TOPICS OF THE DAY.
"BOLDNESS, BOLDNESS, AND AGAIN BOLDNESS !"
THE gravity of the military situation can hardly be exaggerated. We have reached a crisis in the war fraught with consequences of the utmost moment. If we take a wrong decision now, we do not say that we shall be beaten in the end—our essential strength is far too great for that—but we shall indefinitely prolong the course of the war, and therefore indefinitely increase the burden on our shoulders. Speaking generally and roughly, what we have to decide from the strategic point of view is whether we shall obey what is ordinarily considered to lie the leading principle of the art of war—the principle of concentration of effort, and of not adopting what the French call the plan of petits paquets (so greatly sub- dividing your forces that they are everywhere weak and nowhere able to strike a decisive blow)—or whether we shall extend the policy of petits paquets and begin operations in yet one more theatre of war. We see all the force of the abstract arguments against a new war in a new place. Nevertheless we hold that the very peculiar and special circumstances of the present case oblige us to abandon what is usually the safer and wiser system, and to practise dispersion rather than concentration. What we must make up our minds to do—and remember that it must be done with passion, energy, and conviction, not half-heartedly—is to adopt the maxim of Boldness, Bold- ness, and again Boldness ! We have reached a point whore we must put aside the homely proverb of not throwing good money after bad, and must push on along a dangerous and doubtful course because we have gone so far that turning back would now be oven more doubtful and more dangerous than to proceed. We believe that if the strategic situation is carefully studied it will be seen that these are the considerations which must govern us even if we think solely of the abstract military considerations. But apart from these, there are considerations of faith and honour which must in any case control the action of the Allies. Serbia has been our ally from the beginning of the war, and it is now abso- lutely impossible for us to leave her to her fate. We must stand by her at all costs. The Bulgarians are preparing to stab her in the back. If Greece and Roumania quail, we must not do so. How can we expect them to play the part of honour in this respect unless we set the eats inpie ? We cannot desert the Serbians—even though to help them will require a gigantic effort, and one which students of war in the abstract tell us may cause a loss of energy and involve us in great risks. We must take the risks, be they what they may. To say this of course is not to lay down the particular:way in which we are to help Serbia and punish Bulgaria for her assassin's blow. But act we must with promptness, determination, and power. As we write on Thursday Sir Edward Grey has not spoken, nor shall we be able till next week to comment upon his words. Fortunately, however, the policy he will announce cannot be in doubt. X. Viviani's aunouucement of the determination come to by the Allies shows clearly that we mean to stand by, Serbia to the end, and not tell her that we cannot help her because the teachings of the higher strategy forbid another petit paquet. France, Britain, and Italy on the Aegean, and Russia on the Black Sea, mean to let Bulgaria have her first lessons in the use of sea power combined with military operations. The Government have come to a wise decision, and will receive the whole-hearted support of the country. Of that we have no doubts.
We have given the reasons why good faith and honour ,eompel us to think not of our own risks but of the needs of our Ally and to help her at all costs. We believe, how- ever, that, quite apart from these considerations, there are sound strategic reasons why in the present instance we must run the perils of yet another war—must pour troops into SrConika and operate therefrom. In the first place, such operations are, we believe, necessary to cover, protect, and bring to fruition our great operations and commit- ments in the Gallipoli Peninsula, operations from which we cannot now disengage ourselves without losses too great to be contemplated. For good or ill we have put our bands to that plough, and wo cannot leave it. But the position of our troops at the Dardanelles would be serious in the highest degree if, after. Serbia had been crushed, a.
joint German and Bulgarian force were to go to the assist- ance of the Turks and join in attempting to turn us out of the Peninsula. Whilst the forces already in the Dardanelles hold on to the ground we have gained, as they will, we must strive our hardest to make it impossible for succour in men or munitions to come to Turkey from the West.
To show that this is no foolhardy or Quixotic view of the case we will put forth certain arguments which will, we believe, obtain the assent of open-minded and cool-headed men. It has often been said of late, and said truly, that when you get the war down to its bed-rock fact, what we have to do is to " kill Germans." That is the essential as regards both the end and the means of the war. But that being so, it does not much matter whether the Allies kill Germans in France or in Italy, in Russia, or in the Balkans. We must kill them wherever we can find them. Our ideal, indeed, is like that which Nelson put before himself—to seek out the enemy's fleets wherever they could be found and destroy them. Of course we would rather kill Germans in a place convenient to our- selves, but if they place themselves in inconvenient spots that is no reason why we should not follow them up. That they can place themselves in inconvenient spots is,
df course, due to the great misfortune thet from the very
beginning of the war the initiative passed into German bands, that they have been able to hold that initiative, and that we have had to conform to it. But though this is an inconvenience, it by no means necessarily follows that the Germans are therefore going to win. The Boers in the South African War got the initiative from the begin- ning and kept it, but though we had. to conform and ''did conform, we won in the end. And so it will be now.
After all, the Germans and Austrians by invading Serbia are not really adding one cubit to their military stature in the matter of numbers or of guns. What they give with one hand in the Balkans they are taking away with the other in Russia or in Flanders. They have reached the point, reached by all the combatants except Britain and Italy, where they have got a strictly limited though a very large number of men. These, however, they can and will dispose of where they like. If, then, we mean to win we have got to follow their dispositions—subject, of course, to certain geographical and physical considerations. By this we mean that, though strategically we must conform to their initiative, we are not going to allow them tacti- cally to dictate the precise battle-ground. Speaking generally, we must go where the Germans are and kill them there, but that does not mean that we must necessarily meet them on the Danube. If it is more convenient, we and our Serbian Ally may fall back and make Bulgaria rather than Serbia the theatre of the war.
Looked at dispassionately, the Germans are incurring quite as many risks in the policy of petits paquets as are the Allies. We can imagine an exceedingly good abstract strategic case being made out against their invasion of Serbia, but the wise Germans know when to throw their science to the winds and be governed by a policy of adventure. We at once hear our critics saying that we are failing to realize that if the war is regarded as a whole, the Germans and Austrians are on interior lines, and that therefore what may be petits paquets to us is one big packet to them. We fully realize that this is -so, but we meet it with the old retort that interior lines. regarded from outside, can and do mean envelopment, provided the Power on the exterior lines has .a superiority in numbers sufficient to neutralize 'the effects of the extra mobility with which those who are at the centre are endowed.
There is yet one more thing to remember about the Balkan adventure upon; which we are now launched. If we fail, or if it ends in disaster, our position will no doubt be terribly dangerous. If, however, we succeed, and enable the Serbians to hold the Germans curd prevent them from reaching Constantinople, the German position will be a very bad one. In the case we have supposed (that is, a German failure and an Allied success) we may at last have 'found the road into the uncovered flank of the Central Powers—the road to Budapest, the road by which we may insert a spear- head that will give the death-wound to Austria-Hungary, and so to her Ally. In any case, we, the French, the Russians, and the Italians have got to plank down our men and our money and pursue a fearless and honourable course. But to do this all four nations must rouse themselves as they have never been roused before. The French, no doubt, will find it difficult to send great numbers of troops, since their own laud is invaded. Yet in spite of that they will, we believe, be able to spare a serviceable contingent, while Britain, Russia, and Italy, if they do their duty, can and will make the now adventure formid- able iu a high degree. Happily for us, our great need has arisen at a time when our munition stores have been amply replenished, and when it is not possible to say that it is useless to raise more men because we have nothing with which to arm them. We have now arms and ammunition sufficient for our needs, and the plant from which we draw these stores is augmenting weekly, or rather daily. We have plenty of material strength. What we now want most is cool thinking, boldness, and determination. After all, we are a nation full of moral power, and if we one and all seriously will to win we shall win. Hitherto that will to win has largely been absent, or at any rate dormant.
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