DEFENCE
The voice of the turtle
LAURENCE MARTIN
The recent decision by the British govern- ment that irritants like cs should not be regarded as falling within the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol reportedly caused no little distress within the disarma- ment department of the Foreign Office. In particular, press accounts suggested that the senior permanent official of the department objected very strongly to the Government's action and that he was 'on leave' at a rather surprising time.
For the most part the incident was treated as adding emphasis to the immedi- ate issue at stake, the status of cs gas. Per- haps it is worth remarking, however, that the affair also illustrates a problem of govern. mental organisation where issues of national security are concerned.
So far as the cs matter goes, it seems fair to characterise supporters of the Gov- ernment's position as believing that changes in both the design of chemical weapons and the nature of warfare have rendered obsol- ete and positively unwise the decision of an earlier British government (in 1931) to regard all irritants as forbidden. The oppon- ents, on the other hand, argue that any exceptions fatally weaken a ban on chemical weapons and will facilitate escalation from the less to the more lethal gases.
There are, of course, many other argu- ments on both sides of the question. It is not necessary to decide this issue, however, to notice that the recent flurry of controversy revealed once again how many people are quick to characterise as wicked any resist- ance to a measure which is described as 'dis- armament'. Any proposal to abolish a weapon is a Good Thing and it is in the light of this familiar phenomenon that we should occasionally remember that in the foreign offices of many countries, there are now de- partments whose stock in trade is disarma- ment proposals.
This business began in a serious way when, during the 1960 presidential Campaign, John Kennedy remarked that in Washington, while thousands worked on war, less than a hundred worked on peace. As President, Mr Kennedy set up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (acpa) which in its first annual report was able to claim, as a remarkable coincidence, a staff of one hundred and one. Since then it has had other successes and there have been a good many imitators.
In this country Lord Chalfont became Minister of State for Disarmament in the Labour government of 1964 and his dis- armament section of the Foreign Office acquired an Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (acoau). It is no secret that when Lord Chalfont was switched to 'Europe' and the first head of ACDRU left, the whole business lost a lot of steam. Mr Mulley, who took over, had wider respon- sibilities to distract him and to justify his existence. Indeed ACDRU was almost cer- tainly on the point of euthanasia when the General once more said Non and Lord Chalfont was switched back again. As a study of some inspired newspaper articles will reveal, it might in any case have proved embarrassing for the Labour party to kill off an innovation once so eagerly claimed to be a major contribution to peace. Acnitu is now growing again.
It is therefore worth reconsidering whether it is wise to create a special branch of gov- ernment with a vested interest in disarma- ment. In principle, I believe it is a bad idea. Ideally, measures of disarmament should be considered along with measures of arma- ment, as part of a coherent strategy of national security. This would lead one to believe that the proper place for considering disarmament is in the Ministry of Defence. Such an idea frequently produces cynical smiles, but as a matter of fact, much of the modern conception of arms control—that is, of regulating the military environment to mutual advantage by international agree- ment—is readily acceptable to military men. There is evidence for arguing that the Inter- national Security Affairs division of the Pentagon has done far more than AC:DA to advance the cause of arms control.
Nevertheless, it would be going too far to pretend that the Ministry of Defence does not have vested interests in existing military programmes, and it is probably no bad thing in practice to create a countervailing voice in government.
Moreover, it has to be recognised that while most divisions of government have practical enterprises to run from day to day, a department solely responsible for disarma- ment is in the proposals business. It has no other stock in trade and no other hope of reputation. Thus, however hard such a department tries to remain realistic and self- critical it will inevitably be tempted to look on the bright side of disarmament schemes, Equally naturally, those with actual respon- sibility for national defence are likely to view such schemes with a sceptical eye. That, after all, is precisely the assumption justifying the creation of a special voice for disarmament.
Such a system of countervailing influences may work well enough so long as we do not fall into the all too common trap of assum- ing that the voice of caution is necessarily more partisan than the voice of enthusiasm. History suggests that scepticism often does more than enthusiasm for peace and security.
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