivity can still rise. The stoppages in the automobile industry from steel shortage, expected by the employers when they agreed on a lock-out in the Mercedes-Benz district, have shown how close to the margin of steel production the German secondary indus- tries work. This was known, of course, but the public was unaware of it and it made the demand for time reduction by the steelworkers more unpopular than it would otherwise have been. The stock market remained steady and nobody believed strike or lock-out would last after Professor Erhard's talks with both sides last Monday.
His success has helped establish his position as future Chancellor. It would be still further consolidated• if he could now find a way to prevent further rises in prices of domestic goods, including food and fuel. That coal prices should have risen when the mines are overproducing in a shrinking market is absurd. The profit margin in food retailing is much too large. And it is one of the minor mysteries of the Common Market that goods in competition with recently freed imports should continue to be so dear. The complex problems of food prices need solving before the agricultural Common Market really gets going, and here the hold-up with the French may be a disguised blessing, at least to the Germans.
The pampering of German peasants is a tradition closely connected with nationalism and the defence need for food autonomy, which in a unifying Europe is out of date. It will take time to change their attitude, and the lowering of all wheat prices in the future, though rational, will be extremely unpopular and raises irrational but natural fears. The recent behaviour of the French--who would then have a strong hold on the highly industrialised German social struc- ture—has increased those fears. But peasantry will have to be controlled if food prices are not to be artificially bumped up again and again. This question and the question of retail profits are the knottiest problems Professor Erhard has to solve if the steelworkers and others are not to continue to have good grounds for yearly wage demands.
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