TOPICS OF THE DAY.
FRIENDLYASSURANCES.
T" questions put by Mr. Byles to the First Lord of the Admiralty on Wednesday deserve the closest attention of the British people. Mr. Byles asked whether the statement of the Imperial Chancellor in the German Reichstag on Saturday last regarding Anglo-German rela- tions would influence the Navy Estimates in the direction of retrenchment.—The German Chancellor, it will be remem- bered, made the usual statement as to the friendly feeling entertained by Germany for this country, and insisted once more that German naval preparations and the development of the German Fleet had no menace for Britain.—To this question Mr. McKenna. gave the proper, nay, the inevitable, reply. We reciprocate the friendly tone of the German Chancellor's speech, but our Navy Estimates are not based on the assumption that other nations mean to be unfriendly to us, or that we mean to be unfriendly to them. They are framed " to preserve our standard of naval power, and depend upon the actual naval expenditure of other countries. And he added: " I do not understand that any public utterances of German Ministers have indicated any intention to modify the expenditure on the German naval programme as fixed by law." Upon this Mr. Byles asked another question, which must be given verbatim : " May I take that to mean that the magnitude of our naval preparations is entirely unaffected by the friendly assurances of neighbouring nations ? "—a question on which Sir Fortescue Flannery made the interrogatory comment : " Has the right hon. gentleman any reason to anticipate that there will be a reduction in the German Estimates in consequence of the statement of the Imperial Chancellor ? "—and obtained from Mr. McKenna the answer : " I think the supple- mentary question is fully answered in the reply which I have given." We here reach the true issue involved in all the confused and confusing talk about our relations with Germany, and the problem of naval competition. On one side, the side represented by Mr. Byles, are the very con- siderable number of exceedingly well-meaning people in this country who hate, and rightly hate, war, and who are horrified at the waste of the national resources involved in vast naval expenditure. They consider that the " friendly assurances " of Germany are facts which we ought to take into consideration and act upon. In effect they say :—" Either you believe or you do not believe Germany's friendly assurances. If you do not believe them, then you are accusing a great people of treachery of a most abominable kind. If you do believe them, then you should make good your belief by reducing, or at any rate not increasing, your naval expenditure. ' On the other side stand those who, like ourselves, refuse to pay any attention to "friendly assurances" when they are accompanied by a naval expenditure which is constantly increasing. They demand that Germany be judged by her deeds, not by her words. To which set of advisers ought the British people to give their confidence, and on which lines should they settle their policy ? Are we to interpret German action by " friendly assurances " or by Naval Estimates ?
When the matter is put in this way, we presume that very few people will be inclined to say that Germany must be judged by her words and not by her deeds. Probably Mr. Byles himself would, when he was confronted with this plain question, not hesitate in his choice. Unfortu- nately, however, it is very difficult to keep the public mind concentrated on this point. Those who have watched the development of public opinion here as we have watched it cannot fail to have noticed how easily English people let their minds slide off the true point, and allow them to be occupied with another question, in which the realities of the case are disguised or misrepresented. They ask themselves :—" Are the Germans really preparing to attack this country ? Is it not far more likely that they are only, like ourselves, preparing for eventualities, and getting together a big fleet which can in case of need be used to protect their huge com- mercial interests ? But if so, why should we be more frightened about their fleet than they are about ours ? The German people are a good people, but they naturally want the security which comes from sea power. Let us be reasonable, then, and not jump to the Jingo conclusion that any nation which is strong wants to make war upon us. If we do not provoke the Germans, they will never dream of attacking us." A better example of the danger of half-truths could not be given than that which is contained in these reflections. This danger can only be exposed by a calm and resolute facing of the facts, and a true understanding of the underlying motives of German policy. The first thing to be remembered, therefore, by any one who desires to understand German policy and the main- springs of German action is that the German Empire is in a very different condition and a very different stage of development from ours, especially in the matter of the mercantile marine and oversee, possessions. We have got as big an Empire as we can manage. The status quo suits us exactly. We cannot hope for, and do not wish for, anything but a natural, or, as we might put it, an automatic, development. In Germany almost exactly the opposite is the truth. The Germans are not content with the status quo. No doubt they are not violently anxious for change at any particular moment or in any particular place, but they do look forward to a very great development of the German Empire, and they specially, nay, ardently, desire that that development should take place on the water and in the matter of oversea possessions. They believe themselves to be, and indeed are, a growing Power, and they want to be able to take full advantage of every opportunity that may occur to increase their Empire. The Germans want to be ready to utilise that " tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune." But the German people, and especially the ruling people in Germany, are as-- logical as they are idealistic. The two things indeed generally go together, in spite of the widespread convention that they are antagonistic. If any one will take the trouble to put himself in the position of a German who cares about and thinks out the future of his country, he will find that Germany has reached a point beyond which expansion in the direction of what the Germans call " world-power " cannot be obtained unless Germany is able to do what the diplomats call " talk with Britain."
In the first phase of her expansion, the expansion which began with the wars with Denmark and with Austria and ended with the war with France, Germany was to a great extent able to ignore Britain. Britain not being possessed of military power, and Germany at that time not being vulnerable to sea power, she was able to take her own line without troubling much about us. Now, however, the German who looks ahead is always, in the course of his imaginative speculations, brought up by the fact of British sea power. Germany's dream of reaching the Mediterranean at Trieste, provided that the contention between Slav and Teuton ultimately breaks up the Austrian Empire, can only be made practical if Germany is able to " talk with Britain " on an equality in the matter of sea power. The same is true as regards the possibility of German development in Asia Minor, or even in South America or Africa,. Again, when a German contem- plates, we will not say war with France or Russia, but movements in the course of which France or Russia must yield to that display of military force which Germany can always make, he finds his calculations upset by the fact that English sea power may be thrown into the balance, and the scale thereby turned against Germany. In fact, the German who speculates in the region of inter- national politics—and there are very few educated Germans who do not so speculate—everywhere finds our supremacy at sea in his way. Now the German, as a political rationalist, having reached this point at once argues : " We must clearly either give up our dream of becoming the greatest of world-Powers, or we must place ourselves in a position to be able to deal with England." But the Germans, very naturally from their point of view, are determined not to give up their dream of achieving world-power, and therefore, as they would say, have no choice but to put themselves in a position to deal with us. This they can do only in one way,—by buildine.b a fleet which will be equal to ours, if not in the actual number of vessels, at any rate in power and efficiency. The Germans fully realise that as soon as their Fleet is equal in efficiency to ours their power to deal with us becomes overwhelming, for they have the finest Army in the world, and we have what from their point of view is no Army at all. Germany may be vastly superior to France at sea, but while the French Army remains undiminished, France is in no sense at the mercy of Germany. The moment our supremacy at sea has disappeared we are absolutely at Germany's mercy. In this fact lies a tremendous incentive and a tremendous temptation. It must not be supposed, because of the facts we have just stated, that it follows that Germany will fly at our throats. In a very real sense Germany does not want war. She would far rather get the advantages of a successful war without the strain. What Germany would like to do, and what indeed she is preparing to do, is not to fight us, but to use her power over us as she used her power over Russia last spring. But when Germany has got her way with some powerful State merely by rattling her sabre, or, if you will, by laying her hand quietly but firmly on the hilt, her people feel that the trouble, the anxiety, and the self-sacrifice involved in their preparations for war have been amply justified. What Germany looks forward to is not an actual invasion of these islands. That is a disagreeable possibility which she fully hopes to be able to avoid. What she does look forward to is being in a position to tell us in a friendly spirit that we can escape a war by making terms with her, and giving her certain rights to which she is entitled owing to her power and her increasing commerce and population. If we are prepared first to allow Germany to place herself in this position, and then when she has done so to acquiesce in the inevitable and yield as gracefully as we can, it would no doubt be most foolish of us to go ou increasing our Fleet. But why stop here ? Granted we take this view, it would be exceedingly childish for us to adopt. half- measures, and to maintain a Fleet large enough to be a huge burden upon us, but not large enough to enable us to take an independent line of action. If we do not mean to be in the position to say " No " to Germany when the time comes, let us at least have the advantage of our abnegation. To squander our money on an inadequate Fleet is to crown ineptitude in the market-place. But he who knows anything of the British people knows that for them such abnegation is impossible. If the demand comes, the temper of our people is such that, whether we are strong or weak, they will refuse to yield to the logic of events. Therefore, if we would avoid war, we have no choice save to maintain our supremacy at sea, and with it our independence. If we are wise, we shall in addition train our population to arms so that the temptation to rival us at sea will be reduced. If Germany feels that even if she won a temporary command of the sea we should not be absolutely at her mercy, her desire for sea power will be very greatly decreased.
We must end as we began,—with the question of " friendly assurances." Of course Germany will give us friendly assurances, and, in the sense that we have just explained, will mean them. Germany will be quite friendly till the time for talking with us arrives, and even then, if we answer her in the way that she considers right and reason- able, she will still be most friendly. Study the history of German diplomacy during the last fifty years and you will find it positively bristling with "friendly assurances." Till the hour struck, Prussia was full of friendly assurances to Denmark. Austria was overwhelmed with friendly assur- ances till the psychological moment came on a certain day in June, 1866. Friendly assurances, again, did not prevent war with France. As soon as Moltke was able to tell Bismarck that the Prussian Army had reached the point of perfection, that all that human skill and foresight could do had been done, and that the event, short of the intervention of a higher Power, was certain, the blow fell. Our countrymen, however, though they must be prepared, must not be unjust or unreasonable in their dealings with Germany. Let them try to put themselves in the place of the Germans. If German ambitions and aspirations are those which we have described, but if Germany has not yet reached the desired point in naval preparation, would not the Germans be mad to adopt any other policy than that of " friendly assurances " towards this country ? If we look at the matter as reasonable men, what else can we possibly expect from Germany till the time for a change arrives ? The German Government could not tell us that they are getting ready to put the screw upon us. and mean to turn that screw when they are ready and not before. The tendering of friendly assurances is the normal condition of diplomacy. If one nation is not ready to deal with another nation on different terms, there is nothing it can do but offer friendly assurances. Friendly assurances, then, are not to be taken as any sort of indication of Germany's policy. At the same time, we are most anxious that the condition of friendly assurances shall continue, no matter what may be the grounds on which it is based. But there is one way, and only one way, of securing the continuance of this condition. It is by making naval and military preparations on so large a scale that it will never be worth Germany's while to give up the policy of "friendly assurances." If wo main- tain an absolute and unquestionable supremacy at sea, there will be no war. If we allow Germany to become our equal or superior, she is bound by the policy of expansion which she has adopted, and which we cannot possibly hope she will abandon, to offer us the choice between war and what we shall regard here as an unbearable national humiliation. That Germany will be truly and sincerely sorry if and when we choose a war which she will believe must be an act of suicide for us, we do not doubt for a moment. No German, ruler or ruled, likes war for its own sake. If, however, we choose what she will regard as suicide, Germany will tell us, and in a sense rightly, that we have nobody to thank but ourselves.
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