DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS.
E sincerely hope that Greece is not about to ruin her future. She stands at the parting of the ways, and no Englishman who has been fired by the traditions of Hellenism, has read with a glowing heart of the Greek blow for independence, has caught the tone of Byron's passionate and lyrical love of Hellenic freedom, and remembers how Britain has watched--we might almost say presided—over the rise of the little State from small beginnings to great expectations, can look on now unmoved. We know that, according to the latest news, the Greek Government have repudiated their Treaty with Serbia which was signed in 1913. That Treaty requires Greece to come to the assistance of Serbia if Serbia should be attacked by Bulgaria. There could not be a more explicit contract. The precise circumstances contemplated by the Treaty are in existence. Yet Greece seems for the moment to intend to evade her pledged word. It is impossible to regard this repudiation (temporary though we hope and believe it to be) without deep misgiving for the future of Greece. It is not only Greek honour for which we are concerned, though that is always found. to be a material as well as a moral asset in the life of nations ; we fear that Greece may ruin every interest she has in the world. The case seems so bad for her if she allOws herself to be drawn into the German orbit that we cannot believe that she will, after all, allow her political course to be so misdirected. It may be said that the benevolent neutrality which Greece has declared towards the Allies is patently not a submission to Germany but just the reverse. But one cannot look very deeply into Balkan affairs without seeing that for Greece it is a, question of being with the Allies or against them. Her interest permits no middle course. If Greece does not help us, we shall certainly reach the predestined end with- out her. But for Greece that will be a very bad business indeed. She cannot expect to have reserved for her favours to which Serbia by every right of gallantry and suffering will have the first claim.
Germany has brought off the coup which she had long contemplated in the Balkans. For her the one essential is to stir the troubled waters of a divided group of States. If Bulgaria had listened to the proposals of the Quadruple Entente, and had accepted the vast sacrifices which Serbia, with real foresight, was willing to make, the independence and stability of every Balkan nation would have been assured. Our Foreign Office has been bitterly blamed for the failure either to persuade or to alarm Bulgaria. We do not pretend that our affairs have been well managed. A directing brain with imagination, resolution, and energy could probably have countered each German move. We do not mean that we ought ever to try to outplay Germany at her own game. That would be a fatal thing to do, and we fear that only too much of the criticism of the Foreign Office has been based on the assumption that we ought to compete with Germany in a huckstering policy of bluff and dishonesty. Honesty and plain dealing have times without number proved to be the strongest card in the British hand. The man with the ace up his sleeve may score off us several times, but in the end he will be found out and denounced and ever afterwards be kept away from the table. To say this, however, is not to assert that we could not have accomplished a good deal more towards making things go straight in the 13allians. The Germans make a splash with great promises, and we do not even make a splash with the simple truth. Yet such a thing could be done. In the South-East of Europe every statesman is extraordinarily susceptible to German arguments because the legend of G-erman military invinci- bility commands almost universal belief. Our diplomacy has been straight and honest and sound, but not urgent and conspicuous enough. That, we believe, is the whole explanation. What we particularly resent in the roar of criticism we have listened to lately is the singling out of individuals for bitter obloquy. This is a rank injustice, and no nation at war ever helped itself to win by such personal attacks as these, founded for the most part on extremely faulty information. These attacks weaken the Government, and to weaken the Government is a crime.
What Greece stands to lose is proved for all the world to see by the Treaty between Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria which was signed on July 17th of this year. The text of the Treaty—a Treaty which the Bulgarian statesmen, with unexampled knavery, bad in their pockets when they were offering smooth assurances to the Allies—was communicated to the Greek Govern- ment by the British Minister at Athens. It con- cedes to Bulgaria in return for her assistance in the war Salonika and Epirus, which of course belong to Greece, as well as Serbian Macedonia. If the Greek Government do not appreciate the plain meaning of this, it can only be said of them, in the words of Tacitus, that they "dread nothing so much as to understand his [the German Emperor's] meaning." Greece must not suppose that she can be saved if she takes a wrong turning, even if we had all the will in the world to save her. Deep though British sympathy with Hellenism always has been, and may continue to be, there are even greater interests is Europe than that to be rescued. Greece is a sea-sundered State, and as such is at the mercy of the Power which commands the sea. If ever it were our painful duty to compel Greece to yield on any point, nothing would be easier. She is a small naval Power herself. She could not live in defiance of the greatest naval Power. That is exactly where she would be bound to fail and to suffer if she ever provoked. the test. Fortunately the heart of the Greek people has not led them astray. They are certain that their interests are bound up with the fate of Serbia and the victory of the Allies, They watched our landing at Salonika with real friendliness. They. remember that the very railway from Nish to Salonika which the Bulgarians are attacking is partly Greek property, and is the one rapid. means of communication between Greece and Serbia. M. Venezelos sees the whole case clearly, and the people cheer him whenever he appears. On. Monday he said in the Greek Chamber that 'he believed war between Greece and Bul- garia was inevitable. If Greece did not fight now when the Allies would help her, she would have to fight a duel a few years later with Bulgaria, when she would have to stand absolutely alone. No help from Serbia then, no sympathy from her cast-off ally ! What- ever Greece, or Roumania either, decides to do, the duty of Britain excludes all hesitation. As M. Viviani said in the French Chamber on Tuesday, the Allies have come to a complete agreement to send help to Serbia, and to ensure respect for the Treaty of Bucharest, of which they are guarantors. He added that the British and French Governments are at one as to the number of men required for the expedition, and that the scheme is approved by General Joffre. Russia, he also stated, will take her part in the movement. His remarks about Roumania, who in his opinion is convinced that her hopes depend. on a victory of the Allies, were particularly interesting.
We have written rather blackly of the possible fate of Greece, but we cannot believe that this fate is reserved. for her. The Greek Premier, M. Zaimis, has said that the next step to the present policy of " armed neutrality " will be "determined by events.' Greece, in fact, has not decided finally. We believe that she will yet save herself by the only safe and the only honourable policy—that of fulfilling her promise to Serbia.
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