THE ARMY THAT WE NEED. T HE debate on the Army
Estimates may have been satisfactory to those who wished "to take it out of" Mr. Brodrick, or to reduce the Government majority. We cannot say that it was very satisfactory from the point of view of those who, like ourselves, wish to consider the matter not in regard to Mr. Brodrick personally, or as to his success, or want of success, at the War Office, but in regard to the problem of how to get the type of Army best suited to the needs of the Empire, how to provide against such a military fiasco as that which occurred when we were called on to face the South African War, and how to see that we get the best value for the vast sum of money which we spend, and in all human probability must continue to spend, on the Army. As our readers know, we have not been very hopeful of any great saving in expenditure, though we realise that the conservation of the fiscal resources of the nation is per se a most important matter in any scheme for making the nation. safe at home, and ready to strike hard and strike swiftly, if need be, abroad. We want economy as one of the conditions of efficiency ; but in the present circum- stances it seems to us that the true way to look at the matter is not whether we can manage to spend a little less every year on the Army, but whether the sum we are spending is well laid out, and whether we are, in fact, getting the best results possible from the £34,000,000 we deVote to the Army. In our view, we are not at present getting an Army which fulfils the military' requirements of the Empire. To put the matter shortly, we hold that we have not the ,To of force which makes us ready to meet the emergencies with which at any moment we may be confronted, and yet we are spending a sum of money every year on our Army which properly adjusted and properly expended would give us the force we require.
Granted, as we hold it must be granted, that our present 'Army system does not give us what we want, and does not meet the needs of our Empire, and that therefore some change is necessary, it seems to us that the only way in which we can arrive at a true reform is not to try in a scurry of anxiety to put a patch here and a patch there, and to amend with zealous but incoherent fervour, but to think out in the abstract what would be the ideal system of military defence for an Empire situated like ours, and then having established our ideal, to bring the existing system gradually and prudently, into conformity with that ideal. We have already expressed this view, and have attempted to set forth this ideal. If, however, our readers will pardon us the repetition, we will again place it before them in outline. It is clear that the first thing we need is an Army of soldiers to garrison India and the rest of the Empire, and to act as an Imperial police. It is also clear that this Imperial police should be elastic and capable of expansion,—i.e., should always have a large number of its men as it were on furlough, but ready to be called back at a period of emergency—should have, in fact, a Reserve. Next, it is clear that we must keep a force of soldiers always ready in this country to go beyond sea, at a moment's notice in case of a sudden but small emergency, —i.e., to act as an expeditionary force, and to perform the function of the squad of men kept at police headquarters ready to meet a sudden call. Next, we want a force of soldiers to garrison permanently our great arsenals and such defensive forts and works as are to be found in the United Kingdom. Again, it is needful that both the expeditionary force kept at .headquarters and, the troops garrisoning our arsenals and forts should be elastic and capable of expansion,—i.e., should have a Reserve. Now clearly all the soldiers required for these purposes—i.e., for policing India and the Empire generally, for providing the expeditionary force at headquarters, for garrisoning home arsenals and forts, and for the Reserves required to give these bodies the necessary elasticity and power of expansion—must be professional soldiers, that is, men who are under a definite and rigid contract with the State to do its Imperial police work. But this does not, of course, exhaust the military needs of the nation. Two great military needs still require attention The first is to provide a large force of men who will be capable of defending these islands from in- vasion in case of any raid attempted in the temporary absence of the Fleet. The other is the provision of some reservoir of men and some system of enlistment and organisation, some "commission of array," which can be relied upon in a great emergency to give the country a force of men which may number anything up to half-a- million, and of men fit when raised and organised to send on foreign service. In our view, this force for home defence, and also the force capable of meeting such a patriotic call as Mr. Lincoln made when in the Civil War he asked for eight hundred thousand volunteers, and for meeting it, not in muddle and chaos, but quickly and efficiently, must be provided, not by professional, but by unprofessional and citizen soldiers,—i.e., men who know the use of arms and ate organised and equipped, but not men who devote their whole time to soldiering, as does the professional soldier.
This is the skeleton; how is it to be clothed with flesh? The professional soldiers should be provided by an Army which in essentials would be our present Regular Army, though altered, or, rather, developed, in certain respects. As matters stand, our. Army consists of certain professional troops who garrison India and the Empire—i.e., the Line, the greater part of the cavalry, and the artillery—and of certain professional soldiers who only leave the home stations and these islands in case of war,--i.e., the Foot Guards and the Household Cavalry. These troops, which are home-staying, except when an expeditionary force has to be sent out of the country for war purposes, are enlisted. on a, different system and have a different Reserve . from the other professional soldiers. We would accept these existing distinctions. That is, the ordinary professional troops should remain as now, except that we should have only as many regiments of these as were required for service abroad. They would, however, have depot battalions at home, not mere depots, so that there would be a skeleton cadre intact which the Reserve could clothe when called out and create a Reserve battalion of full strength. Next, we would take the Guards system of enlistment and Reserve and develop it, so that instead of, as now, having only some twelve thousand men on that system, we would have, say, fifty thousand horse, foot, and artillery, including the Guards. These fifty thousand professional soldiers raised on the Guards system should constitute the expeditionary force and the home force for forts and arsenals, and so meet our second Imperial need. These home-staying professionals would have a two years' service and a very large Reserve. The need of a Home Defence Army we would meet by organising the existing Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers into a mobile field army on the army corps system. The Militia, however, should be very much better paid and equipped than at present, and in the Yeomanry should be included horse artillery. In all cases the equipment, including guns, should be of the very best kind, and what was not good enough for the professional should never be considered good enough for the Auxiliary, on the sound principle that the less experienced a man is the greater the necessity for giving him good tools. Every Auxiliary regi- ment in the Home Army should, of course, have its full transport, and in a word the various army corps should be complete in every particular, and should be practised every year in rapid mobilisation and in taking up the positions which they would occupy in ease of invasion. Into the service conditions for the Home Army of Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers we need not go at present, except to say that they must be good enough to attract the best men, and that the officers must be properly trained and paid both in money and in status. Auxiliary officers should be able to feel that if they showed ability they would not, as now, " stick " at the position of Colonel, but might rise even to command an army corps, though naturally the biggest posts would oftenest fall to men who had been in the pro- fessional Army, but had been transferred to the Home Army. The two armies, however, would not be in any sense amalgamated. If an officer belonged to the First Army Corps of the Home Army, he would belong to no other force, own no other allegiance, and have no rival military interests while he belonged to that Army. As to the numbers of the Home Army and its Reserves we do not wish to dogmatise, but together they should reach three- quarters of a million men.
Now comes the fulfilling of the last Imperial need,—i.e., the providing a reservoir of men and an organisation which at a call could within, say, two months give the Government some two hundred and fifty thousand men equipped and fully organised into appropriate units, and willing to serve abroad. This is, of course, the most difficult need to meet, but we firmly believe it could be met. First, as to the reservoir of men on whom to draw. That, we believe, exists already, and is sup- plied by the patriotism of the nation. It is, however, comparatively useless, because the mass of the population, though willing and brave, does not know the one thing essential to soldiering,—i.e., how to shoot with a rifle. We would make the reservoir usable by enacting that no boy should be free from the requirements of the Education Act till he had received a physical education of a military nature. We compel him now to learn to read and write. We would in future compel him to learn how to handle a rifle, and to learn also the elements of drill, before the State abandoned its claims on him. This compulsory physical training of a military nature, together- with a proper encouragement of rifle clubs, would supply the reservoir. That, however, would not be enough. In addi- tion we would encourage every man who had received a military training, and every man who held a marksman's certificate, to enter his name on a register of trained men, so that the Government would be able to appeal at once and directly to the trained men in the country not enrolled in any other force. The Government should also keep ready in the dep6ts or military centres scattered about the country the equipment for, say, three hundred regiments, and also have ready drawn out the skeleton cares. Thus when they called for, say, two hundred and fifty thousand Volunteers, they would not call for them in a lump, but would call for, say, a regiment in Bath, for another in Brighton, for two in Bristol, and so forth. And, each regi., ment would already have its recruiting office established, its papers printed, its rifles proviaed, and its uniform decided on. Lastly,the Government would have as part of its system a Colonel and, say, four or five officers already named, and so able to begin at once the work of raising the regiment. We need not, however, go into the details of such a scheme. It is clear that the thing could be done. And in addition to this it would, we believe, be quite possible to arrange that in case of a war where our shores were not immediately threatened a call should also be made on the Home Army. Out of these Auxiliaries it might easily be that a million men could be safely raised. As now, Militia might be allowed to go as units, and. the Yeomanry regiments also. In the case of Volunteers the system of service companies would, as a rule, be followed, though in the cases of homogeneous Volunteer brigades in a Home Army corps it might be possible to create a complete unit to meet the call.
We will say no more to-day to a public wearied with military details except to suggest to our readers that the best way in which to understand our proposal is to con- eider how our scheme would work in war-time. For a small foreign war we should send a part of our expeditionary professional Army. For a large war we should send it all plus its large Reserve and plus the Reserve of the Imperial police. This would enable us to send at least one hundred and twenty thousand men oversea. If the war were a really great one, while we were despatching these the Government would be appealing to the nation at large— but to a nation already trained to shoot—for, say, two hundred thousand men, and also asking the army corps of the improved Home Army and their Reserves—this could be done without destroying the organisation—to give us, say, one hundred thousand men in Militia and. Yeomanry regiments and in service companies. By the end of two months such a force should be raised, equipped, and ready to go. With proper organisation the word " raise " telegraphed throughout the country, even though it did not act so quickly as the word "mobilise," should at once set in motion machinery capable of making the nation's call effective.
No doubt we shall be told that our plan would be as expen- sive as that now existing. We doubt it; but at any rate it would be more efficient. Meantime we have a practical suggestion to make. The House of Commons raises and votes the money for the Army. Therefore it is peculiarly their duty to see that we get value for that money. Why should not a Committee of the House of Commons, sitting with closed doors, have referred to it the question, "Granted that we want many troops for certain purposes [which would be specified in the reference], what kind of troops do we require, how can they best be obtained, and what should be their number ? " The Committee would have nothing to say on policy, but assuming that the policy required so many men, they would consider the best way of providing them and organising them. We venture to think that an impartial body of civilians chosen from both sides would arrive at conclusions not very unlike those we have just put forward.
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