CORRESPONDENCE.
CHANGES IN ADMIRALTY ORGANIZATION.
[To TIM EDITOtt OP TIII " SPECTATOB:1 Sirs,—Memoranda issued on Monday last by the First Lord of the Admiralty contain details of changes about to be made in organization, together with a very full statement of the reasons which have weighed with Mr. Winston Churchill in deciding to take action end of his hopes for the future. Not a few of the critics, whose opinions on the new proposals were expressed after a hasty perusal of the official documents, have unfortu- nately failed to notice a fact -which the First Lord was careful to explain : the most important change proposed to be made— the formation of a Naval War Staff—is really a further and natural development of the Intelligence Department esta- blished nearly thirty years ago. Since it was established that Department has been largely increased in numbers, and much more has been expended upon its maintenance. The name originally given to the Department no doubt led many persons to suppose that it was chiefly devoted to the collection and tabu- lation of information respecting Foreign Navies. All who knew the real character of the work done by the Department realized that this duty, important as it undoubtedly is, was only one of the many tasks undertaken and fulfilled so far as the resources and strength of the Department have permitted. Mobilization was organized and directed by the Intelligence Department, although its practical conduct necessarily remained in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief at home ports and their staffs. A few years ago the Mobilization Department was separated from the Intelligence Depart. ment and placed under an independent Director. In the current Navy Estimates provision is made for a total staff of forty-four officers and civilian assistants and for an annual expenditure of nearly k22,000—figures which indicate the value attached to the two Departments and the growth of their work. Amongst the distinguished officers who have served as Directors the names of Admiral Sir Cypriaia Bridge, Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg may be mentioned; and, speaking broadly, it may be confidently asserted that, under the direction of these officers and others who have occupied the same position, exceedingly good work has been done from which the naval defence of the Empire has greatly benefited. Strategical studies and plans of campaign have not been neglected in the past ; and in annual naval manoeuvres many problems have been dealt with experimentally. The great programmes of shipbuilding carried out during the last twenty-two years and concurrent schemes for the creation or improvement of naval bases have been largely influenced by the work of the Intelligence Department. In short, although not so designated, it has been performing the duties of a War Staff and advising the Board of Admiralty in regard to preparation for war and plans. These facts are matters of common knowledge, and now ought not to be ignored because a further step is to be taken and a more numerous as well as more fully organized War Staff is to be set up in order to cope with problems whose complexity and magnitude are ever increasing and which must become more difficult in future.
It is universally agreed—indeed, it is an axiom of naval war- fare—that a thorough study of naval strategy and the preparation during times of peace of plans for the operations of war are fundamental conditions in the creation and main- tenance of an efficient and sufficient Navy. Upon the British Government, whose foreign policy necessarily dominates the situation at any moment, devolves the responsibility for defence of the Empire and the decision in regard to the most formid- able combination whose attacks may have to bo met in case of war. Furnished with information as to that probable or possible combination it is the duty of the Admiralty to con- sider and advise the Government in regard to the character, constitution, and cost of the war fleet required for the mainten- ance of our sea supremacy; and in order to frame plans of
war operations which will be best adapted to ensure success if a struggle takes place there must be careful study of all conditions and contingencies by competent persons. This necessity has always been recognized. What is now contemplated is the creation of a separate Department for .the study and preparation of war plans under a special Director; and the combination of the three branches—Intelli- gence, Operations, and Mobilization—into a Naval War Staff under a Chief of the Staff, who will be responsible for the general conduct and supervision of the work. This Chief is to be "primarily responsible" to the First Sea Lord, and is to work under him as the principal assistant; but he is not to be "the sole channel of communication between the First Sea Lord and the Staff." The First Lord and the•First Sea Lord will, " whenever convenient, consult the Directors of the various divisions or other officers if necessary." This arrange- ment is intended " to prevent that group of evils which have always arisen from the `narrow neck of the bottle' system."
It is conceivable that other evils of no less magnitude may result therefrom, and the First Sea Lord may possibly find his position and authority not improved thereby. Much will depend upon the personal qualities of the men who have to work the system ; and, fortunately, the feeling of loyalty and devotion to duty runs high amongst naval officers, so one can hope for the best.
The position of Chief of the Staff is one of great importance, and it is always to be held by a Flag officer. Admiral Trow- bridge has been appointed : he has had a distinguished career and has enjoyed the advantage of having been present with the Japanese fleet during the war with Russia. That is an exceptional experience and should prove valuable to the gallant officer in his new post ; but it is to be regretted that in many comments on the appointment an exaggerated import- ance has been assigned to the fact. The chief of a Staff whose "central objects" are said by Mr. Churchill "to form at once a convenient and flexible machine for the elaboration of plans and a school of sound and progressive thought on naval science " requires to be, above all else, a thinker and student of naval history and strategy. Every one will wish for the gallant officer complete success in the performance of an onerous duty, which must call for the exercise of great ability and continuous application in order to fulfil the ideal sketched by Mr. Churchill, who desires to make the Naval War Staff "au aid and a guide for all who are called upon to determine in peace and war the naval policy of the country—a brain far more comprehensive than that of any single man, however gifted; tireless and unceasing in its action, applied con- tinuously to the scientific and speculative study of naval strategy and preparation."
In the First Lord's Memorandum it is emphatically stated that the functions of the War Staff are to be advisory, not administrative, and the condition is laid down that "its responsibilities will end with the tendering of advice and with the accuracy of the facts on which that advice is based." Then comes a statement which deserves careful consideration : "Decision as to accepting or rejecting the advice of the, Staff wholly or in part rests with the First Sea Lord, who in the name of the Board of Admiralty, discharges the duties assigned to him by the Minister." This sentence appears to set up a procedure which is condemned elsewhere in the Memorandum, for it makes the brain of a single man—who presumably must be " gifted" because he has been selected for such an important post—prevail over the reasoned advice of a, Staff specially chosen to deal continuously with " the scientific study of naval strategy and preparation." Moreover, it gives to that man power to act " in the name of the Board of Admiralty" without imposing the condition that the Board is to be consulted ; and virtually, if not openly, it will destroy the corporate action of the Board in regard to one of the most important duties devolving upon the Ad- miralty. That corporate action has worked well, it has stood successfully the test of great ware, and ought not to be abandoned without grave reasons being adduced for the change. Consultation with naval colleagues on the Board, who will certainly he experienced and distinguished officers, has been the established practice on the part of the greatest men who have served as First Sea Lords. The senior naval member of the Board necessarily has the final word, because he is the chief adviser of the Government; but no officer hold-
ing that position would be well advised who did not ascertain and consider the opinion of other naval members before reach- ing a decision on such grave matters as are here mentioned. In fairness to his colleagues if any First Sea Lord ever dispensed with such consultation he should assume personal and inde- pendent responsibility, and not profess to act " in the name of the Board." Such action would tend to bring the Board of Admiralty, with its proud traditions, practically into line with
the mythical constitution and operation of the Board of Trade, reducing it to a mere name instead of being a living reality and a powerful directing force in the conduct of naval affairs.
In a second Minute the First Lord proposes the appoint- ment of an Additional Civil Lord, who is "to be the Admiralty buyer and business manager" and to supervise "the various branches of Admiralty Departments connected with contracts and purchasing." At considerable length Mr. Churchill dwells
on the relief which this appointment is expected to give to the Controller of the Navy, who is responsible for naval materiel and for dockyard administration, and has the assistance of a considerable number of technical experts as heads of the sections of that Department. No reference is made to certain important facts in regard to existing arrangements. For instance, the Director of Navy Contracts is an officer who has been for nearly forty years and still is actually the " Admiralty buyer " for all articles and stores of a general and merchant- able character, including armour and shipbuilding materials. After full inquiry it was decided many years ago not to be desirable, in the public interest, to extend the powers of the Director of Navy Contracts to the oases of ships, machinery, guns, gun-mountings, &c., in the specifications and tests of which great technical knowledge was required. Mr. Churchill can hardly be expected to have fully mastered the past history and merits of this question, because he is unaccustomed to the conditions and conduct of commercial transactions, and has had much to do since his transfer to the Admiralty. No doubt he means well; but it is improbable that his anticipations will be realized, and particularly his hope that the Controller of the Navy and the officers of that Department will be relieved to any sensible extent of either work or responsibility. Even if his hopes were realized the arrangement does not require the new officer to be a member of the Board in order to carry out the duties proposed. The only precedent for the appoint- ment of an additional Civil Lord—quoted by Mr. Churchill —was absolutely dissimilar in character. In that case the circumstances were special and the appointment was tem- porary, while the gentleman appointed had an unique acquaintance with guns and mountings, and his advice was of immense value during the period of transition from muzzle- loaders to breech-loaders. All who have the honour of know- ing Sir Francis Hopwood recognize and appreciate highly his great ability and varied official experience, but that experience has not included the conduct of great commercial affairs and contracts of a technical nature. Sir Francis Hopwood has given such proofs of ability, tact, and adapt- ability to fresh conditions that we may be sure everything which can be done will be done towards making the new arrangements work smoothly and efficiently. He is not responsible for the scheme, and it is to be regretted that further consideration should not have been given to the subject before the scheme was launched.
The organization of the War Staff and the appointment of an additional Civil Lord necessarily involve increased expen- diture. This increase is to be more than met by economies obtained by dispensing with the yachts hitherto maintained for the use of Commanders-in-Chief. It is noteworthy that the third Note dealing with this subject is the only paper of the series described as originating with the Board of Admiralty. The others are the production of the First Lord, and bear a strong personal impress. Perhaps it was well to adopt the procedure described, since the concurrence of the naval mem- bers of the Board might be regarded as a "self-denying ordinance." It does not appear from the papers whether the question of dispensing also with the Admiralty yacht has been considered by Mr. Churchill and his colleagues. The cost of her maintenance must be very large, but it may be thought that it is still well bestowed.—I am, Sir, &o., X.
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