The Second Chancellor
From SARAH GAINHAM
BONN
THE second Federal German Chancellor, who will be elected on October 16, is a sixty-six- year-old Bavarian Protestant professor of politi- cal economy, the son of a retail draper in Fuerst im Walde in northern Bavaria who still speaks with the distinctive tone and thick con- sonants of his home. Ludwig Erhard's name is probably known in every capital city and uni- versity in the world as the most successful living practical economist. If ever one man created order out of chaos and turned a wilderness of ruined cities where immense heat had killed even '1 the merciful covering of weeds into a thriving industrial society, then it was he. One man did not create it, and nobody knows that better than Erhard, but his curiously modest and calm self-confidence is based in the knowledge that he drew the blueprint for his countrymen's re- covery and on the belief of most of those countrymen that he, Erhard, made their success.
This is a dizzy height from which to attempt a new and very different job. Nothing will do but complete success. Moreover, he follows a tactician of genius who not only retains control of the majority government party, but has already implicitly laid claim to a continuing control of at least one department of government policy —relations with France. Even if none of the intrigues against Erhard are reactivated, this con- trol, if realised, must interfere with the most important question of foreign policy for the next two years. This, to put it more bluntly than any German would do, is to prevent President de Gaulle from wrecking the European Common Market, to preserve its achievements and perhaps to further them. The time limit is set, not only by the end of this government's term in the autumn of 1965, but by the date a month or so later, after which majority decisions cannot be vetoed inside the Community. The delicacy of the task is not made easier by a foretaste of American pressures over trade barriers, or by the tactlessness with which discussions on the possible transfer of American store-bases in France to the Bundeswehr were announced. in Washington before they had reached the stage that justified the project being put up to the French. Arrangements have to be made in the teeth of French irritability which conflict tem- porarily, though not fundamentally, with widen- ing markets. In fact, only by steering the French through the barriers of their own touchy egotism in the next two years can conditions be prepared for future expansion. Not to men- tion the repair of NATO. These questions re- quire of the American administration just that quality it seems—perhaps for domestic reasons -to lack; the power to waft . 'A bwarien lee trinken,' as the Germans say, under the im- pression they are quoting the English. This question of West European unity remains the major foreign question for Germany, because East-West relations in fact are not within their Power. What can be done in that direction be- tween influencing the Americans and hesitatingly trying for better relations with Russia's satellites Is probably being done by the Foreign Minister, Gerhard Schroeder, whose relation to the new Chancellor is as close as it can possibly be.
The attitude of the new Chancellor to Great Britain will be quite different from his pre- decessor's, but this may not make much differ- ence at once, for co-operation requires at least two partners, and the readiness of Erhard to be friends shows little sign of being shared in London—yet. And the anti-British attitude of de Gaulle must influence Erhard against any definite or immediate move, for the agricultural questions inside the Common Market have precedence over any other consideration and a gesture towards the 'Anglo-Saxons' might push the Gaullists further into isolation. Another reason for waiting is the possibility of a less friendly Labour Government in Britain.
The agricultural common market in dairy products, beef and rice is to come into force before the end of this year. In November. a decision is to be taken—if it can be reached— as to the distribution among members of the funds from the common customs dues on food imports from other countries. This fund is in- tended for the financing of agricultural reforms, food storage and the subsidising of EEC food exports to outside countries. The central ques- tion is the regulating of prices of food grains between the six members. An increase in French prices (incentive to grow more) and a lowering of German prices (removal of incentive) will have serious effects on the incomes of German peasants, a depressed class already. To avoid widespread bankruptcy, the German farmers will need some interim income help while the re- forms that are absolutely necessary, but which have been postponed for years, are made. These reforms present a thorny internal problem in any case, which is known to be giving the future Chancellor a bad headache. Bonn has been cautious about the suggestion that this help should come in part from the common-dues fund, for this fund had been envisaged up to now as coming to the help of French farming, with Italy in second place. Most of the money that will form the fund will be paid in by Ger- many, which is, next to Britain, the world's largest food importer. But whether the French will agree that the money they had already con- sidered theirs should partly be used in the country that will provide it, is very doubtful. On the other hand, it would be internally irrespon- sible politics for the government to ask Ger- man consumers to pay still higher prices for food in order to subsidise foreign farming while their own agriculture goes to rack and ruin. The price of milk and bread is already a scandal in Germany and hits the large family hardest in the country with the lowest birth-rate in the world. De Gaulle has already threatened--the force of his words was neatly reduced in Germany by an apt mistranslation—that the Common Mar- ket may cease to exist unless these agricultural questions are settled by the end of this year. This is contrary to the Rome Treaties and it is unlikely that the French President could or would go so far; but he can and will force the issue as far as it will go without cracking.
Compared with this complicated technical problem, all internal affairs have to take second place. But there are some pressing problems besides and a fresh one has recently appeared in the row about telephone-tapping. Communist and Nazi agents are listened to, technically, by the former occupation forces and for the practice to be legalised a new law is needed. It has not been drafted because the old system offered a more rubbery surface, though it is arguable whether these thousands of half-amateur agents do much harm; more questionable whether theirs are the only telephones listened to; and even more questionable whether there is any proper control over the listeners and the uses they make of their knowledge. The fear among the general public of any re-emergence of uncontrolled police powers make this a dangerous subject which is connected on the one side with the Emergency Powers Act (still hanging fire) and on the other with the reforms of police and court procedures (still hanging fire).
To achieve success with these two questions and carry out a patching-up operation on the obsolete social services would be enough for any new government at the beginning of its term. Not only is this term half over, but it has been noted up to now for its interior coalition quarrels. A continuation of these quarrels and place-seekings must wreck any chance of success for Erhard. The big question is—can he control his Cabinet? Chancellor Adenauer often used such quarrels, and their publicity, to divide and rule. Many of them will no longer occur if Erhard simply avoids them, and he has often displayed a truly formidable self-control in such matters. But it is one thing to refuse to be annoyed oneself and another to control other people's tempers • Erhard is not a power-handler--a kind of politician for which a new name is needed. He is a rational intellect of great force and a character of sanguine strength, honesty and a certain simplicity. But rationalism and honesty are not particularly useful qualities in a poli- tician. Typical of him is that instead of all his titles there appears on the gate of his pri- vate house the legend `L. Erhard.' But typical. too, is that he circulated plans for the healing of the German economy from Nazism in the midst of the war; to Goerdeler, the proposed civic head of the July 20, 1944, conspiracy; to fellow economists and other suspect persons. It is probable that his unwise belief in honesty then did not result in his execution only because Gestapo agents could not understand his papers.
Erhard's great success was based funda- mentally on a wise use of self-interest in ordinary citizens. He understands economics and he understands ordinary men. But does he under- stand the superficiality and the vanity of men who love public power; can he handle them; can he induce in them his own rational decency and, above all, discretion, a virtue hardly known in Germany? These are large questions. Unless they are answered with a solid 'yes,' and quickly, then Germany will get a Social Democrat majority in the elections of 1965. That, for the power-boys who run the country, would be a real test of democracy which I, for one, do not believe Germany is yet capable of.
Previous page
