THE " POISED SNOW "
By WICKHAM STEED
AT the end of his first speech (as Prime Minister) upon foreign policy, Mr. Neville Chamberlain said that we are " in the condition " when an incautious move or a sudden loud exclamation may start an avalanche. He added : " I believe, although the snow may be perilously poised, it has not yet begun to move ! "
It cannot be said that the Prime Minister's words were everywhere received as a satisfactory account of the inter- national situation. This country, and not a few foreign countries, awaited from him something more explicit than a metaphor, and some indication that British-policy is inspired by other virtues besides those of " caution, patience and self- restraint." The peace-loving world is, indeed, waiting for British leadership, for a sign that the British Government knows its own mind and has a well-thought-out policy adequate to meet whatever turn events may take.
What turn they will take depends upon a chain of inter- dependent riddles. Soviet Russia is a riddle, as are Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The Spanish civil war or, rather, the European war in Spain, is likewise a riddle not to be solved solely by Herr Hitler's statement that Germany hopes to get iron from Bilbao. And British policy, past and present, is an unknown quantity.
Still, among these riddles there are some which, if rightly read, may give the clue to the whole series. Of these " master- riddles " the relations between Soviet Russia and the German Reichswehr form one, and the internal plight of Germany and of • Italy forms another. On or about June 11th the world was startled by news that eight leading Generals of the Russian Red Army had been tried and shot. They were accused, and were alleged to have confessed that the accusa- tion was true, of having carried on secret negotiations with Germany for objects incompatible with loyalty to the policy and constitution of the Soviet Union. At first few were disposed to accept this news at its face value. Knowledge that the executions of the Russian Generals caused consterna- tion in the Higher Command of the German Reichswehr has since lessened the scepticism with which the news was first received.
From Germany little public enlightenment has come upon this grave matter. The less said the better, seems to be the official German view. But the rest of Europe is interested, perhaps vitally interested, in knowing whether the executed Generals had really been working with orfor Germany and, if so, what the Russo-German plan may have been.
On these questions I think I can throw some light. None of the sources of my information is Russian. All tend to bear out the hypothesis that the long-standing intimacy between the German and the Russian General Staffs, an intimacy which began soon after the Russo-German treaty of Rapallo in April, 1922, had been steadily developed and carried to a point at which a Russo-German Treaty of economic and military alliance had been worked out in full detail. The conclusion of this treaty was to follow the establishment of Red Army control over the Soviet Union or, in other words, a Russian military dictatorship working in agreement with the German Reichswehr.
I know the names of the German Generals who carried on the negotiations on behalf of the Reichswehr. They are those of very distinguished soldiers. The Reichswehr has always been opposed to Hitler's and Goering's scheme for a German invasion of Russia with the object of restoring, broadly, the territorial position created in March, 1918, by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. That Treaty, together with the parallel Treaty of Bucharest which was imposed upon vanquished Romania, gave Germany possession of the greater part of Poland and the Russian Ukraine, white the Treaty of Bucharest put Germany and her allies in control of Roumanian oil, wheat-lands and timber. These two treaties were nullified by the break-up of Austria-Hungary in the second half of October, 1918, and by the simultaneous defeat of Germany in the West. But it is an interesting reflection that Hitler's Note to Great Britain of March 31st, 1936, was based on the tacit assumption that the Treaties of Brest Litovsk and of Bucharest were still historically valid. His Note (which contained his " peace offer ") repudiated the Locarno Settlement of 1925 because it contained pro- visions drawn from the Treaty of Versailles ; it repudiated the Versailles Treaty because some conditions of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, had not been fully observed at the Paris Peace Conference ; and it repudiated the Armistice precisely because those conditions had not been observed. In substance Hitler's " peace Note was conceived as a pre- Armistice Note, that is to say, as a " legal " case based on a state of things existing at a time when Germany was still a belligerent and the Treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest held good.
But the Reichswehr was not impressed by this fine-drawn logic. Some three years ago a German General had been sent to Russia secretly to investigate the possibilities of a successful invasion. On his return he reported to Hitler that the greatest difficulty was what he called " the relative invincibility of Russia." Early last year the economic expert attached to the German Embassy at Moscow reported adversely upon the prospects of a German invasion. He warned the authorities in Berlin that German armies would get no help from Russians in the Ukraine or elsewhere. And he recom- mended a policy of secret preparations to wreck all the Russian petrol distributing centres—so that Russian aviation and agricultural tractors might be immobilised—and also a policy in Central and South Eastern Europe of which the especial aim would be to establish German control over Roumania.
Meanwhile the Reichswehr went ahead, more or less " on its own." According to its calculations the military strength of Russia is at least thrice that of Germany. Therefore German policy must aim at securing the benevolent neutrality of Russia towards German schemes of expansion in Central and South Eastern Europe, and likewise in the event of a clash with France or Great Britain in the West. So satisfactory was the progress made in these directions by the Reichswehr negotiators that the Higher Command in Berlin was content to leave Hitler and his Nazi associates a comparatively free hand in home affairs and in diplomacy. It reckoned that the Nazis would probably make a bad mess of both, and that as soon as a military dictatorship should be set up in Russia, the Reichswehr in Germany would hold Hitler in the hollow of its hand.
This may be why the Reichswehr looked upon German intervention in Spain without enthusiasm but did not actively oppose it. Within limits, the Spanish adventure might be useful as an opportunity to test the aircraft and other weapons of Germany under service conditions. If General Franco should end by getting the upper hand in Spain, with the help of Italy, there 'might also be a strategic advantage for Germany in being able to threaten France on her South Western as well as on her South Eastern and Eastern frontiers. But the Reichswehr did not intend to let Hitler bring about a general European conflagration on account of Spain before the German army should be quite ready for it.
This was, roughly, the position up to the execution of the eight Russian Generals. For the time being those executions have smashed the Reichswehr's plan, and have dashed the prospect of a Russo-German economic and military alliance. But this discomfiture of the Reichswehr has lessened its power to call Hitler to order or to stay his hand in seeking the international " success " which he urgently needs in view of the disastrous economic and financial position in Germany, and of the growing volume of German discontent with the Nazi system.
There is sound reason to believe that this discontent has now spread to three-fifths of the German people. Not only are the workmen in sullen revolt against Nazism but their employers, industrialists big and small, are suffering from a dearth of raw materials. Since the beginning of June Germany has had to spend on foodstuffs from abroad the greater part of her reserves of foreign means of payment. This year's harvest threatens to be exceedingly poor. Expert estimates of the prospective shortage in wheat and rye during 1937-38 vary between seven and a half and ten million tons. The great landowners and the peasants are not less sullen and dissatisfied than the workmen. The greeting " Heil Hitler " has become so unpopular that it is rarely heard except when the presence of police spies is suspected. Catholics and Protestants have sunk their religious animosities and are forming a common Christian front against Nazi paganism. The same process of silent coalition is going on among former Social Democrats, Liberals, Nationalists and Conservatives. All hope and pray for the liberation of the German Fatherland from Nazism. The plight of Italy is not much better. The new Abyssinian " Empire " has proved a bitter disappointment. Mussolini is "so alarmed that drastic measures have been taken to " remove " Italian anti-Fascist leaders abroad. All Fascist hopes are now centred upon triumph in Spain.
Hitler's. hopes may be more diversified. tzechoslovaki- a might be radically disinfected of democracy and brought under Nazi control-; or Austria might be absorbed if Mussolini were either willing or weak ; or Danzig and Memel might be restored to the German Reich. Still, Spain seems to offer the chance of a really notable triumph—and of a strategic success which would put France and Great Britain in a very tight place. But if Spain should prove disappointing, the temptation to " liberate " Austria might be hard to resist; So the snow is " perilously poised " and the avalanche may fall. Mr. Neville Chamberlain is perhaps prudent in begging us not to shout and to exercise caution and patience. I agree with him—on the assumption that the British GoveraL ment has whispered or will whisper to Germany and to Italy some very earnest and determined words: He would have done better, I think, to have told the House of Commons and the country, in unprovocative language, how and why the " snow " is so " perilously poised " ; for we are still a democracy and have some claim not to be left altogether in the dark. And it would not have been amiss if he had said that we still believe in freedom for others besides ourselves.
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