The Case for a Z.V.A.
By FRANK DEBENHAM*
RECENT releases of information on how the U.S.S.R. is tackling the water-problems of Central Asia take the breath away, just as the scope and power of T.V.A. (the Tennessee Valley Authority) in the United States did in the past. The schemes of the Russian engineers dwarf all previous ones, for the excavation of only one set of canals is equivalent to that of sixteen Panama Canals. We need not feel unduly envious, however, for it was British engineers who were first in such a large field, in India, Iraq and Egypt, and the Australian Snowy River scheme is comparable in originality of design with American 'projects, and not so far behind in size. River-control, in the modern sense of vast barrages for irri- gation or power-schemes, is a powerful factor for peace and unity in a large valley, just because all the population depends on its smooth functioning. Unity need not mean ownership by one nation, as Egypt must know when it talks wildly of the "unity of the Nile basin," but it does mean agreement on' how to control the water-resources. The recent federation pro- posals for Central Africa draw fresh attention to the Zambesi River in this respect, because the territories concerned include the greater part of its watershed. Some of the ultimate head- waters lie in Portuguese Angola, and its lower course runs through Portuguese East Africa, but all the more habitable land lies in territory which is under British control, including part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It is therefore possible even at this stage to coneeive of a Zambesi Valley Authority somewhat on the United States pattern. It is unlikely that a Z.V.A. would have the extensive powers of its predecessor, but it would start with other advantages—a more virgin land to be developed, a scantier population to be persuaded and fewer vested interests to be bargained with or overcome. On the other hand its markets would be distant, its labour unskilled, and response to its call for mechanised aid slow, all of which mean delay. Yet delay in reasonable degree is precisely what Africa needs in its development—delay in execution, that is to say, not delay in starting. What then would our postulated Zambesi Valley Authority do ? That is a question easy to answer in broad outline but impossible in detail, for the simple reason that we do not know enough about the watershed. Some parts of it indeed are little better known today than when David Livingstone first went there a century ago. Obviously its first duty would be survey. A young army of hydrologists must be sent there to find out all about the behaviour of the rivers—their regime, as it is called. At present that is being done in a piecemeal fashion by each territory in the "spare time," so to speak, of the water-development boards, who are short of staff and mainly engaged upon routine development of a local character. But not altogether, for Rhodesians are capable of "thinking big," and they are already
* The writer, who was Professor of Geography at Cambridge from 1930 to 1949, has made a prolonged study of water problems in Central and Southern Africa.
investigating large projects for the Zambesi, in the Kariba Gorge and on its tributaries the Kafue in Northern Rhodesia and the Shire in Nyasaland. Inevitably there must be, in three separate territories, a degree of overlapping, extra expense and lack of co-ordination in effort, which even a ready spirit of co-operation through the Central African Council could not avoid. These hindrances will vanish, or at least be greatly reduced, if and when there is closer union.
The general aim of the Z.V.A. would be to make the fullest use of the water resources for the benefit of all concerned in the watershed. To ensure this the water received in the rainy season must be held back as much as possible, and as high up as possible on the plateau, in order to make it last out the dry season of winter and spring. The multitude of swamps, large and small, on the plateau already do this, but in a wasteful way, losing much by evaporation and growing little or no food. The control of all swamps must therefore be a charge on the Z.V.A.
Below the swamps come the falls and rapids, where power can be generated to a degree at least as great as in Tennessee, but where costly works will be required. Associated with them, but where possible lower down, irrigation schemes have their chance, for power is no use without an industrial population, and that population must be fed by more intensive agriculture not too far away. Essential, too, for the partnership of power- users and food-growers is provision for cheap transport, as far as possible by the rivers themselves. Fortunately the same works which provide conservation of water by barrages and dams improve the river as a waterway; but the three aims of communications, power and irrigation must be under the same control, since at times their claims conflict.
Indeed, the full reason for a supreme river authority lies in the fact that a choice must constantly be made as to how best to use the water for the benefit of the whole watershed and not I merely one part of it. There is a very good example in the case of the Upper Zambesi where it approaches the Okavango and the Kwando so closely that in high flood they exchange water to some extent—that is to say, the first of the three to reach its peak parts with some of its water to the others. Conse- quently it would be possible to construct barrages and canals which could divert most of the water of the Zambesi into the Okavango, or vice versa. Needless to say, such an area has been somewhat of a playground for planners. There has been, for instance, more than one project for turning the Zambesi down to the south, to reinforce the Okavango, and thence on to the broad Kalahari, there to establish a second Gezireh Irri- gation Scheme. That would be the equivalent, on a very large scale, of turning the Thames at Oxford off through Bucks and Bedford to the Ouse and the Wash. No doubt Berks and Middlesex would like to be consulted about it.
A better example of an important decision to be taken is in the Kafue River, a large tributary of the Zambesi, though here the watershed is already under the control of a single authority. Northern Rhodesia. Here the situation is that the million acres of productive land, the great Kafue Flats, occur above and not below the Kafue Gorge, where at least half-a-million horse- power could be generated. This is in the wrong sequence, and illustrates the two different uses of water to man, its energy and its crop-growing properties. You can extract power from it and then use it for irrigation, but not the other way about. Someone will therefore have to decide how much of the Kafue is to be used for food from the Flats and how much for power from the gorge below them.
Unity of control has stronger reasons for support than these, however, and from the point of view of the ultimate prosperity of Central Africa the proper use of its water- resources must be given a high priority. That, in many respects, is the strongest argument in favour of closer union between the territories, for it will affect nearly all the inhabitants in a more lasting way than any other form of development.
It may be argued that such an organisation as a Z.V.A. belongs to a somewhat distant future, but I would suggest that it should be considered carefully at this stage, and possibly, if only in nucleus form, be set up quite soon. The best reason for that is the scarcity of people` qualified to examine the hydrology. The staffs of the individual water-development boards in the territories are fully occupied with short-term projects and current routine, and since qualified hydrologists are at a premium the soundest scheme would be to train them locally. Those concerned with hydrology in East and Central Africa have already given some attention to the need for train- ing men in advance of developments to .come.
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