14 MARCH 1914, Page 16

MR. CHURCHILL AND THE NATIONAL SERVICE LEAGUE DEPUTATION.

(TO TER EDITOR 07 THE SPECTATOS.'1

Siw,—The recent deputation from the National Service League to the Prime Minister, on the subject of unpreparedness for home defence, has led to a statement in the House of Commons by the First Lord of the Admiralty, in regard to which, if you will allow me, I should like to offer a few remarks.

Mr. Churchill asserted that I misquoted the First Sea Lord when I introduced a National Service League deputation to the Prime Minister on February 27th, and be added that the context of my remarks was " misleading " and "disingenuous." Re mold also that the Naval members of the Board of Admiralty are the objects of "misrepresentations and gross

attacks." Mr. Churchill will, I am sure, allow me to plead innocent to these charges. Nothing was further from my mind than to score a point in controversy or impute bad faith to any member of the Board of Admiralty, whether Naval or Civil. May I therefore very briefly review the situation as I see it ?

On July 29th, 1909, the Prime Minister laid down as the con- clusion of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that, "in order to secure an ample margin of safety, the force for maintaining home defence should be one capable of dealing with an invading force of 70,0)0." Elsewhere in his speech Mr. Asquith defined this force as follows "I am not now speaking of an Expeditionary Force, but an Army for home defences." On April 22nd, 1913, the First Sea Lord, at the Union Sack Club, ridiculed people who said "If war comes, the Fleet alone is quite enough to keep anybody from coming anywhere near the shores of this Island Kingdom"; and he added: "There could be no more foolish or mischievous statement. The Fleet alone could not do it. The presence of a sufficiently trained professional Army at all times is quite as necessary as the other arm of the Service.' On February 27th, 1914, when introducing the deputation to Mr. Asquith, I said in the address that, in "the considered words of the First Sea Lord, the Navy alone cannot now protect this country against invasion. An efficient land Army is required in addition.'

Speaking in reply to this address, Mr. Asquith said am desired by the First Sea Lord—and I am glad to have the opportunity to repudiate those words. He says that is not his considered judgment, and that it rests upon a misconstruction of the language which he used, and which he says was not used by him in that sense, and that he must not be quoted as giving any countenance to the opinion attributed to him."

On March 4th, 1914, Mr. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, stated: "The First Sea Lord has asked me to say that, before making his speech on April 21st, 1913, on which he con- sulted me, that he was aware of the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on July 29th, 1909, with which be fully agreed." Mr. Churchill stated farther, "The House will see that the original statement of the First Sea Lord is entirely in harmony with the statement of the Prime Minister I have just read."

With these extracts before me, I fail to see how it can be said that I have misquoted the First Sea Lord, or that I can be accused of being disingenuous or misleading.

The above-quoted views—the published accuracy of which is not in dispute—lead inevitably to the following conclusions (a) That the Admiralty and the National Service League are all agreed upon the following points ; (b) that, in the words of Mr. Asquith on July 29th, 1909, there must be in this country "a properly organized and properly equipped force, capable of dealing effectively with an invasion of 70,000 men "; (c) that this force is entirely separate from the Expeditionary Force, and that it is set apart for home defence. Have we such a force? The contention of the National Service League is that we have not ; on the other hand, it is held by many people of various shades of politics that we have. Mr. Asquith can quite easily dispose of our doubts when he makes his forthcoming speech on the results of the work of the Invasion Committee. The Prime Minister has only to say that, apart from the Expeditionary Force, there is in this country a force sufficient to garrison our fortresses, carry out the necessary military duties in the United Kingdom, and deal "effectively with an invasion of 70,000 men."

I fear there is no chance of our hearing such a statement. On the contrary, I cannot help anticipating we shall be told that, on account of the Territorial Force having failed to come up to the required standard of numbers and efficiency, many tens of thousands of Regular troops (a considerable portion, in fact, of the Expeditionary Force) must be kept in this country to do the work which the Territorial Army was brought into being to perform. If my prophecy comes true, the whole case for which the National Service League has been pleading for so many years will be proved up to the hilt. It cannot be said, nor has it ever been said, by any responsible person, that our Expeditionary Force of six divisions is too large for its many duties. Six divisions, after all, only mean 100,000 fighting soldiers, and it is madness to suppose that we can guarantee the safety of our colossal Empire, or meet our numberless engagements and commitments in all parts of the world, with a smaller reinforcement than 100,000 men. In the event of a European war, we are dependent on the help of our French friends for passing our troops through the Mediterranean or for rein- forcing our garrisons in that sea and in Egypt, and we are dependent on them also for helping us to safeguard the fifty

per cent., of our foodstuffs which pass through those narrow waters. Does such a sea debt call for no payment in land farces ?

But entirely apart from all European complications, may I recall the fact that in May, 1858, we had 100,000 British soldiers in India, although at that time our troubles were limited almost entirely to a mutiny of Hindustani troops serving in the Bengal Presidency, them was no unrest in the country, nor had we any anxiety about food, or our lines of communication with home P We were fortunate, also, in having made, a few months previously, a treaty with the ruler of Kabul, which relieved us of all anxiety as regards Afghanistan and the tribes of the North-West Frontier. Moreover, the recently raised Paujab Frontier Force, mainly recruited amongst Sikhs, Panjabis, and Frontier men, re- mained faithful, and gave most valuable assistance in the field throughout the campaign. Yet, in spite of all these advan- tages, the 100,000 British soldiers were none too many for the work.

How easy it is to imagine a state of affairs in which it would be imperative to despatch the whole of the Expeditionary Force (the only reinforcements we possess) as reinforcements to the 70,000 men already in India? Egypt was unknown to us, from a military point of view, in 1858, whereas now we have heavy responsibilities in that country ; nor can we forget that fourteen years ago we became engaged in a war which necessitated the employment of 250,000 men. Happily for us, we had no other complications at the moment, and our fleets were unchallenged in those days. No. One thing is certain ; we cannot possibly attempt to keep our Empire together with less than 100,000 fighting soldiers. Are our home defence forces so numerous, so efficient, so ready to take the field, that we can despatch this small Expeditionary Force where we please and when we please, and remain secure against an invasion of 70,000 men. - Let me say once again—a view with which Mr. Asquith cordially agrees—there is here no question of party politics: the safety and life of the Empire are at stake, and this is equally the concern of all men and all parties. Let the Prime Minister in his forthcoming statement take his courage in both bands unit tell us a plain, unvarnished story of our liabilities and of our assets.—I am, Sir, &c., ROBERTS, F.M. Englemere, Ascot, Berks.