THE BREAK-UP OF THE FRENCH MINISTRY.

THE situation in France, we fear, is growing very serious. The work of the last three months has been undone, and the Emperor appears to be once again drifting towards auto- cracy. In our last issue we defended the Premier's conduct in agreeing to the plebiscitum, on the ground of the neces- sity both of conciliating the Emperor and of giving a popular sanction to Parliamentary government. The alternatives appeared to be M. Rouher or a plebiscitum, and it did not occur to us that the Emperor, who only three weeks before had formally surrendered his constitutional power, might be hankering for both. We were wrong, in so far as we never anticipated that he would make the appeal, not only against his Legislature, but against his own responsible Ministry. The immediate result of the concession has been to shatter the authority of the Liberal Ministry and to give a dangerous impetus to the determination of the Emperor to retain at all events a large portion of his personal power. It appears that the Cabinet, as a Cabinet, did not agree with M. 011ivier. According to the best accounts, Count Daru and M. Buffet were not unwill- ing to meet the Emperor on one side of his mind—the statesman's side—and allow in rare emergencies of a ple- biscitum, if sanctioned by previous vote of the Legislative Body, a clause which would have precluded Napoleon from asking a vote against the Legislature ; but they absolutely refused to meet him on the other, or Napoleonic side, and allow him merely as Caesar to supersede all other representa- tives of the people. The Emperor, as we judge, after some hesitation, finally refused to accept any compromise whatever, declaring that concession would show him to France in the position of a conquered sovereign ; and the Foreign Minister

and Finance .Minister both retired. The latter, though an important personage, representing as he does the Liberal section of the Centre, might possibly have been spared, because his retire-

ment could have been attributed, as indeed at first it will attri- buted, to the personal "susceptibilities" of the Emperor, who

is known to think that M. Buffet treats him with insufficient respect ; but Count Daru is almost Premier, the very embodi- ment of the Parliamentarian idea, the only man in the Cabinet in whom the stricter constitutionalists could implicitly confide. He, and he alone, brought the Orleanists to the sup- port of a Bonaparte. To allow him to depart was almost to abandon the effort to revive Parliamentary power, to fall back almost avowedly on the personal authority of the Emperor

and the men of the old regime. If neither Count Darn nor M. Buffet could remain. how could M. Emile 011ivier, unless, indeed, he had resolved to make of himself a mere agent of

the Imperial will ? As if to strengthen this impression, it was reported that M. de la Guerroniive, an able and accomplished man, but in politics a Mameluke, would obtain the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, while M. Buffet's place would be taken by obedient M. Magne, whose budgets are always so favourable to the Empire. Neither of these appointments has yet been made, but they have only been avoided by leaving the offices unfilled, no Liberal of eminence being found willing to accept the Emperor's terms. Indeed, unless he is gravely belied by

the compilers of demi-official bulletins, those terms are of a

kind to which no statesman not personally devoted to him- self could accede without dishonour. It is affirmed that the Emperor, not content with the abstract right of proposing

phibiscites at will, demands that one should be proposed im- mediately, and that it should comprise two separate interroga-

tions. The nation is not to be asked, Do you approve the Constitutional Empire ?' but 'Do you accept the hereditary suc- cession, and do you approve the democratic changes which have been accomplished ?' The Emperor, in fact, is determined that his son shall be informally elected in his lifetime, and that the nation shall have a chance of saying that it prefers his personal rule. It is almost incredible that Napoleon should expose his dynasty to so useless a danger. The principle of hereditary sovereignty was affirmed in 1852, is not assailed except by men who assail also his own title, and is in no sort of danger from the Parliamentary party, with whom, indeed, it is a creed. They desire to Emit the power appertaining to the throne, but not to change the dynasty, far less to abolish the sovereignty itself, which, as they are fully aware, is the only bulwark between them and a Republic which they dislike

almost as much as they do the personal re'ginie. The strange notion attributed to the Emperor that his true rival is the Comte de Paris would be in no degree dispelled by such a

vote, for the claim of the Orleans family will not be sub- mitted to the people, while tho Republicans will regard the decision as utterly null and void. On the other hand, the submission of the hereditary principle to a popular vote for the second time tends to make the sovereignty almost avowedly elective, and opens the door to every pretender, whether Bourbon, Orleanist, or Bonaparte..

A family which from time to time submits its claim to the throne to an electoral vote is not a dynasty, but merely a family at the head of affairs. Suppose the vote were in the

negative. Would Napoleon declare his son's pretensions at an end, or abdicate, or wait for the revolution which, if after such a vote he remained hereditary sovereign, would be as

certain as winter after autumn ? The terrific severity of such a blow given at such a time is of itself sufficient to suggest

what the Radicals already affirm,—that the plebiscitum cannot

be free, that the result has been arranged beforehand, that the entire transaction is only a tricky coup (Taut. Even a tolerably equal vote would cut away the moral ground of the Empire, and so would a vote decidedly favourable, but given by a minority of the electors, and this last contingency is more than probable. The Government, backed as it will be by the Church, retains, we imagine, influence enough to make a hostile vote improbable, though, be it remembered, the last vote of France wag as three

to four against the whole strength of the Ministry of the Interior ; but no power, however unscrupulous, could bring the French people up to the polls against its will ; and if the majority abstain, the hereditary throne will stand in the eyes of all opponents morally condemned. We find it difficult to believe that 'arman who knows France as the Emperor knows it could run such a risk, as difficult as to believe that a Liberal Minister would put the second question. Suppose a negative is returned to that. Then the Emperor is absolute again, while an affirmative would only affirm that the Emperor's decrees, which nobody is resisting, are, on the whole, approved; that the Constitutional Empire, which till yesterday was, shall again be, until upset by a new demand and a new vote. To gain this vote, M. 011ivier has allowed his Cabinet to be broken up, his majority to be frittered away, and himself to become, or at any rate to appear, the personal agent of the Emperor. Indeed, unless he dissolves, it is hard to see how, even after the plebiscitum, he can be anything else, for he can only secure a majority by relying upon the Right, which obeys the Sovereign's nod.

The full meaning of the incident cannot be known until the Emperor's manifesto, with the words of the plebiscitum to be voted, has been published to France ; but it is clear that the first Parliamentary Ministry under the Empire has been broken up in a way which must inspire the most moderate men with a new distrust of the Emperor's designs. He has, on a vital question, insisted on ruling for him- self, has broken with the majority which supported Con- stitutionalism, and has appealed, or determined to appeal, to the country against the Legislature. To gain his end he has risked the resignation of his last Liberal friend, a return to his old instruments, and a necessity of relying exclusively on the Army, in fact, a complete revival of the regime sup- posed to have passed away. His conduct, in fact, has been in direct opposition to his professions, as recorded in his letter of March 22, in which he specially instructed M. 011ivier to prepare for the "withdrawal of that portion of the constituent power with which the nation entrusted me." That he should regret parting with this power is natural ; that he should try to regain it by means theoretically legal is no crime ; but he cannot have at once the gratification of ruling and the security and the credit of constitutional government. Unless the plebiscitum should be fully successful, and should involve a direct regrant of power—which is inconceivable—the Opposition which defeated him in November will at once re-form itself, the cry for representative power will be louder than ever, and the Emperor will be once more replaced in the situation which only six months ago he found intolerable, replaced, too, under this disad- vantage, that the popular chiefs will not trust him again without effective guarantees. Of course, while the Army obeys he can continue to govern ; but the government will be that of a simple autocrat, a position he has always tried to avoid ; his son's chance of success will be nullified, and every movement towards freedom will be, of necessity, driven to take the form of insurrection. That having obtained his plebiscitum he may, with his extraordinary skill, so use it as to remove his difficulties is of course conceivable ; but to outside observers, the result of his action appears to be a re- vival of all the dangers from which his dynasty and France appeared but just now to have escaped.