THE LA.ODICEAN FOREIGN POLICY.
IN the Protocol and its annexes, the Loodicean foreign policy of Lord Derby attains to something like its culminating point, and,—let us hope,—also its euthanasia. Whatsoever things are unmeaningrwhatsoeverthings are savourless, whatso- ever things are trimming, whatsoever things are pusillanimous, whatsoever things are ambiguous, whatsoever things are of doubtful report, if .there be any lakewarmness, if there be poverty of heart, then readers and students of the Protocol, and the accompanying declarations, must think on these things. For a year back now Lord Derby's whole endeavour has been to keep the Penelope-web of diplomacy as near as possible at a stand-still. He has undone one day as well as he could what he did the day before. But in the Protocol and annexes he has improved upon himself. He has made a very good attempt at least, at undoing one minute what he had achieved only the minute before, so far as he can have been said to have achieved anything. He there declares, in common with the other five Powers, that they have all undertaken the pacification of the East, and have with that view taken part in the Conference of Constantinople ; that an "effective improvement in the condition of the Christian populations" of Turkey is "unanimously called for, as indispensable to the tranquillity of Europe ;" and that should that effective improve- ment fail to take place, further steps must be devised. And no sooner has Lord Derby signed this than he immediately puts in and signs a further declaration, to the effect that it is "solely in the interest of European peace,"—i.e., of peace between the Great Powers,—that he had signed a statement which dwells so emphatically on the interior pacification of the Christian pro- vinces of Turkey ; and that "in the event of the object pro- posed not being attained, namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, and peace between them, the Protocol in question shall be regarded as null and void." In plain words, Lord Derby will admit that some kind of intervention in the misgoverned provinces is necessary, so long as he is quite sure that none will take place ; but in case there be any danger even of such an intervention taking place, he will not stand committed to the assertion that any is necessary. Could Mr. Facing-both-ways himself have achieved a greater triumph in diplomatic counterfeits than this ? 'I will admit,' virtually says Lord Derby, "that there is a case for the interference of the police, if such an admission of mine has the effect of preventing that inter- ference; but if not,—if the police do not immediately with- draw and disclaim all notion of interference,—then I must repudiate my admission that there was any shadow of pretence for them to interfere.' And this action of Lord Derby's is all the quainter and more picturesquely suicidal, when the whole transaction of which it forms the leading portion is taken in with it. For the Protocol itself begins by describing the six Powers as "the Powers who have undertaken in common the pacification of the East,"—which is the oddest misnomer which can be imagined, considering that every one of them except Russia has most emphatically disclaimed any undertaking of the kind, unless mere words can accomplish it ; that Germany, the most powerful of all, has declared it no business of hers to make any sacrifice for that end ; that Austria has loudly re- pudiated action ; that Italy guards her assent even to this document, by saying that she means nothing by it unless the Powers remain united ; and that England declares expressly that she will not commit herself to any common policy with the other Powers, if Russia and Turkey do not proceed to disarm. But that is only the first of the paradoxes of this wonderful document, which immediately goes on to say that these Powers,—thus misdescribed as having under- taken what most of them eagerly disavow having undertaken at 914—recognise that "the surest means of obtaining the object which they have proposed to themselves" is to maintain the agreement at which they have arrived, and to affirm it afresh,—an agreement, namely, as to what they would desire for Turkey, if they had any means of gratifying that desire. Well, that is odd enough,—to insist that the " surest " means of getting a thing is to continue to agree in wishing for it, and in repeating your wish aloud,—just as if the Allies in 1814-15 had unanimously resolved that the " surest " way to defeat Napoleon would have been to maintain and recite their complete unanimity in wishing for his total destruction. But even that simple and rather humble expedient seems eclipsed by the further declara- tion of the Protocol, that the Powers have "grounds for hoping" that the Porte will itself gratify their wish during "the present lull,"—grounds which they prudently do not state, and which clearly partake of the wildest illusion ever indulged in even by the few who found their hopes on the contradictory of their experience. After thus declaring that the surest way to get what they want is to be very careful to continue to wish it, and proclaim their wishes to the world, and that they "have grounds for hoping" what is ecrntrary to all the experience of the past, and what is "contra-Indicated," to use a somewhat technical, but rather convenient expression, by all the symptoms Of the present, the Protocol -goes on to say that the Powers will watch the way in which "the promises of the Ottoman Govern- ment are carried into effect." And that no doubt they well watch, and with a good deal of amazement, if they get a chance, —just as children used to promise themselves that they would watch very carefully the results in bird-catching likely to be consequent on the event of the falling-in of the sky. Finally, the Protocol goes on to say that if these wildest of wild hopes should be again disappointed, "such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and the interests of Europe in general,"—not a very novel proposition, since they would hardly be likely to hope against hope for any- thing that was not bound up with their interests. Moreover, in this last case, they would " consider " again what they con- sidered at Constantinople in December and January, and without result, —namely, what to do next. No doubt this, feeble as it sounds, would have been the most formal admission Europe has yet made that the Treaty of 1856, so far as it secures Turkey against European interference and intervention, is at an end, if only it had not been made absolutely conditional, as far as England is concerned, on a reciprocal disarming of Russia and Turkey, which has no bearing at all on any one of the considerations enumerated in the Protocol itself.
And this fact—that Lord Derby makes the only declaration partaking of a practical character in this remarkable document absolutely conditional on the disarmament of Russia, which, to quote Lord Salisbury, would remove the single motive- power tending to induce Turkey to do what is desired of her—gives to the Protocol and the declarations which follow it an effect very like that of extracts from Punch. Would that amusing paper itself have ventured to make the grave statesmen of Europe commit themselves, first, to the delightful statement that the best way to get a thing is to agree in repeating the verbal wish for it ; next, to a hope which they have all recently repudiated as utterly chimerical, in the absence of guarantees which are still absent ; and lastly, to the valorous promise that they will deliberate afresh on what ought to be done to obtain their wishes, on strict condition that effective steps are first taken to diminish the motive for granting their wishes ? And even if Punch had ventured on depicting anything so funny as the substance of these remarkable documents, it would hardly have ventured on so amusing a feat of invention as the anticipation of their form.
First comes the empty Protocol, with six signatures ; then Count Schouvaloff's hypothetical declaration that if three very unlikely things first happen, then Turkey may send a special envoy to St. Petersburg to treat with Russia on the subject of reciprocal disarmament,—a permission which is followed imme- diately by the proviso that if, nevertheless, a most likely event happens, then disarmament will be impossible. This, again, is followed by Lord Derby's statement that unless all these four unlikely hypotheses are verified, the signature of England to the empty Protocol,—little as it would mean,—is to be regarded as withdrawn ; and this, again, is followed by the Italian Ambassador's declaration that his signature means nothing, unless all the others mean everything they ever could mean. It looks for all the world like a comic solution of the riddle how to make a perfectly empty promise, and yet find an ample number of ways of wriggling out of it. But the whole procedure is completely of a piece with all Lord Derby has hitherto done. He began the whole negotia- tion more than a year ago by giving the English Consul leave to listen to the wrongs of the insurgents in the Herzegovina, on condition he should not make any inquiries or commit himself to reporting those wrongs. Then he signed the Andrassy Note, only because Turkey, who was the Power against whom it was directed, wished him to do so. Then he defeated the Berlin Memorandum ; and then neutralised what he had so done by immediately telling Turkey that she must not regard this as giving her any pledge of English support. Then he intimated that we were committed to protect the" Sick Man" against "murder," though not against suicide ; and then, within a week or two, falling into a fright, he entreated Sir Henry Elliot to make Turkey understand that after the atrocities, we were in the "humiliating" position of not even being able to guarantee her against murder, in case of a Russian invasion. Then he tried to menace Turkey into making peace by threatening Sir Henry Elliot's recall, and then immediately explained that he did not mean much by the threat, —not a suspension of diplomatic relations,—only displeasure. Then he sent Lord Salisbury to agree with the other Powers on the terms to he pressed on Turkey, but took the precaution first positively to assure Turkey that ourpressure would not mean coer- cion. When Turkey re fased to yield, he withdrew our Ambassador, but denied in Parliament that displeasure was implied by the act. And now he has signed a Protocol which is to be void in the only case in which it could have any effect, but to warrant intervention in the one case in which all existing means of intervention should have been carefully extinguished. Such is the trusted Foreign Secretary of the Conservative party. His policy is always weak and always tepid,—like a lukewarm cup of watery tea. But the Conservatives seem to have no wish at all that he were either cold or hot. On the contrary, because they know his works, that he is neither cold nor hot, they treat him, not as the angel of the Church of Laodicea was treated, but on the contrary, clasp him to their hearts.
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