TM: POSITION OF ROUMANIA.
1111E well-informed correspondent of the Times in the
Balkans stated on Thesday that Roumania had apparently "come to a final decision" to take action in Transylvania, and that it was generally expected that the campaign would begin in the middle of next month. We have no doubt that the correspondent is well justified its his conclusions. The recent tendency of messages from Roumania, and of public statements by Roumanian states- men, has all been in one direction. It is not for us to offer advice to the Roumanians. We sincerely hope that she may choose the course that will lead her to the achievement of the greatest degree of security and happi- ness. The situation of every Balkan State is now one of great anxiety and perplexity, and this is as true of Roumania as of all the other States, though to be sure she has— what the others have not—an army six hundred thousand strong absolutely intact, since she was able to annex Silistria at the end of the Balkan War without sacrificing a single man. The question for her at this moment is whether she would be able to repeat the traditional per- formance of the tertius gaudens at the end of the present war—whether she would be able to satisfy her perfectly well-known ambitions by remaining neutral throughout the war and formulating her demands afterwards. The "manifest destiny" of Roumania is to embrace the greater part of the people of Roumanian race who live outside her borders. There are some three million Roumanians in Hungary, the majority of whom are in the province of Transylvania, and about another three hundred thousand in the little duchy of Bukowina. This "laud of beech-trees," as the name of the duchy means, is Austrian Crown property, and lies between Galicia and the north-west frontier of Roumania. But Russia is already overrunning Bukowina, and sooner or later will penetrate into Transylvania. Of course it might be that Russia, having occupied all the territory which Roumania hopes some day to have as her own, would politely withdraw, saying : "Your claim is the greater. Our losses of men and money have been gladly expended in your interests, and you are now free to take what should properly belong to you." The point for the Roumanians to decide is whether they believe that human nature in Russia, or anywhere else, works in that way. Would the Russians gracefully give up what they had so laboriously and expensively acquired ? It is not as though the Russians in retaining this new territory would be holding down a hostile population. If the Bukowina and Transylvania would be to them a kind of Alsace-Lorraine, they might well decide that more would be lost than gained by creating a new septic sore in Europe which would poison the body of the Russian Empire. But there would be no such objection to the annexation by Russia of these lands. If there are some three hundred thousand Roumanians in Bukowina, there are also some three hundred. thousand Ruthenians, or Little Russians, out of a total population of three-quarters of a million. In both Transylvania and Bukowina, again, the Roumanians, though they would probably refer to be ruled by Roumania, would not actively object to being ruled by Russia. They nearly all belong to the Orthodox Church, and Russia is their big friend, even if Roumania is their near relation.
It seems to us, therefore, that the logic of events will be strong enough to overwhelm any idea there may still be in Roumania of remaining neutral. If Roumania does not take up arms against Austria-Hungary within the next few weeks, she will have resigned herself to the extinction of her ambitions. She will have gone out of the business of politics altogether. That Roumania intends this surrender of her desires we cannot believe for a moment. She is, as a matter of fact, making large military preparations. It may be said that it is the habit of countries which find themselves in a critical position to take every military precaution, and that preparations do not necessarily prove anything. In a general way this is true; but Roumania has implied that her preparations are directed against some definite enemy. The Times corre- spondent in the Balkans announced on Thursday that Roumania had assured Bulgaria that the preparations were not against her. That was only another way of saying to Bulgaria : " Although we have no thought of attacking you, we admit that we have an enemy in view. On that enemy we are making ready to spring." It only remains, therefore, to say who the enemy is. It is almost impossible that the enemy should be Russia. For think what Roumanian intervention on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary would mean. It would mean, if those Powers won the war, that Hungary would do her very best to keep the Roumanians of Transylvania under her own thumb. No doubt there would be a debt to pay to Roumania for her help, but the strong desire of Hungary would be to main- tain her present borders intact. And this—a mere dis- appointment to Roumania, if Hungary had her way— would not be the worst outcome of a Germanic victory. Turkey would be saved by the success of Germany, and the Balkan States would once more suffer from the old nightmare of Turkish maleficence. The Balkan Alliance was formed to get rid of Turkish oppression. Is it con- ceivable that a Balkan State should now take up arms to restore that oppression ? By such reasoning we arrive at the conclusion that Roumania is preparing to enter the war on the side of the Allies. The Russian troops ought soon to reach the point at which the co-operation of Roumania would be most effective. Roumania lies between Russia and Serbia. If these three Powers joined hands a half-circle would be formed round Hungary. The strain on her would be enormous, and the results would probably be seen very soon. The Transylvanian Alps might be troublesome to cross in the face of an enemy, particularly if the attempt were made very early in the spring; but when they were safely behind the invaders the great Hungarian plain to Budapest would be open. The intervention of Roumania would, of course, power- fully affect the counsels of other Powers which are still hesitating. Greece would almost certainly join in the war on the side of the Allies. And it might be that Italy would consider that her interests required her also to Come in. Certainly the appearance of two fresh Balkan States as belligerents would add very appreciably to the
• complexities of Italian foreign policy. Serbia, as well as • Italy, has her ambitions on the littoral of the Adriatic,
and the aims of both of them are opposed to those of Austria. Possibly Italy will decide that such a delicate state of affairs is as likely to solve itself as to be solved by force. We sincerely trust that she will choose the course which will help her most towards the prosperity and peace which we all hope to enjoy in our different degrees after the war. We suspect that even if the mind of Roumania, Italy, or Greece were entirely made up to enter the war, there might still be delay in acting, not for political reasons, but because of the vast expense of modern warfare. Every day of fighting is a heavy tax upon national exchequers, and it would be very natural that, even when States had committed themselves to action, they should refrain from putting their forces in the field till the last possible moment. The risks of waiting too long are, of course, obvious, and are not ignored, we may be sure, by the shrewd statesmen of the Balkans.
The political weakness of Austria-Hungary at the moment—and it is a weakness that is sure to be reflected in her conduct in face of her enemies—is illustrated by the resignation of Count Berchtold. A conven- tional excuse is offered that he has retired for "personal reasons." The only possible comment is that patriotic men do not retire for personal reasons when their country is in a desperate plight. Count Berchtold may be without much firmness or driving force, but he is a man of great position and possessions who earnestly desires to serve his country well. Why should he resign now ? We can think of only two possible causes. He must have been asked to carry out some policy of which he disapproved, or the other rulers of the country refused to sanction some policy which he thought essential. Nothing less will explain his disappearance. If fresh blows are to fall on Austria-Hungary from the hands of her neighbours, they could not be felt more sensitively than at such a time of debility as this.
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