THE FAILURE IN RUSSIA.
IN writing about the situation in Russia we have .1always taken the line that as the Government knew the military facts and the public scarcely knew anything, it would be absurd to criticise the Government with an air-of omniscience ; but at the same time we have insisted very strongly—deriving our arguments from history—that intervention in a foreign country in order to support one section against another is always fraught with extraordinary danger, however good the intentions of tie invaders may be. When the attitude of the greater part of the public towards the Government in regard to an important military enterpriseabroadis represented by such arguments as we have used, it means in practice that the Government must be judged entirely by results. Hitherto there have not been enough, or at least clear enough, results, to justify us in forming any conclusion, but the time has now come when it is necessary to say plainly that the Allied military campaign for helping Russia is a failure. One after another the schemes of Mr. Churchill or of the Allied military authorities have gone astray. More is involved in this matter than mere military success or failure, or than, helping the sound elementsin Russia to resist the Terrorists. Persistence in a ruinous campaign, which is leading nowhere and is costing -very much money, may make all the difference between success or failure in our attempt to avoid bankruptcy at home.
When the Government thought it worth while to recog nize Admiral Koltchak as the head of the constitutional forces in Russia we supported them in the circumstances. They knew the facts and we did. not. But now, as we have said, they must be judged by results. Admiral Koltchak has been forced to make an immensely long retreat. General Denikin, it is true, has done well, perhaps even brilliantly, and has recovered the Ukraine and the Black Sea littoral. But on the balance the Red Armies are in a stronger position than they were. We heard much a. short time ago about the formation of a constitutional government in North-West Russia which was to have the support of the Esthonians and was to send an army against Petrograd. We hear little about that scheme to-day. Apparently a united Russian and Esthonian army could not be got together or could not be got to work together. Further than that. there seems to be a tendency in both Esthonia and in Lithuania to come to terms with the Bolsheviks. The truth is that the Red Armies are not dissolving, as we were told some time ago, but are probably improving in skill and moral. Newspaper readers have followed with interest a series of accusations which have been brought against the Government and particularly against Mr. Churchill, by the Daily Express. The Daily Express alleges that there has been a breach of faith as in spite of Mr. Churchill's promise to withdraw as quicklv-as possible from Russia, great offensive movements have 'been prepared since the promise was made. The Daily Express has also published a letter from Colonel Sherwood-Kelly, who has recently returned from Russia, and who breaks the King's Regulations as a matter of conscience, so he tells us, in order to enlighten the nation by confirming what the Daily Express has been saying. Again, the Daily Express has published an interview with General Ironside—an interview which was suppressed by the War Office shortly after_it was published in Russia— describing his plans for a very consid.erable advance. We may make a few remarks on all this. There was nothing specially new in General Ironside's interview which was originally published in Russia on June 1st, as on June 19th, when speaking to the Anglo-Russian Club, Mr. Churchill himself disclosed the substance of General Ironside's scheme. As a matter of fact Mr. Churchill has talked impartially of going forward and going back. On June 6th he talked of " winding up " our campaign in Russia ; on June 19th, as we have seen, he talked of a considerable offensive ; and on July 29th he said that evacuation had been decided on -in March. The most charitable explanation is that Mr. Churchill and our officers in Russia believed that our retreat could be secured only by a preliminary offensive. There was also no doubt the desire to put the constitutional forces in as strong a position as possible before we left. We write at a disadvantage on Thursday, .as Mr. Churchill has promised a statement which will probably be, published before our readers see these lines.
To sum up, out of all the mists of the past few months, two points emerge. One is that we must leave Russia as soon as possible, since there is not the faintest prospect of doing the world or even the Russians themselves any useful service by continuing our present policy. The second is that we cannot leave Russia without meeting any obligation of honour we have incurred locally. It may be that we have expressly or by implication encouraged the people in Archangel and Murmansk to believe that we should protect them against the Bolsheviks. The Government ought to tell us. quite plainly exactly how we stand in this respect. We imagine that the people on whom the Bolsheviks could or would take revenge after our retirement would be very small in number. The vast majority of the population—the peasants—scarcely count politically and would probably be in no more danger in Archangel and Murmansk than in any other part of Russia. But we certainly ought to know. It must not be forgotten that it is impossible, however hard we may try, to help those who will not help us to help them. No • doubt there are many splendidly loyal Russians who would co-operate with us through thick and thin to redeem their country, but this ianot true of the mass of the armies with whom our soldiers have been comrades in the field.
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