Naval Policy Surveyed
Mn. BYWATER in this book throws a clearly focused and well- balanced beam over the whole arc of naval polity. He does not deal in abstract theories but in concrete facts and figures clearly tabulated. His view is inclined to be pessimistic.. The Washington Conference (1922) undoubtedly saved a big expenditure and eased the situation in the Pacific, but it was based on the preliminary acceptance of a reasonable and pacific policy by the parties concerned. Since then the power of the air has greatly developed, but there is nothing to show that aircraft can do the work of a navy or an army. The purpose and uses of a navy remain -unchanged, though a reason suffi- cient in itself for a measure of agreement on disarmament can be found in the saving of 194 millions that it would bring to the five leading naval powers, the cost per ton having risen from some £72 in 1914 to about £230 in 1928.
On the other hand, even the present stage of disarmament has not been reached without a considerable degree of risk. In the London Treaty British cruiser strength was scaled down to 50, of which Mr.. Bywatq counts_ only 32., as " modern !' ia• 1935. The Treaty certainly contained a safeguard in the form of an " escalator " clause, but Mr. Bywater considets *at its application would have entailed the serious drawback of pointing a critical finger at our old ally, France.
Dealing with more technical questions, Mr. Bywater points out that our deficiency in destroyers was one of our gravest difficulties in 1917. We had over 400 when the War ended and at present are allowed only 150,000 tons, which works .out at about 135 to 150. The necessity of destroyers arises Plirtly, from the danger of submarines, but Great Britain's proposal to abolish the latter has met with cold response, and Mr. Bywater thinks that they must be accepted as a per- ialancrit addition to the naval armoury. • , Great Britain's suggestions for disarmament have lain along the line of a trenchant scaling down in all combatant craft—battleships to 25,000 tons, cruisers to 7,000 tons, and sub- marines to the zero of abolition or to a smaller size. But the distinct merits of these proposals are not always distinctly seen. On one type of vessel, however, the London Treaty placed no ban—viz., vessels of not more than 2,000 tons, with not more than four 6.1-inch guns and with a speed of not more than 20 knots—a sort of third-class cruiser type. These vessels of a triple negation could undoubtedly be verypositively useful in convoy and anti-submarine work, and Mr. Bywater Would like to see more of them. Finally, he focuses his arguments in a demand for a One Power.: (Continental) Standard in the Air and a One Power (World) Standard for the Navy. Great Britain has done and is still doing her Utmost to procure some measure of disarmament, but arms- loents are merely the instruments and outcome of national pOlicy, and the policies of other nations lie outside our control. Disarmament is an end that we honestly seek, but as Cromwell said somewhere or other, the issue does not always bear out the honesty of the design. The book contains some very useful Appendices, appropriate to any possible Conference.
A. C. DEWAR.
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