THE SPECTATOR
WHY PICK ON DANILOFF?
In international relations, as in all hu- man affairs, there are two fundamental categories of things: those on which it is permissible, and in some circumstances desirable, to compromise, and those on which it is not. Mr Gorbachev's offer of a nuclear test ban, and indeed the whole range of his arms control proposals, belong indubitably to the first category. As was argued on this page three weeks ago, there is a strong case for saying that the Reagan administration should try a little harder to respond to Mr Gorbachev's 'test ban gam- bit' with intimations of compromise. The detention of the American journalist, Mr Nicholas Daniloff, aptly described by Sir Geoffrey Howe as a 'moral Chernobyl' in its poisoning effects, belongs equally in- dubitably to the second category. Here there is no case for compromise. Morally, it is impermissible to sacrifice even one innocent man to the presumed interests of Realpolitik. Pragmatically, there is more to he lost than there is to be gained by any compromise solution which even hints at the acceptance of an equation between the suspected Soviet agent arrested by the FBI and the American journalist arrested in retaliation by the KGB. If that precedent were to be set, then every American in Moscow would have cause to tremble every time a suspected Soviet agent was detained in Washington or New York.
The only assumption necessary to make this clear judgment is the assumption that Mr Daniloff is innocent. Now it is, of course, difficult to prove a negative. Some mud always sticks. There is an all too familiar human reaction — the comfort of all dictators — which goes: because he is a victim, there must be something wrong with him. Yet the circumstantial evidence against the charge is overwhelming. Mr Daniloff was a well-known and highly respected correspondent; we have the testimony of eminent acquaintances and friends to confirm his reputation and in- tegrity. If he was an American spy, it is almost inconceivable that the United States government would have reacted as it did. There are some rules, and many precedents, in the real spy-swapping game. The Reagan administration is not looking for a pretext to scupper the summit. The timing of the arrest, just a week after that of the suspended Soviet agent, is more than eloquent. The manner of Mr Dani- loff's being 'caught' bears all the marks of a frame-up so crude that if John le Cane put it in one of his novels the critics would surely complain of the author's declining powers; and, one might add, if Mr Daniloff had really been an agent, his training would surely have prevented him from falling for it. Finally, everything that the Soviet authorities have told us so far about Mr Daniloff's othet 'spying' activities for example, his attempts to meet people who had served as soldiers in Afghanistan — has been a perfect description of what an enterprising foreign correspondent would (and should) do in such circum- stances.
So why has Moscow done it? It may just be possible to explain the initial arrest as a KGB reflex reaction to the detention of their agent in the United States. (Perhaps one reason why they fixed upon Mr Dani- loff, incidentally, is that there may not actually be many so to speak bona fide American agents left in Moscow: traitors in the American security services have, it is suggested in Washington, helped the KGB largely to unravel the real American spy network inside the Soviet Union.) What is far more difficult to explain is the quite unusual step of formally pressing espion- age charges. If Mr Daniloff had been detained, questioned and then expelled as a 'spy', the ripples would already have subsided. The world would be looking forward to the Shultz-Shevardnadze meet- ing, and the summit to follow.
One speculative explanation for the escalation of the affair is that the summit is what Mr Gorbachev and his senior col- leagues now want to avoid. Mr Daniloff is their pretext. But this fits ill with Mr Gorbachev's reiterated hopes for the sum- mit, and most of Soviet diplomacy over the last two months makes sense only as pre-summit foreplay. A second speculative explanation is that the incident has been `manufactured' by elements in the Soviet power structure who wish to foil Mr Gorbachev's desire for the summit. But so far as we know the elements most alarmed by Gorbachev's pre-summit foreplay are in the military; and would the KGB act at the military's behest? A third speculative ex- planation — perhaps marginally the least improbable — is that the KGB initially acted off its own bat, and that Mr Gor- bachev, who is significantly indebted to the KGB for his present position, may not feel strong enough to defy them at a moment when he has already irritated the military. Whatever the explanation, it is difficult to reconcile this development with what we have previously understood to be Mr Gor- bachev's strategy.
Practically speaking, the best that can be hoped for now is that Mr Daniloff should, after all, be soon expelled as an alleged spy. It has been said of the prize fellowship examinations for All Souls', that the com- pany of those who failed is at least as distinguished as that of those who suc- ceeded. The company of Western corres- pondents who have been expelled from Moscow for 'activities incompatible with their status' is at least as distinguished as that of those who have successfully re- mained. May Mr Daniloff swiftly join this honourable company.
Previous page
