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GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE.* IT cannot be doubted that the historians of the future, in their endeavours to unravel the tangled skein of opinions and events which dominate human affairs, will, in dealing with the present crisis, bo met with the same perplexing problems which have presented themselves to the minds of their pre- decessors. They will ask themselves what relation the proximate bore to the underlying causes of the war. They will inquire whether this great world struggle was due to the personal influence and idiosyncrasies of a few prominent individuals, or whether, on the other hand, the individuals conoerned were blind instruments in the hands of Destiny, and were merely the unconscious victims of circumstances which they could not control even if they had tried to do so. The philosopher with Carlylese tendencies will gravitate in the former direction. The followers of the school of which Buckle was the most prominent exponent will discard biographical details and look in a greater degree to general causes. As a mere matter of academic discussion, it is still acrincutil arta Za■tain Eurove, By Lewis B. Number, B.A. London : l)uckwurth and Co. 1.14.3 possible for any one who cares to treat history as a lawyer would treat a brief to maintain, on the one hand, that the avers of the Napoleonic period would never have occurred if so such man as Napoleon had ever been born, or, on the other hand, that the circumstances of the time were such as neces- sarily to engender the predominance of either Napoleon or some one possessing qualities similar to his. Anglo-Indian authorities still dispute as to whether the Indian Mutiny was duo to the issue of greased cartridges to the sepoys, or whether this incident was merely the spark applied to com- bustible material which, on other grounds, was ready to explode.
Amidst the many vacillations of public opinion which find expression in the abundant war literature of the day, it is, to say the least, refreshing to come across a writer of marked ability who has a very clear opinion, not only on the main reasons which have led to the present contest, but also, which is perhaps more remarkable, as to one, at all events, of the results which will certainly ensue from it. Mr. Namier, who writes with a very full knowledge of Slavonia affairs and a real insight into the broader aspects of Eastern politics, does not hesitate to treat the war as essentially an "Eastern war." It is, he thinks, the "inevitable outcome of Germany's political association with Austria and of the deep-rooted and secular antagonism between Teuton and Slay." No less decisive is his verdict in respect to one of the results of the contest. Whether the Allies or the Central European Powers are the ultimate victors, Austria must, as the French would say, "payer les pots cassia." That singular concourse of political atoms which Prince Gortschaloff described as being "not a State but a Government" must be dissolved into its original elements. " The Austro-Hungarian monarchy must cease to exist."
Without waiting for the final verdict of history, it is possible even now to advance certain propositions of un- questionable validity in respect to the recent relations between Slays and Teutons. In the first place, it is certain that a succession of German, and notably of Prussian, statesmen have persistently regarded it as a cardinal principle of German policy to oppose by all possible means the union of the Slav races. In the second place, the close political relations between Prussia and Austria which have existed since 1866 have tended to precipitate a clash of interests, which, however, was for the time being averted by the astute- ness and foresight of Prince Bismarck. In the third place, the rapid growth of latter; day Fan-Germanism gave an immense stimulus to such race animosity as previously existed, and materially increased the probability of a serious collision between Russia and the Central European Empires.
It was natural enough that an absolutist Government such as that of Prussia should view with disfavour both the growth of free institutions in neighbouring States and the consolidation of homogeneous nationalities, which was almost certain to encourage the adoption of those institutions. This aspect of the question found expression in a speech made by the present Kaiser in 1905, when, speaking of the Poles, he dwelt on the iniquities of "the lower classes who revolted against their Sovereign." And this predisposition was enormously enhanced by a consideration of the obvious fact that German predominance in Europe depended to a very great extent on the maintenance of disunion amongst the Slave. Hence it can be no matter for surprise that the policy of Germany has for many years past been distinctly anti- Polish. Every possible obstacle has been placed in the way of a conciliation between the Russians and the Poles, whilst at the same time every effort has been made to direct Russian Slavonic sympathies towards the Balkan Peninsula and to divert them from Central Europe. No one condemned pre- ventive wars more strongly than Prince Bismarck. He once likened a nation which engaged in any such war to a man who committed suicide in order to escape from death. But he was an adept in the art of preventive diplomacy. He at one time encouraged the idea that England should be made the light- ning-conductor of all the hatred which Continental nations felt for each other. Similarly, be looked on the encourage- ment of Russian religious sympathies for the Balkanic popul tions as an admirable safety-valve through which Pan- blavietn, based to a greater extent on racial and linguistic affinities with the Central European Slays, might blow off its
steam. Prince Bismarck was well aware that when two persons mount on one horse, one must ride behind. his intention, of course, always was that Prussia should be the foremost cavalier. For many years all the efforts of his diplomacy were directed towards preventing Austria from dominating. the political situation, and thus dragging Northern Germany into a conflict with Russia upon issues of Austrian rather than of North German importance. Actuated 'by sentiments
such as these, be made a secret treaty with Russia which, although the offence was condoned, was regarded at Vienna. as little short of an act of political treachery. Ho constantly inveighed against " Hungarian Chauvinism," and he per- sistently urged on Austrian statesmen the desirability of leaving to England the task of checking Russian aggression on Turkey.
Judged by the light of after events, the retirement of Prince Bismarck from the direction of German affairs in 1894 was probably the most important political occurrence of modern times. It produced in Germany a transformation somewhat similar to that which Sallust declared took place in his own time at Rome. Arrogance and pride took the place of self-restraint and moderation. No moralist can attempt to defend the diplomatic methods adopted by Prince Bismarck, but his aims were perfectly legitimate, and, more- over—and this is a point of vital importance—they were definite. He always made a very great distinction between what he called InteressenpoUtik—that is to say, a policy directed towards the realization and defence of national interests—and ilfachteolitik—in other words, a policy which merely aimed at the acquisition of power for its own sake. More especially did lie censure the idea of "working for prestige" (auf Prestige tvirtsolialten). Mr. Namier, in a phrase which felicitously combines both compliment and condemnation, says, speaking of the Bismarckian policy, that "its essence was brutal egotism, but its brutality was sane."
It is no exaggeration to say that on the retirement of Prince Bismarck a situation was created fraught with greater danger to the peace of the world than could have been
produced by any other conceivable political combination. Enormous power was conferred on a few individuals of no great ability and of little wisdom, who did not know what they wanted. The brutality of the Bismarckian system was retained even to the extent of acquiring a character of iiyper- brutality. Its sanity evaporated. German Imperialism, which took the form of a Pan-Germanism intended to over- shadow the whole world, sprang into existence. The leaders of the Imperialist movement were inspired by what Macaulay somewhere calls "all the restlessness and irresolution of aspiring mediocrity." They did not, and probably could not, define their own aims with any degree of precision. To those who have been behind the political scenes, and have thus learnt from experience with what singularly little wisdom the
world is often governed, it is quite conceivable that they never had any very definite Lime, and that they merely allowed themselves to be wafted by a boundless but ill-defined ambition towards the Niagara over which they eventually plunged. Mr. Namier remarks with very great truth
"No compromise nor understanding is possible with a nation or government which proclaims a programme of world-policy and world-power and yet fails to limit its views to certain definite objects. . . The material meaning of the phrase about 'the place in the sun' has never bean explained to us. Like a Jack-in- the-box, the spectre of German Imperialism appeared where anything was happening, whether in China or in Morocco, in South Africa or in the distant islands of the Pacific, in Asia Minor or in the South American Republics."
Hence, eventually, arose the world-disaster which will affect the destinies of generations as yet unborn.
It would be an exaggeration to maintain that the race- antagonism of Slays and Teutons in the Near East was the sole cause which led to the cataclysm. But it was certainly one of the principal contributory causes. So, also, Mr. Namier has rendered good service in drawing marked atten- tion to the necessity, when eventually the terms of peace come to he discussed, of not allowing the importance of the West European questions at issue to obscure that of the Near Eastern political problems. It is most necessary to bear this warning in mind, all the more so because the point is one which may readily receive less attention than it deserves in this country. The " average English.. man," Mr. Namier very truly observes, thinks he has no quarrel with Austria. What he wants is "to crush the hateful spirit of Prussian militarism." Mr. Namier .does not think that this spirit can be crushed. "Mili- tarism in Germany," be says, "is not the creed of one caste; it is the living faith of the whole nation." Without in any degree wishing to challenge the accuracy of this statement, it is nevertheless permissible to hope that, if genuine Constitutional government were introduced into Germany, the danger to other nations produced by the exist- ing form of militarism would be greatly diminished, But, however this may be, it is certain that unless some satisfac- tory settlement can be made of Near Eastern questions, and of the problems which have arisen out of the peculiar composition of the Hapsburg Monarchy, it will not be possible to lay the foundations of a durable peace. Mr. Namier is probably right in holding that one, at all events, of the pillars on which such a peace should be made to rest is the dis- appearance of Austria-Hungary from the map of Europe as
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