HOW IT LOOKS TO A GERMAN.
THERE are plenty of causes of anxiety for English- men in the existing situation. We are of course far better off at the present moment both in the matter
of equipment and of trained men than we were at the beginning of the war. When the war broke out we had
a little Army, though not a contemptible one, and half that Army—the Territorial portion—was untrained. Now, however, not only has the first section of the Terri- torial Force had nearly nine months' training and the second over seven months', but the great bulk of the New Army of something over a million and a half of men has had six months' training, and a good portion as much as seven or eight months'. Again, if we take such things as rifles, guns, ammunition, and clothing, the absolute figures compare most favourably with those of August. In spite, however, of all this, there is a terrible amount of leeway to make up. It may be true that we are better placed than we were in August, but still we enlist more men than we have rifles for, and we tend to fire off more shells than we make. In addition to this, we must face the fact that at sea we are still unable to bring the German battle-fleet to action. At the same time, the Germans attack our merchant shipping, and attack it in a way to which as yet we cannot effectively reply. No one has hitherto dis- covered any satisfactory means for taking the offensive against submarines. Then, too, though here we admit that the public is unduly impatient, events seem to hang lire in the Dardanelles, and the great political results which we hoped from the capture of Constantinople are postponed week by week. Finally, there is a feeling which preys upon many minds as to the almost hopeless task of breaking through the great fortified line, for such it now is, which extends from Belfort to the sea. Those who do proportion-sums based on the losses endured at Neuve Chapelle in gaining a couple of miles, and so estimate what the bill in killed and wounded would be if the whole German line were driven back a hundred miles, sicken at the thought of the sacrifice which they calculate would be necessary. That, of course, is a, very unscientific way of reckoning, for it is obvious that if we once got the Germans on the run and forced them to take up a new line, our losses during such an operation would not be nearly so large as in our last great battle, whilst the Germans must almost certainly suffer in far greater proportion. Still, taking all such matters into consideration, and in spite of the wonderful things accomplished by the Russian Army in the Car- pathians, and in spite, too, of the splendid spirit shown by all ranks in our Army in Flanders, it would be idle to deny that the present period of waiting causes a good deal of despondency in the public mind.
We are not going to attempt to heal this de- spondency, though we cannot profess to feel it ourselves, by any verbal poultice, or by conventional appeals to our countrymen at home to show a more gallant spirit, and so forth. To be quite candid, we are by no means sorry to see men take a very serious view of the war. At the same time, we would ask those of our readers who feel the weight of anxiety which we have described to place themselves in the position of the Germans. Let them try to imagine how things must look to a German who dares to put off the mask of self-complacency which the German people have deliberately worn ever since the beginning of the war and to face the facts, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts. Surely no nation in history ever had a more gloomy, nay, a more terrifying, prospect in front of them in spite of one or two apparent advantages. It is true that there is little or no fighting going on upon German soil, for the woes of Austria-Hungary in this respect do not count. It is true, also, that the Germans have still a great superiority in equipment, especially in ammunition, explosives, guns, and rifles. It is true, again, that they have not yet exhausted their supplies of men. For the moment, that is, an apparently good case can be made out for the German optimist. If the German thinks only of what he sees before his eyes, he has, we admit, a fairly good reason for keeping up bis spirits. What he dare not do, however, is to look on the future. Whence is there any hope of succour coming for the Germans and the Austrians? If they look seaward, it is not there. If they look to the mountain-tops, no flight of imagination can give hope that they will bless the feet of those who bear good tidings. There is not a potentate, not a people in the world who really desire that Germany shall win, or who wish to bring them aid, as, for example, so large a portion of the people of Italy, of Roumania, and of Greece wish to bring aid to the Allies. Germany and Austria have no friends beyond the section of German voters whom they have mobilized, or think they have mobilized, in the 'United States. This section, however, is very much smaller than the boasts of the German Embassy in Washington would lead us to believe.
The very best that an honest German cherishing no illusions could venture to say about the position is that Germany is like a fortress held by a brave, well-equipped garrison, and with an unbre.ached line of fortifications all round it—a fortress which defies the enemy to break through at any point. But even if this view of the unbreakable line were literally true, it would in reality afford very small consolation to the Germans unless they could count upon their enemies growing tired and breaking off the siege as hopeless of accomplishment. But no German who blows the facts and will really face them can possibly believe that the Allies will retire in despair from the work which they have taken in hand of reducing the German fortress. Germany's treatment of Belgium and of the occupied districts of France, Germany's piratical policy at sea, Germany's action in Turkey, have so thoroughly alarmed the rest of the world, that, however much the Allies might secretly wish to give up the great siege, they would not dare to do so. They know that if Germany is not now beaten thoroughly they will never be able to sleep in safety again. If Germany bad waged this war in the old way, in the way, say, in which the Crimean War was fought, the combatants might have got tired and gone back to the status quo. There is not the slightest possibility of such a conclusion of the present struggle. The siege will go on till the bitter end. The besiegers must persist even if it is a siege as long as that of Troy. Not only are the resources of the Allies much greater in men and wealth, but their energies are constantly revivified by contact with the outside world. The gates of Germany are shut. The gates of France, of Britain, and of Russia stand always open to replenishment from the rest of the world. But, granted that the besiegers are steadfast, there is but one fate for besieged places, however strong. If none come to raise the siege from outside— and none can come to do that for Germany—they must fall, as Zion or as Carthage fell before the armies of Rome, as Constantinople yielded to the Turks, or as Paris to the Germans.
As a matter of fact, however, the situation is not .nearly as favourable to Germany as we have just described it. Germany has not got an impregnable line of fortifica- tions around her. She cannot defy the world, even for a time, behind her existing trenches. It is true that the barrier from Belfort to the sea seems unbreakable.
It is true that the neutral buffer State of Holland and Germany's own sea defences protest her western front, while to the east her trenches and her armies bar the way to a Russian advance. On the south, how- ever, it is a very different story. Germany's southern flank at the moment is protected by the territories of her Austrian ally ; but how long will Austria be able to give Germany that protection ? Can she last a year? Can she last six months ? Can she last even three months ? That is the question which the German of our thought, the German who faces the facts squarely, must ask himself. Considering the pressure which the Allies are even now exercising upon Austria, pressure which must be enormously increased as soon as Constantinople falls, as fall it will, no matter what temporary difficulties and setbacks we may have in that region, Austria cannot "stick it out." It is only a question of time before the Dual Monarchy falls in ruin. We say this without counting upon the possibilities of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy taking part in the fray. But when once Austria-Hungary falls, either from ex- ternal pressure or from internal collapse, the southern side of the German fortress will be uncovered and open to attack. Then only one course will remain to Germany in order to prevent her immediate destruction—to build a new set of trench walls from the Swiss frontier to Galicia, from the Lake of Constance to Cracow. What does that mean translated into the military terms of the present war ? It means some six hundred miles of new trenches to be dug and garrisoned by German troops. It means that Germany must call out the last contingents of her man- hood, for such a line as we have described will take another two million men to hold. To put the position, then, in the most favourable terms we can for Germany, it means that she will have no reserves with which to strengthen the lines in Poland and in Flanders upon which her enemies will be battering. No doubt the fulfilment of this forecast will take time, and a great deal of time ; but Time has always been the greatest of the Allied Powers. To put it in another way, France, Russia, and England can afford to wait. Germany cannot.
It all, then, comes back to this. Germany's one hope of success rests in her enemies growing war-weary and raising the siege of Germany because they have failed in the quality of steadfastuess. On this point we have spoken already, and will now only ask three simple questions Does any one seriously suppose that England will break off the encounter? Are the people of France capable of such folly ? Is it conceivable that the Russians will throw up the sponge and admit that all their sacrifices have been in vain ? There is no need to spend time in answering such questions as these, nor, again, will we set forth any answer to the question which we venture to say no honest German dares to put to himself : How will things be with Germany this time next year ?
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