14 NOVEMBER 1840, Page 1

and the lave/tees of the state." French Chambers las' wah.

V ere desget. se. 1'eris with suelt expedition, that the translations which appeared in the London papers of Friday were necessarily hurried. We hoped to obtain a copy of the document in the original, and to have given it in a corrected form ; but were disappointed. One copy of the speech, in French, did indeed reach us; hut it proved to be only a retranslation from an English version. Instead of correcting the faults of what appeared in our columns last week, we now subjoin the speech in the original, copied from the Journal des Dclbitts verbatim et literatim.

" Messieurs les Pairs, Messieurs les Deputes—J'ai eprouve le besoin de vous reunir autour de moi avant l'epoque ortlinaire de la convocation des Chambres. Les mesures quo l'enipereur d'Autriche, In relic de In Gramle-Bretagne, le roi de Prusse, et l'empereur de Russie cot prises de concert pour regler les rapports du Sultan et du pacha d'Egypte in'ont impose de graves devoirs. J'ai la dig- nite de notre patrie 1 cieur, instant quo sa sOrete et son repos. En pers6verant duos cette politiraie moderee et conciliatrice dont nous recucillons depuis dix ans les fruits, j'ai inis In France en etat de faire face aux chances quo le cours des evenemens en Orient pourrait metier. Les credits extraordinaires qui ont .kte ouverts dans cc dessein volts seront incessamment soninis ; vous en appre- eieres les motifs. Jo continue d'esperer quo 1;1 pais generale no sera point troublee. Elk eat necessaire F l'interet continuo de I' Europe, an bonheur de tons les peoples, et an progres de la civilisation. Jo compte our vans pour m'aider it In inaintenir, comme j'y compterais si elionneur de la France et lc rang qu'elle oceupe Parini les nations, nous commandaient de nouveaux efforts.

" La pais 6tait ri",tablie dans le nerd de l'Espagne, et nous nous applaudis- Biome de cot hetireux rultat. Noes verrions avec douleur que les influx de l'anarchie vinssent remplacer les mallieurs de la guerre civile. Jo poste F l'Es- pagne l'interk le plus sincere. Puisse in stahilite du tame de la seine Isa- belle II et des institutions qiii doivent le soutenir, preserver ce noble pays des longues et doulouretFes ipretives des revolutions: . " La satisfaction que 1101.15 IIVOIllreclamee n'ayant pas ete obtenue de la re- publique Argentinejai tailtaine quo de nouvelles forces fussent ajoutees it l'es- cadre chargee d'assuree dans ces plunges le respect de 1109 droits et in protection de nos interets.

" En Afrique, le seleces a couronne plusieurs expeditions importantes, s'est signalee In veleur de nos soldats. Deux de tiles Ills out panne leurs perils. Des efforts s.,itt encore necessaires pone garantir dans l'Algerie la sfirete et in prosperite Ile 1110s etablissemens. Mon gouvernement saliva aecom- plir co que nous avow,oil trepris.

"La ville de BoithTne a (de le theatre d'une tentative insensee, qui n'a. send qua litire (elates de nouveau le devonement de la garde nationale, de Parmee, et de in population. Toutes les ambitions echoueront contre une mo- narchic fondk et defendue par tonic In puissance du vmu national. " La loi du budget ne tardere pas it etre soutnis:e h votre examen. J'ai pres- ent in plus severe economic duns In fixation des depenses ordinaires. Les (venomous nous out impose des charges inattendues : in confianee quo la prosperite publique, rendue h tout son essor, nous permettra de les supporter sans alterer Pettit de nos finances.

" D'autres (140tioss VMS seront presentees pour des travaux d'utilite pub- lique, dais l'interet d,.s !cures et sur la Ebert(' de l'unsei,gneinent. " Messieurs. je n'ai jaetai.; rklaine avec plus d'empressement et de confiance votre loyal concours. 1,Im1tilissance n'a point deeourage les passions anarehi- ques. Sous que1.11.1, fonne qu'elles se presentent, man gouvernement trouvera dais les lois exis:antes et dans lo fcrme maintien des libertes publiques, les armes necessaires pour les reprimen Pour moi, dais les epreuves quo m'im- pose hi Providence, Jr Lie veux que lui rendre grace de In protection dont elle no cease de me (amyl ir, ma fluitille et moi, et motives it la France, par an sobs

toujours phis a.“1.ht illtiWk et de son bonhettr, in reconnaissance quo m'inspirent lea teinoijmges cl'alfection dont elle m'entoure dais ces cruets momens."

On Friday, the Chamber of Deputies proceeded to ballot for the President. The election had been looked for with anxiety, as a great test of the strength of parties : it resulted in the triumphant success of the Ministerial candidate. The candidates put forward and the number of votes stood as follows- 220 votes 154 4 1 1 1 M. Sauzet M. Oil illon Barrot M. Thiess

31. Berryer

M. Dupla M. Dnfoure

In the minor elections of Vice-Presidents and Secretaries, the Cabinet were equally successful. The four Vice-Presidents elected were M. Calmon, M. Dufaure, M. Jacqueminot, and 31. Salvandy.

The Chamber of Deputies met on Tuesday in their Bureaux, for the purpose of electing the Committee to draw up the address in reply to the speech from the throne.

The knowing Deputies were elected: General Bugerind, H. Passy,, Do Res

musat, De Dimas, 13. Delessert, Jacqueminot, Dupin, and Solvently. The votes were as follows: 1st Bureau—General 13ugettud, 25; Tocqueville, 22. 2d Bureau—Ilipiedyte Passy, 27 ; Rampon, 7 ; Coreelles, 7 ; Tracy, 3. 3d Bureau— Wont:to, 21; Hebert, 19. 'Bit Bureau—Eamartine, 22 ; Du- four°, 11; Gander Pie:es, 5. Slit Bureau—Ducos, 24; Galos, 10; Delessert (Francois), ; Blank Vote, 1. 6th Buts•au—Delessert (Benjamin), 22; Ganneron, lb ; 1; 1.aerosse, 1; Legentil, I. 7th Bureau—General Jacetteminot, 25 : Cliasseloup, 1 ; Gustave de Beaumont, I. tith Bureau-

; fItIl C,12; ditithert, 2; latiloucette, I ; Durand, I. flth Bu-

reau—Salvandy, ; I 1.

t-i.mmAitv Or TUE DISCUSSIONS IN TIM First Burma .—M. 11.; Tocqueville opened the debate. Ile objected to the speech from the. thro-e, herau,e it did not reflect the sentimetits of the French nation. They kit lti.and naturally so, at tha In:most. in which England had separated twits. If from alliance with Frame to tii ies. herself into the

arms of the ti 1 Franee. The speech from the throne, at such a time, proelaimisl tint it was to the interest of the Frsneli nation to re- main at pesee. M. de 'novo:vine said he was an advocate for peace; hut surrounded in I it to liy hostile or envious nation:, hr did not think that

the proper souriii•1 -..eure the maintenance of Ann, Innnitity and

resignation. 'L I of the Government should he dignified and firm. In proportion as 1: Isieitme humble, the arrogance of other nations would increase.

M. Devergier de I It ran ne took nearly the same line of argliniellt as M. de Toequeville. I I 1-ab! tint England would never have coecluded the treaty

of the 15th of dills:, it had not been influenced by a belief that France would merely make a coi it and not act. General thigefoei telaiitted ti it the Fpcech from the throne was not all Wry decided colour ; bat said it (amid not be otherwise, tH it sv:H the work of it new Cabinet, which was not yet thoroughly acquainted with the position of' things.

Serpnel 11 de Cora Iles considered the speech as unworthy or Ihe country, arid l'olf,p1:■11.-1 ii tvong terms of the abandonment of the cause of the Pemba of Egypt. 31. de Tracy said he could not admit that France bad entered into any posi- tive engagement with Mehemet Ali, or that she had been insulted by the. treaty of the 15th of July ; but even if this had been the case, they were bound to consider the extent of the danger of a struggle against the whole of Europe, i

and to reserve their strength for a more fitting opportunity. He disapproved of the intention of fortifying Paris : he saw no utility n it as a security against imminent danger.

M. Passy entered into a defence of the Ministry, of the 12th of Slay, of

which he was a member. He said it was not true that EngIantl had made a pmposition to force the passage of the Dardanelles : the proposition came from France. As to the ulterior relations between Russia end England, he saw in them an advantageous position for France, if she would unite prudence with moderation. In his opinion, the negotiations connected with the treaty of July 15th ought to go on simultaneously with armaments.

M. de Combard asked the Minister of Justice, who was present, whether the Twesent Cabinet would make a cams bell of the deposition of Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt ? and whether, by the note of the 8th of October, the posses- sion of Egypt was guaranteed to him as regards France ?

M. Martin (du Nord) said, he could not answer this question without a breach of official discretion, or compromising the negotiations which had been opened.

Third Bureau.—M. L'Ilerbette said lie would neither support the policy of the late nor that of the present Cabinet ; for he saw little difference between them, except it was that the une had endeavoured to conceal its timidity under big words, and that the other announced in its present language the humility of the acts which were to come. The late Ministry had, he said, placed the Eastern question upon very false grounds; and it ought not to have with- drawn from the conference, where it might have been able to obtain better con- ditions for Mehemet Ali than he could now have. As the question now stood, he saw nothing to induce France to rush into a war, either as regarded her in- terests or her honour ; but he would recommend that the armatnents should continue, so its to ;invent, in ease of need, the possibility of Russia or England obtaining territorial aggrandizement or a commercial monopoly in Turkey or Syria.

M. Larabit adopted nearly the same line of argument as M. L'llerbette, M. Hebert trusted that the address would not recommend the continuation of' armaments. It would be sufficient, in his opinion, to continue to make general protestations on behalf of the honour and dignity of France.

M. de Remusat remarked, that many lines of policy might be laid down as regarded affairs in the East, but that the late Ministry had adopted that which the Chamber had sanctioned by its votes. This policy consisted in preventing the question of the East from being treated either against or without the con- currence of France. The statues quo was to be maintained and the proteeter- ship of France had been promised to Mehemet All ; and the nation i al nterest in. the East also required that he should be supported, independently of the consider- tion due to a man who had raised the glory of the Ottoman name. France was also bound to do all in her power in aid of the development of the navies of secondary nations, and the establishment of secondary and independent States in the Mediterrauean, which might serve as a counterpoise to those of the first class. The last Cabinet had not, he said, committed the error of withdrawing from the conference ; there had been no conference, but merely negotiations between Ambassadors. " We were," added SI. de Remusat, "on good terms with England, when without apprizing us, she concluded the treaty of the 15th of July. She had also put forth the humiliating belief that, pleased or displeased, France would show resignation. There was not in this indeed, a case for War, but there was a great lalling-off in the friendly feeling that bad previously existed. The advice given to Ibrahim, by which his progress was checked after the victories of Koniah and Null), had also in some sort bound France to the Pasha; not indeed to such an extent as to go to war in his sup- port, but certainly to the extent of employing all her influence in his behalf. If France, without waiting for a partition of territory in the East, found her- self excluded from commercial influence, that would be a ease of war. The last Ministry set out with declaring that the treaty of the 15th of July was not in itself a ease for war, because it was hoped that it would not be executed, or that the success of the Pasha would make it mill, or that there would be a division among the Allies. The last Ministry had also stated that the mere execution of the treaty would not be a case for war, but that the necessity for war might arise out of the eventualities of the struggle between the Pasha and the Allies." Finuuth Bureau.—M. Gander Pages said, lie should abstain on this occasion from doing more than advising the Committee to :mil for the production of every document connected with the Eastern question. The truth was not known to the country : the late Cabinet had monopolized not less than six of the journals, and the public could not know from them how the question really stood.

M. de Lamartine would adopt the same reserve as the last speaker. The susceptibility of a generous nation had been excited, and alarm and agitation had been created. The production of all the documents connected with the negotiation could alone enable the country to judge how far this excitement had been justified.

Fifth Bureau.—M, Milton Barrot proposed that, as the President of the Cabinet of the 1st of' March was a member of this bureau, it should be he who should speak first, in order to furnish elements for discussion.

M. Thiers expressed himself nearly in the following terms—" I entered the Cabinet on the 1st of March with the liveliest regret at being called upon to undertake the direction ot piilihie affairs in the situation in which they were left to my hands. At home the majority had been broken up; abroad a very serious question had just been mooted ; and the numerous despatches which I have written will prove that from the very first moment I augured ill of the conchsSon of the affairs of the East. Nevertheless, I could not do otherwise than accept office : and I will lay before you in few words what was the state of the Eastern question %% hen I came to the direction of all'airs. I trust I shall say nothing that may wound the feelings of my predecessors; but at the same

time, as may be well believed, 1 cannot in this affair accept more than my own Aare of the responsibilit v. All union of views between France aud England had ceased ; tuni England found herself completely united to Russia, AtistriS, and Prussia, in the question of the East. Frani.° was alone in her opinion fl opposition to the filOr Powers. She had demanded in the most formal and post: t ive manner the hereditary suricession of both Egypt and Syria for Mehemet Alb She had even annetitieeil her intention of separating herself completely Irons England alai the other Powers, rather than yield. mem that point. I do not

Ii to say by' that, that any irrevocable engagement had been taken; but

when I undertook the direittion of nithirs, fninni h., alone in opposition to fly. four Powers of Europe, and maintaining a po;nt which none of them chose to admit. The only line of conduct whieli it 8Cellied to me might to be pursued in this situation, w ao it, gain time, in order to allow the amour pr(Tre of the negotiators which had Le en embarked in the affair to disengage itself. M. Guizot was A tobas,iiiIiir at London. not think flint he can complain of theididr?ticiitiocomplain of his services, and I do shall monk t dehatc in the Chamber. 1 maymstiatge7110bWinael'er,Attlilaitilledvseenfftos'rtIs and mine toodell to prevent the fitful resolution of the 15th of July. We fiiiled, lassies, England hall already irrevocably made up her mina. Lora

It ti ways considered the power of the Viceroy as an injurious oue; nod he has ul ways declared at every epoch, that the only good line of policy was to place him in subjection to the Porte. The three Continental Powers

the Viceroy. As to the boundary question, the note carefully reserved it for future decision ; for it expressly said, that the fate of the war actually entered upon might cause the territorial limit to vary, which would separate in Syria the states of the Sultan and the Viceroy, hut that as to the existence of the Viceroy, an attack upon it would be coneid.'red a eq,:as he'll. So coneiderable fool so serious was the resolutimi cmitained in this note, that it became itself a Cabinet question. It; at tlir! •-aine time, it had onffitimal, as people venture to mood, the abandonment of Svria, it would have contaffied the immediate and. they never succeeded, for never has this proposal, which we were led to expect, complete solution of the E L,te ri thlair : for if Fleece had declared that she been made to us. At all events, I had recommended M. Guizot not to reject abandoned Syria, peace would have been signed that very instant, since the is—to accept it ad riferendum ; and I was seeking to incline the Viceroy to treaty of the 15th ofJuly, and all its consequeesea wall bare been agreed accept it, when the treaty of the 15th of July was signed. This treaty was to. The proof that it did not contain the abandoomeot or s,ria was, that the concealed from France. It is perfectly true that M. Guizot knew that some- question still suleisted to its entire extent, eve!) to the present moment. He thing of a very important nature was preparing in the English Cabinet ; that (M. Thiers);ffistained from judging his sued's-airs, but he did not choose them be bad been informed of it, and that he hiuf informed his Government of it ; to make use of an act of his administration to cover whatever they might but they had made a mystery of it to him, and he was not informed of the sig- mean to do after him.

nature of the treaty until the signature had already been given. I considered (Thus speech was liatened to with the utmost silence ; it lasted upwards of this not as an insult offered to France, but as a great want of consideration for an hour.)

her (tut tres naturals procede7)—nn abandonment of her alliance in fact, which Sialh Boo:am—Marshal Sebastian' contended that France had entered into she could not but consider very wounding to her feelings. This MaUVUIS pro- no engagement with Mehemet Ali or his son. What France desired was the cede, however, was not of a nature to call for war. The motive which, as far strength of the Ottoman empire, and not the aaforandieement afire Pasha of as I am concerned, decided my whole line of conduct, was this: four Powers Egypt. had formed a coalition, not like the Powers which united in '92 to pass the M. Lacrosse was of a different opinion. Tho honour of France, in Ids opt- Rhine the following spring, but to annul the influence of France iii the most important question which has been mooted for a long time ost In a question in which France had is greater interest than the having hastened to join themselves to England as soon as they saw her sepa- rated from France, Lori Palmerston found himself strong enough not to make any sacrifices to France. It is perfectly true, as has been said by certain persons, who gained their information I cannot • tell from what sourcei—it is perfectly true that the Ministers of Austria and Prussia insinuated to M. Guizot, that perhaps Lord Palmerston might be brought to give the Viceroy the possession ot Syria for life. They said that they would use their efforts.. to brine the English Minister to this result; but

greater part of the Powers who undertook its solution, she could not allow of hetet. Ile approved, however. m iiie ;liana:ow:it- s.,i had oeen °roared, and being put out of the question. I consider, then, that France ought to take trusted that they would he cohtimo d, so thot • be ;:ehity of Eranee might be

steps to obtain a modification in the resolutions taken at London. I should. upheld. As to the speech from the thrime, it laf thought, either firm- never have demanded a concession which would have been a humiliation for ness or foresight. the Four Powers ; for WC ought not to seek to humiliate others, when desirous lh. T.e.te ole ot. 'ad, that the IICW had reproached with having

of not being humiliated ourselves. What was necessary was a concession, by which the honour and influence of France might be saved. It was w-hat she owed, loyally speaking, to the 'Viceroy ; for if she had not interfered in his affairs at the commencement of the negotiations, he would infallibly have forced the Porte to submission, and obtained front it all be wanted. Such was the motive of the armaments we have made. Certainly, in my thoughts, what was aimed at WIts not to prevent the passage of the Rhine, for no one in Europe would have been hardy enough to have taken such a step spontaneously ; the intention was to place France in a position to negotiate efficaciously. But in order for the armaments to have had this effect, it was necessary that they should be serious. Half- measures were only vain measures, at once expensive, compromising, and far from honourable. The only thing which could have an efficacious result, was a complete armament, which might give Europe to understand, that if they did not choose to negotiate upon an equitable and moderate basis, the result might be war. Without a doubt, by following this line of policy war was possible—just passible, and not certain : hut then, to attempt to obtain at the same time a result compatible with our honour, and to preserve the certainty of peace, is an impossibility—to attempt to have an influence upon the world, especially when one is one against four, and to pre-

serve the certainty of peace, is contradiction unworthy of political men, We ought not In /matte embarked in the Eastern question; hut once embarked, as has been done, it was necessary to get out of it otherwise than to the shame of the country. My colleagues and myself resolved that .the country should. be

armed. The country %MS not in a state of readiness: it could not be ready before the spring. was desirous of' gaining time until then ; and I was decided upon committing no rash act as low as the necessary preparations did not appear sufficiently advanced. I wished, too, that the Pasha of Eg.ypt should confine himself to the defensive in a vigorous manner : and in case this defensive attitude should meet with even half-suceess, France, in taking, the position of' an armed mediator, would have had the chance of obtaining a concession, however moderate a one it might be. Provided it were proved that it was owing to France, the honour of the country would have appeared to me to be saved. When the bombardment of Beyrout took place, this event, which it was very easy to foresee, took us in no way by surprise, and changed nothing in our determination ; but it proved still more that it was necessary to hasten measures, and I then demanded of the Crown three things,—first, the completion of the armament ; secondly, the convocation of the Chambers as speedily as possible, in order to demand of them the completion of the arma- ment ; thirdly, that the fleet should he sent to Alexandria, to cover this im- portant position and support the moral attitude of the Egyptians. These propositions were rejected, and my colleagues and I gave in our resignation. The Duke de Broglie was called in, and a compromise was effected. It was

agreed upon that the Chambers should he convened for the 20th of October—

that is to say, twenty days afterwards ; that during the interval, the fleet should be concentrated unties the command of Admirals Lalonde and Dupuis': that the preparations, which were commenced, should he continued; and that, as far as regarded the measures necessary for completing them, a definite resolu- tion should he adopted at the moment of drawing up the Speech from the throne. The same day, the note of October was agreed upon, the intention of which was to reply to the act flint declared the rights of the Paella forfeited, but in which Syria was tar from being abandoned. When the authentic text is known, it will be imposaible to Jiave any further doubts upon the point. It was agreed upon at the same time, that when the moment for drawing up the speech of the Crown should come, if the Crown accepted the in•oposals of the Cabinet, the Cabinet would remain in office ; it' not, that it would retire ; but that the members or the two Cham- bers being then ;issembled, the formation of the Cabinet would present tinier difficulties. The reaignations, however, were tendered, and it WZIS agreed upon to keep the secret. The moment for the drawing up the speech from the Crown being come, the Cabinet renewed its proposals, the principle of which was the completiou of the general armament. The proposal of the Cabinet not being accepted, the resignations were again renewed, and irrevocably given. It was not upon a single sentence of the speeech that the dissension broke out, it was upon the ens( fog. of the plan. The Cabinet would not have either a peace at any price, nor a war at any prier; what it desired was, to support

itself by a serious. and •ffiove all complete armament ; iiegotiate fin. the Viceroy conditions which might he more or less advantageous, according as fortune had been more or less favourable to him. Such were the motives of the resignation

of the Cabinet. The late Cabinet titters no complaint : it does not attack its successors ; it confines itself to the simple remark, that the armament or France not being 1:0111111,,te, and the intention of going to war in any CAA' not being manifest, there is no longer any possibility of negotiating in an effective manner."

M. de Reseigenx then followed, and declared that in his opinion the honour

of the countra WaS IlinraVS eeeeteed : and in this respect he referred to the note of the e.'ih tif 0.•tober,-by whieli he considered Si. Tiller's had abandoned Syria.

M. niers protested violently aaoiast the sense attriletted to fire note of the eth of October. The note, he slid, asis the result. of a Cabinet question, which

was diacussed at great length, and of which he well knew the sense. It was a reply to the ad- by Nviiich.the Porte declared the forfeiture of the Viceroy. It was a protest 111,e lo by threateeine such a step as a eosas bell/ against the idea which might have been entertained of absolutely destroying the exietence of concealed from France. It is perfectly true that M. Guizot knew that some- question still suleisted to its entire extent, eve!) to the present moment. He thing of a very important nature was preparing in the English Cabinet ; that (M. Thiers);ffistained from judging his sued's-airs, but he did not choose them be bad been informed of it, and that he hiuf informed his Government of it ; to make use of an act of his administration to cover whatever they might but they had made a mystery of it to him, and he was not informed of the sig- mean to do after him.

chased by dishonour. If the honour of Hama- tlo• equilihrium of Europe should he in dahger, France would know how to 1,:,eet the neeeasity for war.

He denied that any promiao of support bad ev, :a ei I tIme Pa3lait of Egypt. &read; Bur: the seventh lonami also, which had 31. Goon, one of the

late Ministers, for President, the general discosdoo was very long aid violent.

General Jacqoeminot first rose. Ihni t ee. la 1. H:: insolted? Te answer to tins question he could onla- ;a- wns as susceptible as any one could be upon t; and lie was ready to shed the last drop of not wish to red-lie:nate against Ile• "m•- mated by a natimed feeling ; I-:, I-

diplomatic notes if the , •1 the journals %%Lich followed its as; M. Gustave de Ile:mm(011" : .

diSCUSSCLl to par•i, - had often express d the fear that 11.,•- he would ask w LI her that ....ramry, Upon it at pia:a:ht. did not 1,..1;:rj, tl;,• S.... keys el the LI' it, ()I. dread the effect of ao ,xelusi‘e

Ought not Fra..ea. :.'s•., to sae e .r: '

deranee in the Lod, than liars'':, 1.: • 8!ila;nis h a dignified hot or been station,b u A aandria to aa .fe a . •

circumstances. :.., • shhredi that lb.- s•

tenatice of Foe,. 1: -

if the legitimate of Fra:hv e••• by war. nion, tees involved, and the power of the Pasim ought to be maintained. M. Dubuia said, that in the abaenee of the docoments efoolected with the negotiations, it was difficult to form an epiniou as Si, the poliey of the late Ca- one4 to be Europe ; and . est it, grasp

■ kept the resesn to et. Suez. ;.sepon- :leet at he at somild have te Lgyet. 1:oder the :- eve. mo: no the main- aot nary, that s.,eport it

. lie himself c emoi honour, :fa.. He did • ,ed also ani- , ieotween the eta: Land, and M. Bianco) (of the Loire Inf:riour,' rather weak. 11.- 0,•s aware that in Eual,.

der the speech fr,ee ief throne of as „ trusted that the CI .•::ber would not a vloce the Deeply wounded as be was at seeing the c.a.,. conclusion of the treaty of the 15th July,

bonds of alliance il•s:at mg between Ire „..

the Cabinet of f a I st March for having t .".. •. easore- • • -aeoaratioa for • 1:0 W3S. of • l the .re. • Mut ed. the . trade the

war. laevertle •,s, far as concerned te.•

opinion that the te.,'..atet of the 1st of 31-f e's representative-. ,:f country to deliberate a:

intending to wao,, e with the pr, -•, ;a. :

the most serious sses, and that th. use of. It Wa: h,u 1:: Yolor•-eary assassin's halal royalty.

31. Gunin-1;., . entered into I, Little of N. • :Ministry had the speech of tie- Stli (,fatobi'r ii , • , not considered ...- between the been insulted. ii,,'

oil'. By iutrr:u:,

the note of tea—. . • continue ht tio:::

Si, Gouin w.,s e East; but in Oh the country prove the fads . Etotalantl had pao: Dardanelles, i blo t.ottin great

COollICSS Of

Eighth nations respee, 31. 4.■ nizot . lie eould saa: ;:,-.

regulated to, a:ta.

:\ I. I.:Mooed ;;.: 4.4... .4 the Pasha ?

M. Ciuizot reldle a. ea' ••.: enga:ement with the Pasba, lanaar ash,d ,

there should la• s; .topoacb. thl. 1,'.; • 10 four. Fero" I. ,• lVeTt` desirous ot: havin the Crown I.:lit to rein- bathe : to reply. ac it of the !t. regret the lie thanked

Lad ;Le

V C its

:ferH he - . eot

-"en

to s:sry te•

ast :

. 1....s:

time cal -sry to :March.

the s 31.

the

M. Barand de Romorantin observed, that the policy of the different Cabinets had been sometimes to support the Sultan and sometimes the Pasha ; and thistle considered a policy unworthy of the country. To judge by the replies of M. Guizot, it would appear that the country had not been insulted; but in that case, what reproaches were due to the late Ministry, that encouraged this idea in the country M. Billfold said, that England proposed an alliance to the Cabinet of the 12th of May, in order to treat the Eastern question. England, at a late period, concluded with Russia that which the Cabinet of the 12th of May refused. The Cabinet of the let of March did, after the 15th of July, what a firm and prudent policy imposed upon it. He wished for France to assume a more forrnidable position.

M. Guizot replied to M. Billaud, that in tlie. opinion of the present Cabinet the maintenance of the Pasha is not the question. The speech of the Crown was explicit in that respect. The Cabinet admits the note of the 8th of October. With respect to the question of armaments, the Cabinet does not Coincide with the views of its predeeeseors. The measures which had been already adopted in order to attain more than 1.'0,000 men appeared sufficient to treat honourably for peace. In the present state of things, there was no necessity for further firmaments. The Cabinet of the 1st of -March wished to pot on foot 150,000 men more. That would be a direct movement for war. If the two Cabinets agreed in many points on the late policy, there was between them at difference of napreeiation as to the ibture. The preceding Cabinet looked upon wee as all 'lint inevitable; whilst the llew Cabinet believed in the possibility of maintaining peace with honour. A difference in the line of conduct necesearily resulted froin that difference in the nature of viewing the future.

M. Duchatel formally denied, the assertion that a refusal had been given to enter into an alliance with Eegland upon the question of the East.

Count Jaubert stated, that the late :Ministry upon coming into office found France in an isolated position in Europe. It was not necessary to say that • Frauce was insulted, for she was not so, but she had to arm without boas•ing or bluster; mid the late Ministry did right to retire when it found obstacles placed in the way of the fresh armaments which it considered indispensable to the honour of the country.

M. de Vatry said that Trance could not make war with all Europe alone.

M. Jaubert replied, that nothing, was ever to be obtained of France by threats; and this was the principle which dictated the acts of the late Ministry.

M. Dupin considered the 5perch of the Crown to be perfectly satisfactory, and sufficiently energetic. It did not provoke a war; but that did not mean to say that war could not be made if neceeeary. Ninth Buy,an.—M. de Came attempted to trace the origin of the treaty of the 15th July ; and declared that England, ins becoming a party to it, gave her adhesion to the principle of partition in the East. According to him, the eventuality of this partition was perfectly uuderstood, if not openly avowed ; and, if followed up, Russia was to have Constantinople and England Alenandria.

M. Beeville entered, into same general considerations, the object of which was to show that an alliance wtrh Russia was the most natural for France, but that the political situation of France had rendered the alliance with England a measure of necessity. In the course of his observations, M. Berville took occa- sion to observe, that the Cabinet of M. 'riders was ilot responsible for the opinions of the journals whichluol professed to support it, and that it was unfair to judge of the late Ministry in any other way than by itsown acts. M. Janvier, in reply to M. Beeville, refitted the attacks which had been mule upon the Mieistry of the lath of May, and threw all the responsibility of the present position upon the Cabinet of the let of March. lle dwelt with great force upoe what he styled the wet t of foresight, the illusions, the rash- ness, end the retractions of the poliey of M. Tillers. Alluding to the defence set up by M. Berville with reference to the journals M. Janyter admitted that M. Thiers wns not responsible for every ..pinion of journals, put forward by those which, although friendly to him, were independent of any direct control: but there was, he said, great ingeptitude in dieavowing now these journals whose opinions and assertions had fin several !limas been uncontradicted by the Ministry, and which, on the contrary, had reeeived a sanction as to their general policy in the colatnns of the Nessager, which had by purchase become the property of the Government.

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and the lave/tees of the state." French Chambers las' wah.