12 FEBRUARY 1921, Page 19

PLEBISCITES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.* THE plebiscite or popular vote for

or against a change of allegi- ance has been sanctioned by' the Allies in certain districts affected by the Treaty of Versailles. This method of expressing " self-determination " was advocated with special vigour by President Wilson. It is appropriate, therefore, that two of his countrymen should have prepared, independently, what seem to be the first serious works in English on the subject. One of these is an elaborate monograph by Miss Wambaugh, who has described in some detail the various plebiscites held between 1789 and 1914, and has printed masses of illustrative documents. The other, by Mr. Mattern, of Johns Hopkins University, is an essay on the general history of plebiscites from early times and on the political considerations involved in them. Mr. Mattern's thoughtful essay, which may be supplemented here and there by references to Miss Wambaugh's collection of materials, is opportune and deserves attention. We may note at once that Mr. Mattern does not share the President's unqualified admira- tion of the plebiscite. He is conscious of the fact that the North declined to allow the South the privilege of " self-deter- mination" in 1861, although a Southern plebiscite would have given a large majority for Secession. Mr. Mattern cannot reconcile the President's belief in

" the settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relation- ship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery "

with the hard facts of history, and especially of American history. He remarks :-

" No state can, at the present time, from the point of view of constitutional law recognize the right of secession founded upon the principle of self-determination. By doing so it would invite its own destruction. For in every modern state there may be found, at one time or other, groups sufficiently dis- satisfied with the conduct of the majority or of a ruling minority to demand a release from their allegiance. Such demands are especially likely to occur in a state which in the past has acquired, on the time-honoured principle of conquest, groups of populations ethnically foreign to its own racial stock."

The application of this view to Southern Ireland or to Porto Rico is obvious. The policy of the North in 1861-65 has un-

questionably been justified by its result, as against " self-

determination."

Mr. Matteis outlines the history of the plebiscite, which in

• (1) The Employment of the Plebiscite in the Determination of Sovereignty. By Johannes Slattern. Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Plow. [1 dollar 50 cents.' —(2)A monograph on Plebiscitee. By Sarah Wam h. New York Oxford University Press tor the Carnegie Endowment ; H. rd. [Zs. net.] Rome expressed only the will of the plebs or commons and was not made binding on all until 287 s.c. He dismisses supposed examples of plebiscites in mediaeval France, though he admits that the Swiss, secluded in their mountains, decided important matters by popular vote much as the German tribes had done in the age of Tacitus. He rightly gives the credit of reviving the principle in modern Europe to the Independent officers and soldiers of Cromwell's army in the " Agreement of the People," while the French revolutionaries were the first to put it into practice. The special use of the plebiscite, to determine a change of sovereignty, was first exemplified in the case of Avignon and Venaissin, the small Papal States in the heart of Provence. The revolution broke out in Avignon in 1790 and prevailed after some bloodshed. The French Assembly was then asked to annex the districts, on the pretext that a plebiscite had declared for reunion with France. The Assembly showed much reluctance to decree the annexation, but at last agreed to it in September, 1791 ; the Pope protested against the " manifest violation of the law of nations," based on a sham plebiscite from which the Pope's supporters had been forcibly excluded. When the Allied sovereigns bad failed to make good their threats against France, the Convention in November, 1792, promised support to all peoples who should desire to regain their liberty. Bale, then occupied by French troops, was quick to declare itself the " Republic of Ftauracie " and to vote for union with France. Savoy and Nice followed suit. Belgium, having revolted against the Austrians, desired to be independent, but Jacobin ' clubs, subsidized from Paris and including among their members all the French troops in occupa- tion, arranged a plebiscite in favour of annexation. The Rhineland was similarly constrained to return Francophile members to a Convention, which declared that " the free Rheno-Germanic people " wanted to become Frenchmen. The French Republic had declared against conquests, and therefore had to veil its annexations under the dogma of " self-deter- mination," as expressed in a plebiscite. At the same time, the Republic declined to admit the right of the Vendee to " self- determination " ; the soil of France was of course inalienable. Thus " the institution of the plebiscite as a method of expression of the popular will in its determination of sovereignty was killed between its conception and birth."

While France was deprived in 1815 of the regions—except Avignon—which were supposed to have voted for union with her, the plebiscites held in 1859 and 1860 in Italy had lasting results. The Sardinian Kingdom annexed the other States, except Venice, on the strength of the plebiscites which, in each of them, had shown overwhelming majorities for Italian unity. Mr. Mattern points out how Napoleon III., who had raised himself to power by a plebiscite, was careful to stipulate that the cession of Savoy and Nice to France should be subject to confirmation at a poll of the people. The Venetians, too, were consulted in 1866, when Austria had transferred Venice to France rather than yield it to Italy ; and the Romans were asked to vote for or against annexation, after the Italian troops had occupied the capital in 1870. The union of Moldavia and Wallachia was effected after the Roumanians had voted for it in 1857. Bismarck agreed in principle to hold a plebiscite in Northern Schleswig in and after 1864, but he was careful never to let the Danish inhabitants have a chance of voting for reunion with Denmark. When Napoleon UL tried to acquire Luxem- burg in 1867, he made it a condition that the people should first vote on the question. On the other hand, when we ceded Heligoland to Germany in 1890, Lord Salisbury declined to take a plebiscite of the poor Heligolanders. " The plebiscite," he said, " is not among the traditions of this country. We have not taken a plebiscite, and I see no necessity for doing so." Mr. Gladstone, though he had suggested an Alsatian plebiscite in 1870, agreed with Lord Salisbury in 1890. When Norway broke away from Sweden in 1904, the Norwegians had a plebiscite, in which 368,208 persons voted for independence and only 184 against it. Mr. Mattern does not forget to mention that at the outset of the Civil War Texas and Tennessee held plebiscites, which yielded very large majorities for secession ; while Eastern Virginia gave a popular vote for secession from the Union, Western Virginia voted the other way, and seceded from Virginia. It may be added that by the treaty of peace between Chile and Peru in 1884, the people of Tacna and Arica were to be allowed in 1894 to say whether they wished to be Chilians or Peruvians ; Chile, however, continues to occupy the provinces " by the same right," as a Chilian Ambassador said, " which Germany exercised when she annexed Alsace and Lorraine." The author shows how largely the plebiscite principle has been adopted in the Peace Treaties, though, as he adds, the Allies' practice is by no means uniform. In his closing chapters Mr. Matters emphasizes the wide difference between a plebiscite on a domestic question and a plebiscite which may transfer a whole population from one state to another. He contends, not unreasonably, that a bare majority ought not to suffice, where it is a question of a change of sovereignty, and that the majority in favour of change ought to be overwhelming, other- wise the minority will create endless trouble for their new rulers. He leaves it to be inferred that in those cases where a plebiscite may be held with some prospect of producing a durable peace, the plebiscite is really unnecessary, since its result can be fore- told with certainty—as, for instance, in Alsace-Lorraine if a vote had been taken there. On the other hand, where the result of a plebiscite is uncertain, the plebiscite in itself is not likely to restore harmony between the two sections of the population concerned and the two States to which they look for help. As the result of his inquiry, then, Mr. Mattern cherishes a profound distrust of the plebiscite, as a means of determining changes of sovereignty.