WHAT HAPPENED TO ROMMEL

By STRATEGICUS

rIIHE battle in Egypt has now left the field of tactics and become I a matter of exegesis, and even the Prime Minister has been accused of contributing to the obscurity. But whether Rommel

was defeated, reproved or rebuffed, he has certainly fallen back, leaving only a powerful rearguard east of his point of departure. Such obscurity as remains must be attributed to the remarkable

reticence of the Command. No one can find fault with them for placing a ban on ill-judged optimism ; but it is a little challenging to learn only on Monday, eight days after the battle began and

some days after a clearly marked phase was over, that Rommel had moved 25 miles behind the positions of the Eighth Army and reached a point only 15 miles front its coastal communications. Such reticence as this may defeat its own end and leave a residue of doubt when it is least desirable.

In fact, even now we have little knowledge of the scale and effect of the attack. The enemy has described it as a "reconnaissance in force." It certainly performed the function of such an action ;

but in a hundred battles the Germans have "discovered the disposi- tions of the units" they attacked and "compelled their opponent to

disclose his force." "Reconnaissance in force" may, then, be no more than a euphemism, or perhaps a gibe at the description of the raid on Dieppe, which the Germans continue to insist was an attempted invasion. Such heavy-handed humour would be quite within the capacity of the Germans, who cannot fail to remember that in June, 1941, the Eighth Army made a similar "reconnaissance."

The term matters little, except that it is impossible to estimate the success of an action unless we know its objective. On this occasion there seems to be very little doubt that Rommel was not out to

discover the dispositions of the Eighth Army, but to disorganise them completely, not out to compel Montgomery to disclose his force but to destroy it.

Such being the case, it is not to pander to a thirst for victories so much as to admit the compulsion of truth to say that he failed.

Whatever the future may hold cannot change that verdict. It is true

that his rearguards are a little in advance of the place from which he launched his attack, and they are apparently establishing them-

selves on the El Hemeimat height. It must also be recognised

that this hill holds a dominating position ; but as this peak has been named, it is permissible to infer that the higher hill, some eight miles to the south-east, remains in our hands. It is a matter of little moment, and it is the very least of the puzzling features of this episode. Rommel advanced with a very strong mobile force

consisting of the two German Panzer divisions, the 90th Light division and part of the 20th Italian Motorised Corps. This striking force moved forward 25 miles, but at no point succeeded in securing

a lodgement in our organised positions ; and at that critical moment when the leader must decide whether to stake all a outrance, General Montgomery began to harry him in earnest.

It was at this very moment, apparently, that two officers approached the units on the central front under a white flag to demand the surrender of the Eighth Army. This incident, on the information we possess, is inexplicable. The attempt of parachutists to cut off a part of the South African unit seems to have failed very thoroughly. The Italian Commando landing, as it has been described, appears to add merely light relief to a very grave challenge. The Eighth Army positions were visibly organised in great depth. The Air Force was assisting a very strong concentration of artillery and anti-tank guns to batter the enemy concentration. The British mobile units were hanging on to its flank and the armour was showing its metal. What could have justified such an amazing mis- reading of the position?

German commentators have been, making much play with the fall of Tobruk to suggest a breakdown in morale. Can it be that Rommel really thought the whole army on the point of collapse? On the following day he must have been disillusioned by the Spirited attack south-west from the central sector ; and this blow in the direction of the rear of his spearhead seems to have had effects

out of all proportion to its weight. He began to withdraw, though three heavy counter-attacks were delivered in an attempt to recover the lost ground. The withdrawal continued steadily, and admittedly in good order. With almost visible reluctance Rommel took his main force and much of his damaged material back to his starting- point. On the facts disclosed this episode seems inexplicable. There is no evidence that the losses of the two armies were gravely dis- proportionate. If they had been we should have expected to see Montgomery taking advantage of the situation to do to Rommel what the German so clearly hoped to do to him. As far as we can gather from the evidence at our disposal this can hardly be more than a phase in a battle which will be shortly renewed ; for rarely do such prizes await the harvesting so near at hand.

The explanation of what seems obscure in Rommel's handling of his force may perhaps be found in the influence of the great battle of Stalingrad. The Russian and Mediterranean fronts are strategic- ally connected, and the interdependence of their various sectors is becoming more and more apparent. Rommel's drive towards the • Near East is presumably only one part of a pincers movement ; but the northern arm of the pincers is immobilised by the extraordinary resistance of Stalingrad. It was on July 22nd that the Germans made their first attempt to take the city by a coup de main. The railway to Stalingrad at one point runs less than twenty miles below the Don. The Germans crossed the Don and tried to reach the railway in order to march against the city from an unexpected direction and along the easiest route of approach. This attempt failed ; and they then began to develop their attack from the east.

It seems pretty certain that they expected to enter the city nearly three weeks ago ; but, as I write, this amazing resistance is still holding the thrust from the west and from the south-west and there is even a counter-attack developing against the north-west. The immediate purpose of the defence appears to have been achieved already. Ice will shortly block the Volga channel in any case. The river seems to have been reached north and south by the Germans. The railway to Moscow is already cut. But the strategic purpose of the battle is still being fulfilled. The great concentration of enemy troops is being detained long after many of its units were expected to be at the disposal of the German staff for other pur- poses. Some of them have been so roughly handled that they will make no further appearance this season. Others will need re-forming before they are taken to distant sectors. The detention of the very heavy concentration of the Luftwaffe must be particu- larly disconcerting to von Bock.

Yet, of course, the Germans are following the soundest of military precepts in maintaining the concentration of their vast force on this sector until their objective is achieved. It is in this way that Marshal Timoshenko is now influencing the grand strategy of the war. There can be little doubt that, if Stalingrad had only done what was expected of it, some of the concentration at present immobilised there would have been detached to assist Rommel in his attempt to reach the Nile delta. It may be, in fact, that this terrible battle of Stalingrad conditioned Rommel's operations and impelled him to return to his starting-point when he found the Eighth Army stronger and more scientifically disposed than he had hoped while he was without the assistance he had expected.

The various parts of this great theatre of the war are beginning to interlock. The continuing attack upon Ftzhev and the central sector as far as Briansk is inflicting losses on the enemy and weakening his position, though it is not making the progress that everyone wished, and it seems to have the worst sort of luck with the weather. In the earliest days, when it was vital that the attack should be unchecked, rain dogged the advance, and recently, when the Russians appeared to be getting into the city, the weather once more broke and arrested their impetus. But it is certain that the Germans would have either checked the advance more effectively or initiated an offensive on the central front if Bock had not been unable to weaken his concentration before Stalingrad. Mr. Churchill

pointed to the date when he was commenting on the Russian

situation ; and it is clear that already any attack on the central sector would be impossible until very near the date of the attack last year. This, it will be remembered, was said to have been defeated by "General Winter." The influence of the prolonged Stalingrad battle is spreading over the whole front ; and, of course, the calls of Rommel cannot be dissociated from the conditions under which it is being fought out. Twelve divisions, including four armoured units and a considerable air concentration, are in use against the Eighth Army. If they have proved not enough to secure it victory, they are at least a diversion. In other directions also there may be expected diversions in due course that will play their part against the enemy. The most Interesting part of the Prime Minister's speech was perhaps the .reference to plans concerted between the Allies. The heroic and skilful resistance on the Russian front must form part of this combined attack on the Axis, and every day that it continues it is preparing the conditions for the Allies' successful co-operation. 'The combined Russian and Allied air offensive has its role in the attack. Though one's eyes tend to be focussed on the one sector pf Egypt, reason convinces us that the fortunes of that struggle may be decided on the Volga or even on the Seine.