NEITVE CHAPELLE.
NO battle of this war has caused more strangely con- flicting rumours and emotions than the battle of Neuve Chapelle. After the first brief report of the victory, stories began to be told here that it was anything but a victory ; that there had been culpable blunders, a failure to reach the real objective, and heavy unnecessary losses. The next stage in public feeling about the battle was reached when undeniable evidence came across the Channel of the excellent effect produced in the spirits and confidence of our soldiers by the results of the battle. It was a puzzle to reconcile the evidence of mistakes and disappointment and the evidence as to an improvement in moral ; yet such a reconciliation is the only possible clue to the real signifi- cance of the battle. We are not likely to have any official guidance beyond the restrained but very interesting despatch from Sir John French which was published on Thursday. Fortunately this despatch does enable us to see that both what was said in dispraise of the manage- ment of the battle and what was said about the rise in the spirits of the men are only different sides of the shield. Both sets of statements were founded on fact. We might set forth the import of Sir John French's despatch in this way : After the first attack, which was carried out with comparatively little loss and triumphant success, there was a delay. The enemy should have been pursued when he was eitheronthe run or considerably confused and unnerved. The delay enabled him to bring up reinforcements and prepare fresh defences. When our men attempted a further advance they found the fire of the German artillery and machine guns too hot. The greater part of our losses occurred in this second phase. To this extent the battle was a dis- appointment. But the fact remains that we are now in possession of a tremendously encouraging piece of know- ledge. We know that when an overwhelming artillery fire has been brought to bear on a position we can make almost a certainty of capturing it. We can obliterate the physical features of the place. We can stun and daze the defenders who are not -killed. We can hold off rein- forcements by interposing between them and their friends who require help what Sir John French calls "a curtain of shrapnel." Before Neuve Chapelle no man could say for certain that an entrenched position could be carried with less loss to the attackers than to the defenders. That can now be said with something like certainty. It is no wonder, then, that the spirits and confidence of our men have risen. They look forward to the help of an over- whelming artillery fire in future, and they assume that the mistakes which prevented Neuve Chapelle from being a
decisive victory will not be repeated. From this point of view Neuve Chapelle is much the most significant battle of the war. For while the German supply of guns and ammunition is not increasing, our own supply has increased greatly. It must increase, however, beyond all limits hitherto dreamed of if we are really to make sure of applying the lesson learned at Neuve Chapelle. Our supply of shells must, as Sir John French says, be "almost unlimited."
We hope and believe that all the unpleasant rumours and innuendoes about Neuve Chapelle have been ended by Sir John French's despatch. It has been published sooner after the event than some previous despatches, and for this we must express our gratitude. But we cannot help saying once more that the motive of the authorities forwithholding, either for several weeks or altogether, information that is already blown to the enemy is quite beyond our compre- hension. Sir John French has avowedly not told us all the facts, but he has told us enough to set all doubts, misunderstandings, and anxieties at rest. We cannot conceive why this should not have been done sooner. I great deal of ridiculous and injurious rumour would have been prevented. Of course we know that such a despatch as Sir John French's takes time to compile. It cannot be fired off at a moment's notice. Innumerable facts and figures have to be collected and collated. But surely it would be possible to communicate speedily to the nation a brief statement of the Commander-in-Chief's estimate or general impression of the effects of a battle. Sir John French's word would absolutely check all that sort of suspense which is based on the uncomfortable convic- tion that the truth is being kept back. So long as Englishmen at home feel that they are kept in the dark unnecessarily, so long will they fail to put forth the highest effort of which they are capable. For Englishmen are built in such a way that their effort is always to be measured by the degree of their knowledge about the kind of effort required. Of course everything that can possibly be kept secret from the enemy should be kept secret by the strictest rules, the most stringent censorship, and the sternest penalties. Our plea for light concerns only facts which are necessarily already in possession of the enemy.
We shall now try briefly to summarize the narrative of Neuve Chapelle. At the end of February Sir John French decided that an offensive movement must be undertaken. His reasons were that the line in front of him was weakening, that the French advance in the Champagne called for indirect support, and chiefly that after the winter the men in the trenches needed to be cheered up by gaining ground. The importance of the last reason is not easily exaggerated. Every officer who has led troops in action knows that men who have lain long under a heavy fire are less easily moved than men who have only rested between rushes or have not lain down at all. And this applies on a far larger scale to troops who have remained on the same ground for several months. With the drying of the land the men would naturally say : "Now is the time for an advance." But if the advance were delayed without apparent reason the psychological tendency to prefer holding on to going forward would become more pro. flounced than ever. Sir John French knew that this tendency, which affects all troops—though we venture to any that it affects our own less than any in the world— must be dispelled in justice to the men themselves. He chose a moment for an advance when tho movement would be not only possible but popular. The point of attack was a ridge on the left of the German position that runs from Lille towards the plain of the Lys. The village of Neuve Chapelle is on this ridge. The attack began on March 10th. On the right of the British infantry belong- ing to the 1st Army were two Indian brigades. The find Army and the General Reserve were in support. The advance was more rapid on our right, and the Indiana were the first into Neuve Chapelle. On our left the wire entanglements were insufficiently destroyed by our artillery. Artillery, as we see, in this kind of warfare smoothes away all difficulties ; where the artillery pre- paration is inadequate an advance becomes impossible. In three hours, however, Neuve Chapelle was held by us. Between the village and the Germans, who were now dis- posed north and east of it, an impenetrable screen of shrapnel poured down. Moreover, our airmen simul- taneously raided German railways and stations behind the German positions. So far everything had progressed splendidly. But it was difficult to re-form the troops, which had been "greatly disorganized" by the violence of their attack and by passing through the German trenches and the streets and houses of the village. The German fire had also broken the telephonic communica- tions with our artillery. The delay lasted for more than three hours. 'I am of opinion," says Sir John French. "that this delay would not have occurred had the clearly expressed order of the General Officer Commanding 1st Army been more carefully observed. The difficulties above enumerated might have been overcome at an earlier period of the day if the General Officer Commanding 4th Corps bad been able to bring his reserve brigades more speedily into action." How far the enemy's defence had been shattered for the time being is proved by the fact that one British brigade re-formed in the open without having a single shot fired at it. When the advance was renewed in the afternoon of March 10th it was too late ; the German machine guns in particular held excellent positions.
On March 11th the Germans were reinforced, and it was not possible for the British troops to do more than hold their own and strengthen the positions won. A farther advance would no doubt have been possible if mist had not made aerial reconnaissance impossible and if the telephone-wires had not been cut the day before. Sir John French says : "Even when our troops which were pressing forward occupied a house here and there it was not possible to stop our artillery fire, and the infantry had to be with- drawn." Nothing is more disheartening to soldiers than to know that their own guns are firing on them. On March 12th there was again a mist which hampered artillery action. The 4th Corps and the Indian Corps seized positions in front of them, but in the circumstances could not hold them. On this day the German counter- attacks were very violent, but Sir John French remarks on the ease with which they were repulsed. Then came the order not to attempt further advances unless favourable conditions suddenly presented themselves. Sir John French says : "As most of the objects for which the operations had been undertaken had been attained, and as there were reasons why I considered it inadvisable to continue the attack at that time, I directed Sir Douglas Haig on the night of the 12th to hold and consolidate the ground which had been gained by the 4th and Indian Corps, and to suspend further offensive operations for the present." The cavalry had been held in readiness in case a favourable opportunity for using it occurred. In the opinion of the General command- ing the 4th Corps, however, there was no such oppor- tunity, and the cavalry was withdrawn. In the three days' fighting our losses were nearly 13,000. The German losses have been estimated at about 18,000, including nearly 1,700 prisoners. We learn from the despatch for the first time that 23 British officers and 1,728 men are returned as missing.
Sir Douglas Haig, in command of the 1st Army, has increased the already high esteem in which be is held. He has imagination, resource, coolness—all the qualities of a
great military leader. Whatever tactical mistakes were committed were clearly not his. And he led men worthy of his leadership. Sir John French once more speaks of the magnificent gallantry of all ranks. To sum up. There were some misfortunes and some mistakes. Better luck and better management should prevent the recurrence of both. Then the guns will be free to do their work. Neuve Chapelle was a victory. We have every confidence that at the next attempt we shall win a decisive victory. Mean- while it is plain that not a syllable of exaggeration has been uttered in this country about the support that can be given to the Army by a full supply of munitions. Ultimate success is being prepared in the factories as much as in the trenches.
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