THE ULTIMATUM TO TURKEY. T HOUGH Turkey may not have actually
yielded before these pages are in our readers' hands, we have little doubt that at the eleventh hour, or, to be more correct, on the eleventh day, Turkey will agree to the British terms, and consent to make reparation for the aggres- sive acts committed on the Egyptian frontier. But even if this should turn out to be too optimistic a view, and the Sultan forces us to take naval action to compel him to yield, that will only be deferring his surrender by one step. We do not, of course, know what the plans of the Admiralty are, but we feel convinced that they will not be deterred by any fears as to the safety of our ironcla,ds, but will use our Fleet for the purposes for which a Fleet exists, even though they may be told. that Turkish waters are sown with mines, and that the Turk is prepared to show his force and determination by blowing up a British warship. No doubt we shall not run unnecessary risks in narrow waters, and therefore if we have to take naval action it is more likely that it will be by seizing islands than by operating in or at the mouth of the Dardanelles. It may be, however, that Yildiz will be indifferent to the occupation of islands. If that should prove to be the case, the old suggestion to seize the Custom-houses at Smyrna will probably be considered. Smyrna, with the narrow inlet to its harbour, is, never- theless, not a very suitable place for the operations of warships. Therefore, and. though we speak as amateurs. in this matter, we may venture to suggest that there would be something very appropriate from the moral and political as well as from the strategic point of view in seizing Beyrout. Beyrout is the terminus of the Damascus Railway, the prolongation of which by the Hedjaz Railway may be said to be the ultimate cause of Turkish aggression on the Sinai Peninsula. It would, then, be not inappropriate for us to take possession of one end of the line until we were satisfied in regard to Turkish action at the other end. The fact that the line from Beyrout to Damascus belongs to a. French company need cause no embarrassment, since France is acting, as she was sure to act, in the most loyal way, and has left no doubt whatever in the mind of the Sultan as to her views concerning his conduct. Another reason for acting at Beyrout is to be found in the fact that the Lebanon region is neutralised, and that the Sultan, though its nominal Sovereign, would find it very difficult to make use of it and its resources in case he were foolish enough to enter into a prolonged. struggle with the British Govern- ment. The Consuls-General of the Powers, who are in the last resort responsible for the Lebanon, would, it need hardly be said, insist on the preservation of a strict neutrality. Again, the existence in the Lebanon of a, large Christian population and the presence of the Druses, who, though they may be anti-Christian, are certainly not pro-Turk, is a factor .with which the Sultan would have to reckon. Finally, the character of the harbour at Beyrout, and the nature of a large portion of the population, would make it particularly easy for us to seize and hold. the town. Should we determine to operate at Beyrout, in all probability it would be wise at the same time to seize Jaffa, the port of Jerusalem, and also Acre and Haifa,— harbours midway between these two ports, and famous as the last strongholds of the Crusaders in the Holy Land.
We need. not, however, discuss these matters in detail till it is certain that the Turks will not yield wilhout a touch of positive coercion. What is more important is to consider what shall be done when the Sultan has yielded, and the diplomatic question is closed, to prevent further aggression of a similar kind. In the first place, it is evident that, having received so clear a warning of the Sultan's intentions as regards Egypt, our first duty will be to make Egypt as strategically secure as possible. Obviously the most complete way of doing this would be to prevent the extension of the Hedjaz Railway even on Turkey's own territory. This, however, is too arbitrary a measure to be contemplated. As we said at the beginning of the dispute, we have no right, and indeed no wish, to forbid Turkey to build any railway she likes on her own territory. We must assume, therefore, that the Hedjaz Railway can and will be made, and that we must take other measures for maintaining the strategic isolation of Egypt. We do not, of course, profess to be experts as to desert warfare, but a primd-facie examination of the case would seem to suggest that if the water difficulty can be solved, it would be wise to construct and hold strong positions at what we may term the half-way houses of the two desert routes, the one from Gaza and the other from Tabah, along which an invading army would march to threaten the Suez Canal. Granted, as we have said, that the water difficulty could be got over, we should like to see Nakhl, the half-way house on the desert route between Akabah and Suez—occupied at present only by a handful of Egyptian irregulars—strongly held. El Arish should also be well fortified and garrisoned, for it may be described as the "jumping-off place" for the invasion of Syria by the northern route—the route followed by the early invaders of Egypt, the Syrians, Persians, Greeks, and. Romans—and also the chief strategic point in the marches and counter-marches of Napoleon and Mehemet Ali. Katieb, the half-way house between El .A.rish and the Canal, should also be held. A very interesting account of the part played by Katieh in Napoleon's use of the El Arish desert route is to be found in a lecture on the desert frontiers of Lower Egypt delivered to the Military Society of Ireland by Colonel Rycroft, of the 11th Hussars. This lecture, given in February of this year, is published by Messrs. Dollard, Limited, of Dublin, and contains a useful map, though not on so large a scale or so full of information as the excellent map for which we are indebted to the Times of Tuesday. The Times map and the article which accompanies it constitute an admir- able piece of work, and we congratulate our contemporary on once again proving to the world its perennial ability to supply at short notice full and sound information on the most difficult and out-of-the-way subjects.
In addition to giving Egypt strategic security, we must also, of course, give her moral security by making it clear to the Sultan that we do not intend to allow him to maintain a centre of disturbance in Egypt. In view of recent developments in our position in Egypt, it is ridiculous that the Sultan should maintain a Turkish High Commissioner in Cairo. While the Imperial Com- missioner, Muktar Pasha, confined himself to the dignified indolence of a great Turkish official, little harm was done, and we rightly tolerated him as a picturesque anachronism. As long as such anachronisms are not harmful, English- men of all kinds obey a very proper instinct in not only leaving them alone, but actually admiring them. When, however, anachronisms become dangerous they must be removed, and it appears to us that the Turkish High Commissioner has now entered upon this stage. It must not be supposed that when we write thus we are in the least alarmed as to any serious Mohammedan disturbance in Egypt. The bulk of the Egyptian population have become far too prosperous under British rule, and remember far too well the oppressions of the old regime, to desire that we should make way for the Turk. Egypt, again, is too near Syria, and there are too large a number of Syrian immigrants, for the Egyptian population to have any illusions as to what government under Turkish influences means. But though we are convinced that the Egyptians themselves will never try to substitute Turkish for British rule, we must not forget that they are essentially a passive people, and that their attitude is always to accept any ruler who can get himself into the saddle. It is probably a safe rule never to expect gratitude from subject races ; but even if the Egyptians felt gratitude for what we have done for them, we may be sure that they would not show it by resistino. the Turks. They would regret us -when we had gone, but they would not lift a finger to prevent our expulsion. Therefore, small and contemptible as is the Turkish faction in Cairo, and unwilling as the Egyptians would be to be despoiled by the Turks, we shall no doubt be wise to take security that the Sultan shall not have an emissary in Cairo whose main business is to undermine our position. The Sultan, in our opinion, should be told that he must withdraw the High Commissioner, and that if he refuses to do this, we shall have to reconsider the whole of those nominal relations in which Egypt stands to the Turkish Empire. It remains to be said that the action of the Sultan should warn us to take measures to counteract the claims made on his behalf to be regarded as the head of the Mohammedan religion. The question, we fully realise, is one of great difficulty and delicacy ; but it seems to us that if possible we, as the greatest of Mohammedan Powers, should convince our Mohammedan fellow-subjects that when we withstand unjust claims on the part of the Sultan we are in no way acting in opposition to Islam. We must do all in our power to dispel the notion that to withstand the Sultan is to attack the Mohammedan faith. Surely there are ways in which this might be done. For example, might it not be possible for us to give guarantees to the Mohammedans of India, Egypt, Persia, Morocco, and Northern Africa generally that we will at all costs secure the neutrality and safety of the Holy Places ? We do not, of course, suggest for a moment that we should occupy any portion of Arabia, but merely that we should let it be known that we consider the protection of the Holy Places and freedom of access to them a paramount British interest. It might also be worth while to obtain from the most learned and enlightened of Indian and other Mohammedan scholars. and lawyers who are free from fear of the Sultan an independent declaration as regards the Khalifate. Should. such independent representatives of the Mohammedan faith declare that the Sultan is in truth the Khalif, and so the spiritual head of Islam, we should of course be obliged to bow to their decision. If, however, which is far more likely, they were to give their opinion against such pretensions on behalf of the chief of the Ottoman Turks, the position would have been very greatly simplified, and we should have sure ground on which to base our policy in regard to the problem of Arabia and the Holy Cities, —a problem of cardinal importance in dealing with Mohammedanism. In any case, we must make an effort to reassure the adherents of the Mohammedan faith that they have, not enemies, but friends and protectors in the British Empire, and that no British Government will ever consent to any injury being done to the just rights and claims of the religion of Islam. The Sultan, no doubt, likes to pretend that when be is touched all Islam is wounded, but we must try and see if we cannot correct this artfully propagated delusion. After all, it is Mecca, not Constantinople, which is the centre of the Moham- medan faith. It is towards the Kaabah, not towards the dome of St. Sophia, that the Moslem turns his eyes as ho prays.
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