MR. CHAMBERLAIN AT BIRMINGHAM.
CHAMI3ERLAIN'S very interesting and straightforward
speech to the Birmingham Liberal Association begins with a string of congratulations which are hardly borne out by the facts on which he himself insisted later on. The Birmingham Liberals, it seems, have defeated the device of three-cornered representation, baffled the cumulative vote, stormed the Board of Guardians, won municipal contests in every part of the town, and shown, in the words of Mr. Bright, that Birmingham is liberal as the sea is salt. But what if the salt have lost its savour? What if Liberal principles, as at present understood and applied, are not worth fighting for, and the Board of Guardians is about the highest level to which Liberal ambition shows any signs of rising ? What, in a word, if congratulations upon victory are out of place when the victories themselves have been turned to no account ? Why should any one rejoice at the reviving prospects of a party which can make no use of success, even when it has achieved it I These are fair questions to put to Mr. Chamberlain, because he admits the facts on which they are founded. The Opposition, he says, has been accused with regard to the Eastern Question of being" willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike." The taunt is not uttered without reason, for the Liberal party have not attempted to raise a distinct 'issue. They have been paralysed by their divisions. The country did its part in the autumn, and when Parliament met, it became the duty of the Liberal leaders to do their part. The condition of the Turkish provinces is in no way better than it was last year. All the efforts of the English Govern- ment have only resulted in leaving things as they were. Yet though the Government have ostentatiously disclaimed all intention of trying to mend matters, the Liberal party has remained obstinately silent. They would not propose any- thing on which they were not agreed, and they could find nothing on which they were agreed. From one cause or another, almost every section of the Parliamentary Liberals found an excuse for not urging the Government to take a bolder line. Some of them are all for peace at any price, and would not consent to support any policy which might conceivably commit England to taking active measures against Turkey ; others would not help the Bulgarians, because the Power that wished to help them had ill-treated the Poles ; others dis- liked the Greek Church ; others were afraid of the losses which LI possible war might entail upon English commerce. Mr. Cham- berlain's description of the condition of the Opposition is not in the least exaggerated. It is hardly possible to imagine a more con- temptible part than the part which the Liberals have played from February 8 onwards. After talking in the most energetic way at public meetings during the autumn, and protesting that the Government ought to call Parliament together and challenge a vote upon its policy, they find, when Parliament is at last called together, that their only strength is to sit still. They have not dared to criticise the Cabinet, because they dared not face the challenge to say what they would do if they were in the Cabinet's place. Yet they are really almost as responsible for the discredit which the action of the Government has brought upon the country as if they had themselves been in office. There was a time, at the beginning of the Session, when the Government were plainly hesitating what course they should take. The discrepancy between the speeches of the Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords, and of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Commons, on the first night of the Session must have represented, no doubt, a real divergence of tendency, if not of deliberate opinion, between the sections of the Cabinet which these Ministers severally represent. The language which Lord Salisbury used at Constantinople, the language which Sir Stafford Northcote used at Westminster, pointed plainly to the maintenance of the European concert to obtain, not the signature of an empty protocol, but the introduction of fairly effective reforms into the status of the Christians of Turkey. When a section of the Cabinet spoke in this strain, the true policy of the Opposition was to give them some indication
of the support which they might look for in Parliament and the country, in the event of their breaking with their colleagues. But such a course as this might have done nothing to advance the return of the Liberal party to power, and with some who call themselves Liberals this is the only end which it is worth taking trouble to attain. That it would have done something to ensure the ascendancy of Liberal prin- ciples at a critical moment goes for nothing with politicians of this school. They only value Liberal measures when they are offered by Liberal men.
The blame of this miserable collapse must be divided be- tween the leaders and the rank and file. As regards their own wishes we believe that the leaders were the better of the two. If they could have seen their way to uniting the party in support of a distinct declaration of policy, they would pro- bably have been ready to frame one. But they lacked the courage which would have led them to set up the Liberal standard, without stopping to calculate whether those who came to it would be few or many. We will concede that in the present condition of the party, it is more than probable that such a course would have led to a conspicuous defeat. The peace-at-any-price-Liberals, the anti-Russian Liberals, the Liberals who think Mahommedanism a religion for men, while Christianity—at all events, Greek Christianity—is a reli-
gion for women, might all have deserted Lord Hartington, and gone into the lobby in support of an amendment leaving everything to the discretion of Ministers. But in that case, the end would not have been yet. Behind Parliament lies the country, and if the country had seen the front Opposition Bench maintaining the paramount need of an energetic policy, a policy which should aim at securing the peace of Europe by acts, and not by words, a policy directed to removing the cause of the evil, not to plastering over its effects, we believe that before long the Liberal party out- of -doors would have found means to convince their representatives that they must choose between their crotchets and their con- stituents. Unhappily, the first Opposition Bench had not the conrage or the wisdom to appeal from a divided party in Parliament to what a little boldness would have made a united party in the country. The characteristic fault of Lord Hartington's leadership has been its too exclusive regard for Parliamentary success or defeat. It has never been his principle to discipline his troops by constant fighting. It has almost always seemed to him a sufficient reason for not moving a resolution that it is certain to be defeated by a large majority. But after all, what is the proper function of an Opposition, if it is not to be defeated? If it were strong enough to carry its points, it would be her Majesty's Govern- ment, not her Majesty's Opposition. Supposing that Lord Hartington had seized every opportunity this Session of setting forth the Liberal view of the Eastern Question, and had taken a division whenever challenged to do so by the Government, he would undoubtedly have found himself in the lobby at the head of a small minority of the House of Commons. But it would have been a minority constantly cheered with the convic- tion that the feeling of the Liberal party in the constituencies was more and more with it, and as a consequence of this fact, constantly cheered with the sight of fresh recruits coming in at each successive trial of strength. Lord Hartington might have remembered that at whist it is often of more import- ance to let your partner know what is in your hand than to keep this knowledge from your adversary, and in this case we hold that what was most of all necessary was to let the Liberal party in the country see that their leaders had a policy. When once this signal had been given, it would have been the fault of the Liberal party in the country if it had not risen to the height of the situation, and we do not believe that if it had been tried in this way it would have been found wanting.
Mr. Chamberlain's otherwise excellent speech lacked that most essential feature of an argument, a conclusion. Worse than this, the latter part of it was calculated to lead the Birmingham Liberal Association out of the track in which the right conclusion is to be looked for. Its object was to show that if the Liberals were to sink their differences, they would have to throw overboard their whole cargo. The county franchise must be given up in deference to Lord Harl- ington, rurdenominational education in deference to Mr. Forster, the Established Church in deference to the front Opposition Bench, the land question in deference to the Whig landlords. At this rate, says Mr. Chamberlain, we shall have sunk every- thing for which we care two farthings, and then what will be the value of our being united ? As a general principle, we quite agree with Mr. Chamberlain. The notion of giving up all the objects for which any reasonable man cares to see his party in office, in order to get into office a session or two sooner, is essentially a contemptible one. We do not agree with Mr. Chamberlain in his list of what constitute the essentials of Liberal policy, but we quite agree with him that the mainten- ance of these essentials, whatever they are, is a considera- tion of infinitely higher moment than a union which has only place for its object. But it is the duty of Liberal politicians to postpone remote essentials to pressing ones, and it is this advice that we should have liked to see Mr. Chamberlain give to the Birmingham Liberals. We will assume, for the sake of argument, that we want all that Mr. Chamberlain wants, disestablishment, secular education, the abolition of landlords. Still, even on this assumption, it is nevertheless true that at this moment all these questions, taken together, are as nothing compared with the Eastern question ; and it follows that they ought, one and all, to be subordinated to this paramount consideration. If Mr. Cham- berlain is right in his estimate of the place which foreign policy ought for the present to hold in the Liberal programme, he ought to see that to insist upon the party pledging itself to a long series of domestic revolutions, none of which are likely to present themselves for serious discussion until after the pre- sent troubles in the East have been disposed of, is to throw needless, and probably fatal, obstacles in the way of the formation of a solid body of Liberal opinion on this question of questions. For the present, the test of Liberalism should be the maintenance of Liberal ideas in foreign policy. That is an end for which it is worth while to throw the rest of the cargo overboard.
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