TOPICS OF THE DAY,
MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES.
TT-TE news of the mobilisation of the American Army on the Mexican frontier and the fitting-out and putting to sea of a large portion of the American Navy, with orders to proceed to Mexican waters, is unquestionably a very grave matter. The causes which have set these armed forces in motion seem largely to be misunderstood in this country, and also, as far as we can judge from the tele- grams, in America. In reality, the explanation is simple enough. In three words, it is " the Monroe Doctrine." We have always been supporters of the Monroe doctrine as in no sense hostile to this country, and we have also supported it as friends of America, for we quite under- stand and sympathise with the general belief in America that the Monroe doctrine is a vital part of their State policy. But, though sympathising with the Monroe doctrine, we have also always recognised, what a great many Americans do not recognise, that it involves cer- tain very serious consequences, which are in conflict with some of the most cherished of American ideas. Shortly, the Monroe doctrine means the order " Hands off " from the whole of the American Continent North and South. It warns European Powers that America will not tolerate any interference by them in the affairs of the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking American Republics, whether on the Northern continent, in Central America, or in South America. In theory, no doubt, foreign Powers are, under the Monroe doctrine, allowed to collect their debts and protect their nationals, for to do that cannot be held to be " extending their system " to the American continent. So jealous, however, has the United States always been in regard to the doctrine that, as in the case of our troubles with Venezuela, they have looked with the greatest diplomatic jealousy upon any coercion of a Spanish- American State, however legitimate in origin. They have been afraid of permissible interference at the beginning ending in something in the nature of annexation or the creation of a European Protectorate. But it is clear that under modern conditions the doctrine of " Hands off " in this extreme form cannot be enforced unless the United States is willing to see that the South American States be- have themselves properly in their international relations, and fully respect the rights of the European Powers. The world could not possibly tolerate a state of things under which the rulers of the South American and Central American Republics could snap their fingers at the Powers of Europe and tell them : " We can do exactly as we like and you cannot touch us because the Monroe doctrine forbids you." That would place the Governments in question above all law and above the reach of all correction for misdoing. The practical con- sequence of the Monroe doctrine, though it is a practical consequence that the Americans have not admitted in so many words, is that America feels pledged to see that the South American States do not pass beyond certain limits in their dealings with the European Powers. Thus the Monroe doctrine has come to act as a kind of American protectorate over the whole of the Spanish- and Portuguese- speaking Republics, with the result usual in the case of Protectorates—the protecting Power becomes in effect re- sponsible for the conduct of those it protects.
As we have said, America has never acknowledged in words the existence of this fact, though she has done so in deeds. One reason for her failure to acknowledge the existing situation openly is the dislike of American public opinion to accept external responsibilities on so large a scale. The American, like the Englishman, when he takes a great responsibility prefers to take it in the dark rather than in the light, and to minimise it rather than magnify it in words. Yet another reason for this strict diplomatic reticence is the feelings of the Southern and Central American Republics. They are very jealous of their independence, and, though from many points of view they like and find the advantages of the Monroe doctrine, they would be up in arms against it if it were represented as a protectorate. Still, as we have said, facts are facts, and the State Department at Washington knows that the Monroe doctrine will go by the board unless it is prepared to undertake itself the work of protection, which otherwise would be done by European Powers, with consequences almost sure to be inimical to the crucial part of the foreign policy of the United States. Whenever, then, there is serious trouble at any point covered by the Monroe doctrine, the Americans feel that they must be on the alert, ready to undertake the protection of foreigners and so anticipate the action of other Powers. This has happened on several occasions in the case of small States. They have not called for much notice, however, because of the comparative smallness of the interests at stake. When, however, so great a state as Mexico, with its fifteen millions of inhabitants, its large foreign commerce, and its vast commitments as regards European capital, is concerned, the consequences of the Monroe doctrine become infinitely more visible. If the revolu- tion triumphs in Mexico, or, still more, if the fighting between President Diaz an]. his opponent is prolonged and success seems to favour first one side and then the other, while the ultimate result remains in doubt, there is the greatest possible risk not only of foreigners being injured in their persons, but of their commercial interests being prejudiced. From the point of view of the State Department this means that America, may at any moment be confronted with this appeal from some foreign Power : " We have no wish to challenge the Monroe doctrine, but if you cannot or do not desire to get us redress from the Mexican Govern- ment, or if you will not undertake the protection of our nationals and their interests, we must do the job our- selves." If once such a question is put to the State Department, provided that it means to maintain the Monroe doctrine in its full purity, there can be only one answer : " We will do what is necessary, for we cannot per. mit the landing of troops by you or any form of armed interference." The next move of the foreign Power is, of course, to say : "Very well ; provided that you will do the work for us, we have no desire to undertake it ourselves. But, remember, it must be done, and done efficiently, or else our nationals will suffer."
Translated into action, all this means what we have been seeing during the last few days. The course of the revo- lution in Mexico is likely to endanger foreign interests, and at once America has to make preparation by land and sea to keep order. In the present case this is intensified by the immense material interests which America herself possesses in the Republic to the south. Not only is the frontier involved, but Mexico swarms with American citizens and has been largely developed by the use of American capital. Thus, on the material as well as on the political side, the United States is bound to watch with anxiety the Mexican Revolution, and be ready if necessary to intervene. It is essential that she should be first in the field. We sincerely trust that the steps taken by America for the preservation of order will be sufficient, and that she will be able to emerge from the Mexican imbroglio without actually having to send her troops on to Mexican soil. We are bound to say, however, that the matter is one which cannot but cause anxiety to all friends of the United States. Suppose the troops have to cross the border, or that the American fleet has to land troops on the coast. In that case the Ameri- cans may find it, as they found in Cuba, exceedingly difficult to restore the status quo. Mexico again is a most difficult country to fight in, and, as the French found, the Mexicans are very good fighters. It is true that conditions have a good deal altered since the sixties. Still, the main facts are the same. The Mexicans seem, like other Southern Americans, to enjoy fighting among themselves, but they all have an intense hatred of foreign interference. Unless, then, American action is kept within very strict bounds, we should not be at all surprised to see the quarrel between the Government and the revolutionaries eclipsed by a passionate outburst of feeling against " dictation from Washington." But if America became involved in long and serious difficulties in Mexico, the State Department would unquestionably be placed at a very considerable disadvantage shouldthe need for enforcing the Monroe doctrine in some other part of the Continent take place, or should trouble arise in the Pacific. It must not be forgotten that the Germans have never, as we have, admitted and acknowledged the Monroe doctrine. On the contrary, they have shown that they regarded it as very irksome in the West Indies and in other cases. If, then, the United States became thoroughly involved in Mexico, we should not be surprised to see a pushing of German claims, say, in the south of Brazil, or in Hayti, or San Domingo. Again, it might be exceedingly awkward if at such a moment some foolish action on the part of the San Francisco mob were to rouse ill-feeling in Japan. For these reasons every well-wisher of America, and every supporter of the Monroe doctrine like ourselves, will hope that American action, whatever it may be, will be short, sharp, and decisive, and that order may be very quickly restored in Mexico. Happily the Americans have in General Leonard Wood a soldier and statesman of great capacity as well as of high character and long experience. General Wood will not only handle his troops well, but, as his record in Cuba shows, he will deal tactfully, firmly, and justly with the Mexicans, whether they belong to the party of Government or to that of the insurgents. Again, his statesmanship and diplomatic experience will help him to minimise difficulties with foreign Powers. He understands the European situation, and is not in the least inclined, as is alleged of some of his countrymen, to ask : " Who's the German Emperor, anyway ? " or " What does the King of Italy 'mount to on this continent ? " Best of all, General Wood is not one of those soldiers who lookout for trouble and make a campaign in order to provide for himself a field of glory. He has had plenty of fighting in his time, and we may be sure that if, as we presume will be the case, he has the command of the troops, they will be used in a reason- able and pacific spirit—provided always that the true interests of his country do not suffer.
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