MAHOMMEDAN " FANATICISM."
THE second invasion of the Soudan by troops under the command of English officers rouses once more the old and exceedingly difficult question of what Mussulman "fanaticism " really is, what we mean when we talk about it, and to what extent it differs from other motives as an incentive to resolute fighting. The English—and, as far as we know, all other Europeans—attribute to Musaulman fanaticism two lather different effects. Under the influence of the first of these the Mahommedan, it is supposed, if moved by considerations of creed, will act without obeying his reason, without considering consequences, and without in many instances paying any attention to the dictates of instinctive conscience. That view is to a great extent correct. A respectable and honest Massulman, and of course there are millions of Mussulmans entitled to that description, will not swallow alcohol if he knows it even for the good of his health, will not lift "the harem veil" even if lifting it is essential to the life of his wife or daughter, will not take out an insurance even when failure to do so is ruinous to him in a business competition, and will not in a country ruled by Mussulmans from any motive whatever short of a necessity such as destroys freedom of will Record equality to men of any other faith. In these respects he is " fanatio,"—that is, he will act upon the precepts of his creed, as interpreted by its doctors, without reference to any other consideration, and especially without reference to convenience or to the opinions, moral or otherwise, of men of any other faith. His creed is for him the operative law, as custom is for a Chinaman, or a caste rule for a Hindoo, or duty for a good Englishman, or that which is convenant for a respectable Frenchman ; and though there are points upon which he will break the law, especially for gain, there are also points, especially those we have mentioned, upon which he will not,—rather will be chopped in pieces, or chop you and take all con- sequences serenely.
So far European opinion is correct, and in dealing with Mahommedans should invariably be acted on; but there is a second opinion which is not equally accurate. It is imagined that the Mahommedan when fighting the infidel seeks death itself as a reward, that when he has proclaimed a Jehad, or Holy War, he fights under an impulse stronger than any which moves Christians, and that consequently he is always the bravest and most dangerous of fighting men. That is in the main a pure illusion. We think it probable that this is the temper which Mahommed intended to produce—first, because he wanted his followers to be devoted to the death; secondly, because he had to deal with a custom which was terribly in his way. Mahommed always thought of Arabia first, and in his time the Arab tribes, bound together by their common language, their liability to the same conditions, and their systems of intermarriage, had got into a way, like the Free Companies of Italy, of fighting feebly. They did not desire too much slaughter on their own aide or the enemy's, and fought with a sort of reserve which Mahommed felt it a necessity to terminate by the tremendous revelation that death in battle with the infidel insured instant translation to Paradise without the delay—or the risk—of waiting for the Judgment Day ; a revelation which made of every believer a soldier who ought under certain conditions to seek for death. We snppoae that among a large proportion of his followers and for a considerable space of time he did secure the result that he intended. We are not quite sure, because, as we read history, after the Hegira Mussulmans, and especially Arab Mnssulmans, exhibited precisely the same courage and energy in fighting each other which they exhibited in fighting in- fidels, and this ought not, on the popular theory, to have been the case. Still, it is impossible to explain sacrifices like those of Khaled's soldiers, or some of the earlier battles with both Romans and Persians, without believing that some special source of enthusiasm had passed into the Mussulmans, and fanaticism will do to describe that enthusiasm as well as any other word. But when the first impulse waned, fanaticism as a fighting force waned with it, until the position of affairs became something of this kind. The ideal remained and re- mains. Every Mussulman thinks that when fighting infidels he ought to be glad to die, and if he is a specially brave man, or has for any reason adopted that side of his creed as the one which he prefers, he is glad. There are a few tribes or classes, such as the Malays of Sumatra, the Moplahs of Southern India, and some Dervishes of North-Eastern Africa, who really are "fanatics" in the popular English sense, that is, when they fight they intend to die, and are, therefore, exceedingly dangerous,—they kill such a number of the enemy before they are defeated. It is a wonderfully difficult thing, as all ex- perienced soldiers know, even with superior weapons, to slaughter out enemies who mean dying, without a proportion of loss during the operation, from which all but the very best soldiers shrink. There are, too, in every force of Mussulmans -usually a few men who live up to their ideal, who seek in battle death rather than victory, and who will charge without -considering the odds, and, indeed, rather rejoicing if the odds are heavily against them. But then such tribes or such individuals are very few. The Moplahs have never, we believe, placed three hundred men upon one field; the .Ghazees seldom number more than 2 per cent. of any Munn!. anau force ; and the men who, without drugs or special incite. meats, deliberately prefer death to life are seldom numerous enough to be even perceptible in a great battle. The majority hold their fighting doctrine just as most nominal Christians hold the nobler precepts of their own faith, that is, they never dream of denying them, and wish they could always obey them, but under temptation they fall away. Now, there is no
temptation, not even that of hunger or of any of the lusts of the flesh, which to the majority of mankind quite equals the temptation to run away from a shell or from a charge of cavalry. The consequence is that Muaanlman fanaticism in an infinity of cases does not act, and that in India, for instance, or in South Africa, English officers have found Sikhs or Mahrattas or Zulus, none of whom are supposed to be " fanatics," much more formidable opponents than Mahommedans. Nor have they discovered that the courage produced by fanaticism differs in kind, more especially as regards contempt for death, from any of the other motives which move other armies and creeds. Englishmen at the call of duty, Germans under pressure of discipline, Frenchmen if they see glory to be gained, act precisely as the most " fanatic " of Mussulmans act, that is, they hold the pre- servation of life but lightly as compared with the object to be attained. No regiment of " Delhis," or whatever the " fanatics " among Turkish soldiers call themselves, ever exhibited greater willingness to die than the English in the storming of Badajos, or the Germans on the slope of Speicheren, or the French in the earlier charges at Gravelotte. " Fanati. cism " does not inspire Mussulmans to lose a larger pro. portion of men than patriotism inspires Europeans, nor does it lead to more sustained efforts against fearful odds. The very utmost that can be said for it is that it makes Asiatics and Africans braver than they otherwise would be, and even that is not proved, for the Sikh and the Goorkha is on the whole braver than any Mussulman, and a regiment of Zulus is equal, man for man, to any regiment of Houssas. Indeed, our own West Indian blacks, who are Christians if anything, and certainly have no trace of anything that is popularly called fanaticism, would face and probably defeat any equal number of Mussulmans from any country whatever.
How far fanaticism of the Mabommedan type can be increased or diminished by external influences is a very curious and perplexing problem. Almost all historians and newspaper correspondents are convinced that it can be in- creased enormously by preaching, and they talk of tribes fight- ing under the influence of eminent preachers as if that effect were an inevitable consequence of such "incitement." That is not the opinion of the cool and experienced Government of India, which for a century has refused to prohibit any kiud of preaching in the Indian mosques, and, indeed, treats the whole business of incitement as we treat Anarchist diatribes in the London parks, with a nonchalance which frequently provokes remonstrance. Nor is it the opinion of experienced officers on the frontier, who bold that a few men of prepared minds may be, and are, maddened by preaching, their "fanaticism" rising to blood-beat, but that the majority fight very much as they would have fought had the fiery zealots held their tongues. Eloquence t ffects something everywhere, but not more among Mahommedans than men of any other creed, and much less than it once did among Catholics when priests were preaching the necessity of securing the land where Christ died, or among our own Puritans when they expected battle with "Malignant" soldiers. As to the cure of Mahommedan fanaticism there probably is none that is quite certain, but the writer bolds a belief, founded on the observation of a lifetime, that there is one efficacious solvent. Mahommedan fanaticism burns hottest when it is well mixed up with, and almost indistinguishable from, temper,—good, hearty, burning Asiatic rage. It dies away, therefore, under justice and tolerance and prosperity. A Mussulman people well treated may turn on infidel rulers, but if it is prosperous it is very reluctant to do it, and this reluctance increases with time until it becomes something like an impossibility. It is not quite an impossibility, because every creed is liable at intervals to intense fits of appreciation of its ideal, and fanaticism, in the English sense, is part of the ideal of Mahommedans, but we might govern Egypt, if taxation re- mained mild, for centuries without witnessing an explosior, and this although our principal army were composed of men who ought, on the theory, to be ready to die at any moment, if only they might die doing battle to throw off infidel domi. nation. There is a good deal of human nature in man under all the creeds, and Mahommedan fanaticism, like Christian virulence, yields in the majority of men, though not of course in all, to persistent sympathy and good treatment. The belief that it does not, still entertained by many who govern Mahom- medans, is one of the greatest obstacles in the way of European success in the grand task of guiding Asiatics and Africans towards a higher, or at least a more merciful, civilisation.
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