TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION.
THE position of the Government has improved during the week ; but a partially new question has come to the front which forbids us to believe that they are as yet quite safe. Lord Salisbury, to begin with, has done the Ministry a most important service. His violent speech of Wednesday week showed the French Ministry that his accession to power would be a calamity for France, and produced a change of tone upon several important points which enabled the two Foreign Offices to come to an agreement upon all the principles involved in the negotiation. The moment both Governments were in earnest, a modus vivendi was discovered ; and the agree- ment when submitted to Parliament will, we believe, be found to be one for which all Liberals can vote. Many of them will not like it ; but they will not feel bound by their convictions to vote against it. We do not pre- tend to know any official secrets, and no doubt the wording of the clauses will be most important ; but, com- paring all the accounts which have been offered, we sus- pect it will be found that the Egyptian Treasury will be relieved by the abolition of the Sinking Fund, and possibly by a small reduction in the rate of interest, and that in return the Caisse do la Dette will be invested with a treaty-right to protest against any Budget which appears to the Commis- sioners to involve a danger for the bondholders' dividends. That is not, in our judgment, a fair arrangement ; for Egypt, if left to Asiatic management, ought to retain the right of repudiation ; but it is not one which in the least impedes any English policy. The Caisse will have no rights if the debt is paid off ; and, as we pointed out last week, the British Government, even if they accepted Egypt at the hands of Europe, must, to secure the solvency of their dependency, pay off the Egyptian bond- holders. There is no permanent harm done by the arrange- ment, which incidentally gets rid, officially rid, of the Dual Control ; nor we suspect will there be much involved in the renewed obligation to retire. The words used upon this point will, of course, be of the last importance ; but we suspect their general meaning will be very like this,—that England will evacuate Egypt as soon as a stable Egyptian Govern- ment can be formed, and, should one not be formed by January, 1888, will not remain without a further European sanction. That is to say, she will not keep Egypt without the consent of Europe ; which is nothing new. The first principle in foreign policy laid down by this Government is that only Europe collectively can dispose of the Turkish Empire—the rule which governed all the negotiations about Thessaly—and it cannot defend that rule against other Powers if it is to violate it when its own in- terests are involved. Besides, common-sense must have a. hearing even in politics. Egypt is most important to Great Britain ; but it is not so indispensable that we should hold it in defiance of Europe—which, again, is the only tribunal competent to release us from our past pledges. Strongly as we desire the protectorate of Egypt, we would rather retire from the Valley with the certainty of having to fight our way back again, than hold it if Europe refused to release us from our promises, imprudent as such promises may have been. One contention, to which we still adhere, has alwa3 s been that if the Government, instead of allowing these wretched Pashas to go on misgoverning, would assume the direct administration of Egypt, Europe would within three years recognise the results of their work, and assent to the only arrangement which can secure
.prosperity to the country. It is still open to us to pursue that course ; and in any case a recognition of the claim of Europe to be heard does not alter the permanent situation. She would be heard, with her four millions of soldiers, even if we did not recognise that she ought to be. So far, we do not think Liberal Members will be greatly troubled ; while it is quite clear that the constituencies are decidedly on the Ministerial side. We doubt if the body of the people care at all about the fate of Egypt, while we are titrite certain that they do not intend this Government to be overthrown. They want the Franchise Bill ; they want Mr. -Gladstone ; and they want, above all, to keep Lord Salisbury out. We study provincial papers, and still more provincial meetings, with some assiduity, and we cannot discern the smallest symptom of a desire to change the Government even among those who acknowledge that in Egypt it has not been successful. There is a wish that the Ministers would be firmer, and would not let affairs drag on ; but there is no wish that they should depart, and no hint of belief in any alternative adminis- tration. That it is possible to rely too much upon this de- cision, is, of course, true ; and had the Government really invited Turkey into Egypt, or replaced the Sultan in the Soudan, the decision might have been abruptly changed. That would have been, and would have been considered, a dereliction of avowed principle, would have affronted every philanthropist in the country, and would have given a full moral excuse for numerous abstentions. That story, however, was either an invention or a preposterous exaggeration of some arrangements- intended to prevent the Mandi from reaching Arabia ; and apart from this, and one more question, the constituencies have made up their minds. They will not give Lord Salis- bury power for the sake of Egypt.
The "one more question" is, however, a very dangerous one. It requires no official knowledge of secrets to perceive. that the British Government will propose to lend eight millions to the Egyptian Treasury. That sum, it is admitted on all hands, must be raised somehow, or the machine will stop ; and there are no means of raising it in Cairo. It is net a question of the Bondholders only. They cannot be deprived of their dividends just when they have consented, through M. Ferry, to reduce them, but if they were deprived, the situa- tion would only become worse. No money could then be borrowed; and without borrowing the Treasury of Cairo cannot get on. If it repudiated to-morrow, it could not find the four millions for the indemnities, which are, unhappily, peremptory obligations—that is, obligations which can be extorted by the- Courts—and the four millions required for expenses caused by the Mandi, by the reorganisation of the Egyptian Army, and by the British occupation. The money must be raised, and there are no means of raising it. The financial Rings, whose first object is to obtain a guarantee for the Debt, will not advance another shilling without it ; and recourse to local usurers in Egypt means an increase of the Floating Debt at 30 per cent., and ultimate ruin to the finances. The iniquitous Pre- ference Debt was contracted to get rid of that very difficulty. The British Government, therefore, will advance the money ; and the vote for the advance will be exceedingly distasteful to the House of Commons. It will be said that the loan is a large one, that the security, while we abstain from claim- ing the administration of Egypt, is distinctly bad, and that there is nothing to show in return for the pecuniary risk. Nor is there, it will be argued, any certainty that the loan will be final ; for if the Mandi advances, or a local insurrection breaks out, the Egyptian Treasury may again be brought down to its last piastre. These arguments, while they will give an excuse to all wavering Members, will undoubtedly affect the electors, who either understand finance, or think they do ; and the Government must be prepared with a serious reply. They can say with truth that they have absolutely no option, and that they advance the money to an ally, as they advanced it to Turkey, to Sardinia, and to Morocco, in order to avert worse evils. But that answer will give their opponents a for- midable advantage. " This," • it will be alleged, "is mis- management. We are not only to have the trouble of the occupation of Egypt, but the pecuniary risk, without obtain- ing anything in return except the bitter ingratitude of the Pashas, who never cease their intrigues." The rough business sense of the community, will be exasperated, and men who are now not doubtful may declare that whatever the consequences they will pass no such vote. We trust, therefore, that the Ministry will be prepared to show either that the interests of this country or the people of Egypt will be directly benefited by the loan. If we secure direct control, even for a short period, by the loin, that will be considered sufficient ; while we incline to believe that if in return for the relief the Egyptian Government allows the land-tax to be equalised, and therefore reduced one-third, the British people would not object to a risk which secured to the Egyptian peasantry so immense a boon. There is a deep feeling among Liberals that our occupation has burdened, instead
of relieving, the fellaheen. But if there is to be no visible quid pro quo, if the only defence for the loan is to be the argument of necessity,—then, for the first time, we should be inclined to believe that the Government might be in danger. It could not dissolve on such an issue ; and both its open and its secret enemies would have an excuse which would perplex electors, before whom they could pose as con- scientious defenders of the national purse. We do not believe that Mr. Gladstone, who is before all things full of the sense of his pecuniary trusteeship for the nation, will place his fol- lowers in any such position ; but we do believe that this money must be obtained somehow, and that Egypt cannot obtain it for itself. It is, therefore, round this arrangement that the contest will be fought out.
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