GENERAL McCLELLAN'S OWN STORY.* Da. W. C. Pane, an intimate
friend and most devoted admirer of General George Brinton McClellan, was entrusted, verbally and by will, with the control of the manuscripts, letters, and papers left behind by the General; and out of them he has pub- lished this remarkable volume. It consists of a useful bio- graphic introduction by the editor, and of what he has entitled
• McChalales own Story Tho War for the Unton, the Soldiers lo,/to Fought It, She Citratalsa who Directed 1t, and his RolaHotta to It and Them 'Sy George B. McClellan. London Sampson Low and Co. McOlellan'a Own Story, an unfinished, yet, as far as it goes, con- tinuous and instructive narrative concerning the events, and especially hie share in them, which occurred between April, 1861, and May, 1862, a very critical period of the Secession War. The soldier-author's original draft of his personal reminiscences had been accidentally burnt, and he did not resume the labour of rewriting it until 1831, when he was told that his children had a right to possess his version of the stupendous occurrences in which he had been engaged. He then wrote portions from time to time, and what he set down Dr. Prime has printed, exercising, as he says, the discretion accorded to him " by omissions and not by changes." He has appended to the several chapters passages selected from McClellan's private letters, and extracts from published books, the first to show a little of the man, the second to illustrate or support assertions which are made in the text. So that, on the whole, we have a tolerably fair picture of a General who did much and suffered much for his country ; but one who, if he met with ill-fortune daring his military career, has, at all events, the great good-fortune, after his death, of having his own vindication of himself presented to the public in perhaps the most effective shape which it could have been made to assume. Dr. Prime, as editor, appears to have done his work well ; and we shall not quarrel with him in the least because he shows throughout manly affection and boundless admiration for his friend and hero.
No one who has studied his career can doubt that McClellan was a born soldier. His natural military capabilities had been developed and strengthened by assiduous study, including a trip to Europe in 1855, which gave him an insight into the armies operating in the Crimea ; so that when the war broke out, although he had left the Army and occupied a civil position in Ohio, men turned instinctively to one who had passed through West Point, had served in Mexico, and had seen war as conducted by soldiers in the Old World. He started at once as a Major- General of Volunteers; he had the good fortune to win victories in West Virginia; and when McDowell was routed at Bull Run, "the Young Napoleon," as some had began to call him, was summoned to Washington, where he was put in command of the beaten troops, a command soon extended, and one which in the end placed him at the head of the "Army of the Potomac." That he was quite right in fortifying the capital, and refusing to be pushed into action of any sort before the troops had been organised and disciplined—brought, in short, into a shape which might deserve the name of an army—none will now deny ; but he himself may have doubted whether he would have had time to do so, had the Confederates followed up the lucky success of Bull Run. In this volume we have a full account of all the steps he took, of the obstacles he had to encounter, and of the means he adopted to overcome them ; and, of course, his narrative of the famous Peninsular Campaign, followed by his recall, and his immediate restoration to command. Then come the operations he carried on to repel Lee's invasion of Maryland, which was stayed by the Battle of Sharpsburg, and the subsequent movements of the Federal Army, until its com- mander was abruptly superseded by Burnside. That is a large field, and as every inch of it bristles with controversy, we must, eschewing detail, endeavour to state the principal points which the narrative is intended to enforce.
General McClellan's contention is that all his plans were thwarted by the animosity and perversity of Mr. Stanton, Mr. Chase, and General Halleck. Mr. Lincoln, all through the volume, is acquitted of any sinister intention, and figures as a personage who was misled, bamboozled, and deceived by " the politicians," represented, in this case, by the two Secretaries, Stanton and Chase. Now, on the surface at all events, there is a good deal to show for the soundness of McClellan's assertions. He was promised the command of a large army, he was allowed to enter on a difficult enterprise in the fall belief that he could rely upon certain military means ; and it is true that when he had been plunged into the business, his advice was disregarded, and a great part of his means was withdrawn. It is also true that fallacious modes of reckoning led the public, and even the President, to believe that he had under his control a far larger number of effectives than were " present for duty." We are afraid, also, that Mr. Stanton was passionate, impulsive, not truthful, and addicted to modes of conduct which have a strong flavour of duplicity. Mr. Chase was evidently from the first preternaturally suspicious of McClellan, never being able to forget that the young General was a Democrat and an avowed opponent of the Radical abolitionists. General Halleck is defined
by McClellan as " hopelessly stupid ;" and after attentively con- sidering that officer's career, we cannot say that the definition errs by excess. Probably it was his stupidity which made his conduct on several occasions seem so base. Nevertheless, and granting much that is alleged with such fervour by Dr. Prime and his hero, we do not think that either allows sufficiently for the absolute inability of most ordinary politicians to comprehend any military problem whatever. The authorities of Washington suffered under real alarms. They did not understand, could not be made to do so for years, that Washington was better defended on the James River than it would be by keeping armies upon the roads and rivers between the capital and the enemy. It is possible, of course, that McDowell was anxious to retain a separate com- mand, and not eager to join McClellan ; but the effective cause, we are convinced, was the genuine dread experienced at Washington lest that place should be " rnshed," and the fact that three lawyers and one " stupid " soldier were incompetent to form any sound opinion upon what were the conditions which offered the best chances of success in any military operation. Any political chicanery practised by these officials enhanced, of course, the ill-effects of their military ignorance and incom- petence. But we mast regard it as inconceivable that Mr. Stanton, Mr. Chase, and General Halleck conspired to mislead President Lincoln, and deliberately risked their own lives, positions, the loss of the capital, and the destruction of the Union, simply and solely to thwart, defeat, and rain General McClellan. Such, however, ie the contention of this book, and we hold it to be one of the most extravagant constructions ever put upon the actions of men.
There is, however, plenty of evidence that the General and the Executive at Washington were at variance in regard to the conduct of the war, not only upon military plans—where he was almost certain to be right—but in regard to political measures. Nor was this all. Rightly or wrongly, McClellan fell under the suspicion of being disloyal to the Administration,—that is, of showing a disposition to support political opponents. He was supposed to be ambitious, and there was a dread of a popular General at the head of an army. These suspicions and alarms may have been groundless ; yet in a private letter written by McClellan as early as August 9th, 1861, we find these remarkable passages :—" The people," he writes, " call upon me to save the country. I must save it, and cannot respect anything that is in the way." The " anything " in this case is the opposition and enmity of General Scott ; but the word is one of large scope. "I receive letter after letter," be continues, " have conversation after conversation, calling on me to save the nation, alluding to the presidency, dictatorship, tkc." And then he solemnly declares that he has " no such aspira- tion." But this declaration, however sincere, is weakened by this astonishing sentence which follows,—" I would cheerfully take the dictatorship and agree to lay down my life when the country is saved," words indicating a frame of mind which, however lofty and pure, is one which experience has shown to be dangerous to States ; and no one can be surprised that, if his sentiments were known in Washington, they aroused considerable anxiety. At a later period, after his superb retreat to the James River, he wrote a letter to the President setting forth what policy he thought the Government should pursue, and he says in a private note that, contrasting his policy "with that of Congress and of Mr. Pope, you will readily agree with me that there can be little natural confidence between the Government and myself." We do not wish to press these admissions, but they prove pretty conclusively that the relations between the Executive and its General were not those most likely to be conducive to the successful prosecution of any policy, military or politicaL
As a soldier, McClellan had many admirable qualities. He was a first-rate organiser of an army, and, if let alone, would have produced a first-rate instrument. He did, in fact, lay the foundations, and did much to build up the Army of the Potomac, which to the last adored him. He had a sound military mind, understood war, looked after essential affairs as a General should, was a tactician as well ae a strategist, and had a firm grasp of the main problems. But, curiously enough, he at once under- rated and overrated the adversaries of the Union,—believed that, if he had his way, they could be crushed in a campaign ; and yet was constantly declaring that he had to contend against overwhelming numbers. " Lee will never venture upon a bold movement on a large scale," he wrote, on the eve of starting for the Peninsula,—a most curious
example of misjudgment, and one lees excusable because he knew Lee in Mexico. Now, what does General Long report respecting Lee's views of McClellan P He says " it is unques- tionable that Lee availed himself of McClellan's over-caution, and essayed perilous movements on which he could not have safely ventured in the presence of a more active opponent." Perhaps the truth lies midway ; and in any military estimate of the Federal General, it must always be remembered that, from whatever cause, he was at critical moments deprived of resources on which he had a right to count. The reason was, of course, partly that he did not enjoy the full confidence of the Federal Govern- ment, and partly that, altogether ignorant of war, they lived in a state of constant nervous apprehension. It was unfortunate for the Union, because there was a chance on two occasions—in the Peninsula, and just as he was relieved finally from command— when McClellan might have struck, if not a fatal, yet a shattering blow at the Southern armies in the East. We say a chance, because in war the element of uncertainty is strong, and because no one—not even McClellan—could say what men like Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet might or would have done to frustrate his plane. There is much in the book of very great interest upon which it is impossible to touch ; but we may commend it to notice as, if not an important contribution to the history of the war from a purely military standpoint, yet indispensable as a witness in the still horning political controversy upon the rights and wrongs of the accomplished General's peculiar rela- tions to the politicians and responsible authorities at Washing- ton during the trying ordeal of 1861.69.
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