THE SHIP OF THE LINE IN BATTLE.* IT is a
matter for congratulation that Sir Reginald Custance should have decided to put the materials collected for use in his lectures, at the Royal Naval War College, during the past three years into a permanent form, which has made them available for students of the complex problems of warship design. As a summary of war facts, from Trafalgar to Tsushima, the volume is of great value : it also includes interesting accounts and illustrative diagrams of naval engage- ments at Sinope, Sebastopol, and Kinburn during the Crimean War ; of fights which took place during the American Civil Wei; the campaign which ended in the battle of Lissa; the war between Chile and Peru ; the battle of the Yalu between the Chinese and Japanese fleets ; and the naval incidents of the Russo-Japanese war. Terse comments and pointed questions are interspersed by the author throughout his narrative and his analysis of war facts; these add much to the
• The Ship of the Lin., in Bettie. By Admiral Sir Reginald Cnstance,
R.C.B., C.V.O. London William Blackwood and Sons. [5e. net.]
interest of the book, help to point the lessons taught by past naval actions, and indicate their bearing upon the principles of future naval construction. Enormous labour must have been bestowed upon the collection of such a mass of detailed information from widely scattered records, and upon the colla- tion, comparison, and condensation of a large number of official and non-official accounts and reports. Admiral Custance has taken nothing on trust ; he has done his best to reconcile conflicting reports, and to ascertain what really happened in the several actions described, as well as to discover the main causes of victory or defeat. His individual opinions are never obtruded, nor is the statement of those opinions the author's main object. Readers will have no difficulty in determining what these opinions are, yet the intention expressed in the brief introduction to this interesting book has been fulfilled.
" War facts have been examined and set forth" in a brief and clear fashion, and every reader has been left at liberty to settle for himself the "military principles" which have been disclosed, and which ought to govern future designs for warships.
In other publications Admiral Custance has made a confes- sion of his faith in the historical method of treating naval policy ; and in his latest work has emphasized, and—as most readers are likely to think—has conclusively demonstrated the doctrine that, although vast changes have been made in naval war materiel during the last sixty years, these have involved no considerable changes in fundamental military principles. It is still true that the personality and genius of the Admiral in chief command of a fleet are of primary importance; that much depends upon the intelligence and prompt action of commanders serving under him ; and that the efficient train- ing, professional skill, and undaunted courage of the personnel continue to exercise greater influence on the fate of an action than results from the most recent developments in warship design and construction. The quality of the "men behind the guns " was no less important at Tsushima than it was at Trafalgar ; the tactical scheme of the Japanese commander- in-chief led on to victory; the power of initiating independent action by chiefs of squadrons had a great influence on the destruction and dispersal of the Russian fleet; the final result was not chiefly due to the comparative number of ships, or to the offensive and defensive qualities of the two fleets as tabulated in comparisons such as are commonly made in the press or in Parliament and treated as trustworthy guides in forming shipbuilding programmes.
One salient feature of this analysis of the naval warfare of the last sixty years is found in an insistence upon the principle that superiority in offensive power constitutes one of the best means of defence, and that a passive defence such as is con- tributed by strong armour-plating is usually overrated in discussions of the characteristics of modern warships. Not a few readers will be disposed to think that Admiral Custance has pressed that principle further than is justifi- able, even when full allowance has been made for incidents adduced in its favour from records of engagements in which armoured ships have taken part. On the other hand, it is well that certain facts to which Admiral Custance draws attention should be recognized more generally than they have been. In this list are included the limited areas over which the side-armour of modern battleships frequently extends; the permanent exposure of the greater part of the lengths of heavy guns outside the armoured turrets and shields; the common practice of estimating comparative defence by naming only the maximum thickness of armour, and saying nothing of the comparatively small areas covered by plates of that thickness.
Another deduction from naval history made by the author is that in the gun-armaments of "ships of the line" it is not " sound to accept an advantage at one range at the expense of a disadvantage at another." He shows that long experience in war has led to the inclusion in the armaments of " two natures of gun"; and that repeated departures from this principle, leading to the use of "single calibre big guns" as the sole armament, have been followed by a reversion to the practice based on war experience. This statement has a special interest at the present time when a return has been made to the use of secondary armaments of 6-in, quick-firing guns in our battleships, after a few years of the so-called " Dread- nought" system of gun-armament, in which only 12-in. guns were to be used in action, and to be supplemented for defence against attacks by torpedo craft by 3-in. or 4-in. guns. It is obvious that fluctuations of authoritative opinion on such a matter as this can only arise from a lack of firm grasp of principles, and that apart from such firmness of grasp there can' be no consistency or continuity in ship design. At present the cycle of increase in calibre of guns is being com- pleted, and reports are rife of the introduction of 14-in. and 15-in. guns, the largest weighing over 100 tons. History is thus repeating itself, as guns of 110 tons weight were in use for newly designed ships about thirty years ago and were subsequently abandoned in favour of 12-in. guns. Then, as now, much was said about the destructive effect of a single explosion of a shell fired from enormous weapons; and their great power cf perforation at long ranges with armour- piercing projectiles was also emphasized. During the interval, of course, great improvements have been made in the design and manufacture of naval guns and explosives; but the same principles still hold good, and it seems probable that in the course of a few years there will be a revulsion from the present policy of " bigness." However that may be, it is meanwhile of interest to read what Admiral Custance has written in regard to the lack of any war experience which would justify the theory of an enormous destructive effect being produced by a single projectile fired from the heaviest gun. It furnishes a curious comment on the stock arguments with which the public is favoured at the present time.
The foregoing are but specimens of the living interest and importance of subjects treated from a historical standpoint in the volume under review. Probably the section which will secure the greatest and closest study is that with which the author deals last—the campaign of Tsushima. His description and discussion of the greatest and most decisive naval combat of modern times are admirable, and lead to certain general conclusions which cannot fail to influence to the summary by Admiral Custance of "the broad results produced by the Whitehead torpedo during the war." These .are described and tabulated ; and the general conclusions reached are stated in the following interesting passage :-
" How then do the gun and Whitehead torpedo stand to-day as part of the armament of a ship of the line ? The object in war is to disarm the enemy. The gun tries to do this directly by striking at his weapons and personnel, whereas the Whitehead aims only indirectly by attacking his ships themselves. Again, both weapons are very inaccurate at sea and especially in battle. This inaccuracy is counterbalanced in the gun, but not in the Whitehead, by the great rapidity of fire ; not only from individual guns, but also from the larger number that can be carried. Is it not probable that the more direct attack on the true object and the greater rapidity of its fire will cause the gun to decide the action before the Whitehead can intervene ? Altogether do we question the idea that the danger of being hit by the Whitehead any more than by the gun should damp the desire to close to decisive „ranges, whether with guns or Whiteheads. Since the Russo- Japanese war the range and speed of the Whitehead have been increased and the methods of using it have been improved, but it still remains a very imperfect, complicated, and unreliable weapon. In estimating its true value should we not seek to avoid past exaggerations and to discount carefully the results given by present peace practices ?"
-These are wise words : omelettes can only be made by breaking eggs : the naval commander who dwells on the risks
to be faced, and makes his personal safety the governing con- sideration, never wins victories. Nelson would not have feared
to go well within " torpedo range," if weapons of that nature had been in use in his day. His successors in the Royal Navy will not be content with "long bowls " only, but will
certainly seek to reach what Admiral Custance terms the " decisive range," and so to win victories.
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