TOPICS OF THE DAY.
CU3I1JLATIVE VOTING MTH AN EXTENDED S U FIRAGE
AS it seems now certain that the present feeble Ministry— the Ministry which, as Sir John Pakington confesses, agrees to new Reform Bills at ten minutes' notice,—is to be permitted at least to unbosom its uncertain counsels to the nation, and as it becomes therefore even more neces- sary that men who have any convictions themselves should do what they can to guide Parliament in its somewhat limp and nerveless treatment of a limp and nerveless Ministry, we cannot resist one further appeal to those who sincerely believe in the principle of Representation, to make a united effort to carry such a Reform Bill as will not only give a strong representation to the working class,—which is the con- dition sine gud non of Reform,—but also increase instead of diminishing the power of the adherents of all important poli- tical creeds to combine so as to secure a fair hearing in the House of Commons. We believe that the only feasible instru- ment for securing a large addition to the representative effi- ciency of the House of Commons, beyond a generous extension of the franchise to the working class, is some form of what is now called the Cumulative Vote. We wish to show what the absolute opponents of the cumulative vote really mean by the arguments with which they resist it. We do not speak here of the special difficulty of applying the cumulative vote to the boroughs in which there are but two members. Even that difficulty,—the difficulty, namely, of giving too much (namely, an equal) representation to a minority, which need not be greater than one-third, in so very many constituencies,— might be got over, if the House were in earnest about it, by the very ingenious, though too novel plan, suggested by a correspondent in another cohunn,—the expedient, namely, not of permitting the piling of votes on one single member, but of giving to each elector, besides a vote for each candidate (not cumulative), if he likes to give them, one extra vote as a means, as it were, of specially accenting his individual pre- ference for one of them. This plan is quite too novel for practical consideration in connection with a Bill that must be submitted next week, and we need only state that, whereas in a two-membered constituency ordinary lump-voting would give a member to a perfectly united minority of more than one-third, the plan suggested by our correspondent would give one only to a perfectly united minority of more than three- sevenths, and in a three-cornered constituency to a perfectly united minority of more than two-fifths. But this is, we admit, for the present at least, purely theoretic. Nor have we any doubt that Parliament will decline to adopt the ordinary cumulative vote in two-membered constituencies, both because it would risk a great many too many seats, and because it might seem intrinsically unfair in such constituencies to give a minority of one-third as much representation as the majority of two-thirds. The only practical alternative seems to us the multiplication of three-cornered constituencies by taking one seat from each borough of a population, say, under 12,000,—if the propo- sition to increase the House of Commons be absolutely inad- missible,—and giving a third member to as many great cities and important counties as practicable. This would greatly increase in all such places the chance of really representing the local opinion in proportion to its local strength, and so introduce for future extension a political instrument of great power and value into our electoral system. Now, let us look at the arguments,—the dangerous, prejudiced, suicidal argu- ments, we consider them,—by which this principle of repre- senting, as far as possible, the local opinions in proportion to their actual numerical strength, is opposed by the Democratic Press.
The most frequent and most impressive argument is, that in giving any new power to a minority to make its voice heard, you are taking away from the majority with one hand what you offer it with the other. Nothing can be more false or more misleading. You give to every new voter,—every voter admitted under the extension of the suffrage proposed,— precisely what you give to every old voter. You give only,— you take away nothing. If a thousand artizans are admitted in any three-membered constituency, each of these thousand has a greater, and not a less, individual influence in the con- stituency, by being permitted to cast his three votes as he pleases. No one can tay that anything is taken from him because he is permitted to give all his three votes, if so he pleases, for his favourite candidate, or to split them, if he likes
better. Individually, the influence of each new elector is not nullified with one hand while it is accorded with the other,. but accorded only. No doubt it may so happen that the new principle diminishes the influence of a certain party or class, as compared with what it would be if the same extension of the suffrage were accorded, and no power to pile the votes ow one candidate were given. But this is a diminution to the influence of a class or party, not of any individual voter. And what that one class or party loses the other (opposite)- class or party gains. If three-quarters of the electors can no longer carry the whole representation, but only two out of its. threeseats,—that is no doubt a limitation on the political power of the three-quarters of the constituency. But then,. by that very same amount, it is an addition to the political power of the other quarter. Now, is that in any conceivable sense taking away with one hand what you give with the I Only conceivably even in one case. Supposing that. the constituency is already (say) a rather Radical constituency,. and returns two members Radical and one Whig. By in- creasing the number of electors, if the mode of election were to continue the same as now, it might be that all three mem- bers would in future be Radicals ; while if you introduce the of cumulative voting, it might possibly happen thaf. by• so doing you gave back to the moderates the power to return one Whig member, of which otherwise, by the exten- sion of the franchise, they would be deprived. In that case,. no doubt, there would be a sense attaching to the words, that by giving both the extension of the franchise and cumu- lative voting you took from the Radicals with one hand what; you give them with the other. But you would only do so- on the supposition that even after the alteration the Whigs remained a united party of more than a quarter of the new constituency. And the question would be,—Is it fairer that three-quarters of the constituency should send all three members, or that they should send two out of the three, and the other quarter the third? Is it fairer that one-quarter of the constituency should have no voice at all in Parliament, or that it should have slightly more than arithmetically it is entitled to, namely, one-third ? In such a case something might be given to a particular political party by blank extension of franchise which would not be given by extension of franchise,. coupled with the cumulative vote, and something, therefore,. which seems put within their reach by the one provision is taken out of it again by the other. But put it the other way, as re- gards the other party, which might be supposed to lose represen- tation by the first measure, and regains it by the second. They would appear to be robbed by the first measure, taken alone, of what—considering their numbers and union—they had a fair right to, but it would be given back to them by the second step. And the only question is which is the fairer,—to leave the Radicals where they turn out to be less than three-quarters of the new constituency where they were, and the Whigs who are more than one-quarter of the new constituency also where they were, —or to obliterate the latter, in spite of their strength and numbers, from the representation altogether Individual voters gain, and only gain ; it is only a party which can lose by the one process what it gains by the other ; and it can only do so when it cannot command a majority greater than three-quarters in the extended constituency, i.e., when it oughC not to be able to extinguish its adversary entirely. And indeed, this whole hypothesis supposes that the consti- tuency added by the extension of the franchise, is sure to in- crease the strength of the party which previously had a majo- rity,—in which case alone the cumulative vote might counter- balance the gain accruing-to it by the extension of the franchise. But it might just as well happen that the Radicals previously in a hopeless minority might be strengthened into a much stronger minority by the extension of the franchise, and that in this case the cumulative vote would give them, what they would not otherwise gain at all, the command of one of the seats. In that case the cumulative vote, so far from taking away with one hand what it conferred with the other, would be the instrument of making the boon efficient,—in other words,. of giving political significance to the stimulus which ex- tension of franchise taken alone had administered to the Radi- cal cause previously in a minority. Thus it is evident that the cumulative vote, so far from always taking away with one- hand what it gives with the other, may very often double With the one hand the boon bestowed by the other,—and indeed make it from an empty form of giving into a real substantial gift. As regards individuals, then, the cumulative vote always gives more, instead of less, individual political power to each new elector ; and as regards parties and classes -even, it may quite as often double the gift offered by extension of the franchise as neutralize it ; and whether it does one or the other, it does so because the opinion of the constituency is really divided in the way indicated by the final result.
There can therefore be no real objection to the Cumulative Tote, at least in the three-membered constituencies, except on the part of those who do not wish to see a House of Commons representative of the nation at all, but only of the majority of the nation. And of these we suspect there are a good many more than any one knows. We constantly hear it said that an opinion ought to be dependent for its representation in the House of Commons, not on the number and weight of the people who hold it, but on the accident whether or not it can manage to secure an absolute majority in any decent number of constituencies ; and this even though we are going to make a change which must tend in a very large number of the borough constituencies to throw a certain class -of opinions into a numerical minority. It is of course con- -ceivable that a political view which was in a minority in every borough in the Kingdom, and so extinguished in Parliament, might yet be in a minority of only one in every borough in the Kingdom. That of course is not likely, but the tendency of a large increase of the franchise is in the direction of extinguishing politiially in each borough the representative -chance of opinions which are unpopular with the most nume- rous class. Now, is it in any sense fair that opinions strongly held by a very strong minority of the nation, should be either suppressed in Parliament or represented there in a very insuffi- cient way ? Those who think so are not, as they suppose them- selves, enemies of doctrinaires, but enemies of the principle of a Representative Assembly.
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