17 AUGUST 1901, Page 17

' VARIA.*

Tilts volume of essays contains Many interesting papers, and a few dell ones. The first six are by far the best. The later articles are less original, and one of the longest, entitled "Philosophical Societies in the Universities • of Scotland,": is an •" °cession's' paper" of no general interest whatever. Perhaps the title Varia to some extent excuses the in- equality of the two halves of the book, and the chaPters are too entirely detached not to be judged on their own merits. The whole work, the autaor tells us, is especially addressed-to those "who wish for an ,introduction to philosophy," who want "to know what philosophy, is and what it can do for us all." He quotes Coleridge's sentence, "In wonder all phil- osophy is born, in wonder all it ends, while admiration-fills up the interspaces," and proceeds to endorse and to enlarge upon the poet's definition. He describes the intellectual develop- -meat of the child, whose earliest ideas reach him, Pro- fessor Knight believes, not from the external world, but

from a remoter realm, out of which we emerged, and into • • which we again remerge. "Upon these primitive instincts is grafted the plant of tradition, and not till the authority of tradition is consciously questioned does the philosophic spirit come to life within us." The uses of philosophy he thus describes. It is needed, "first, as the dispassionate critic of antagonistic systems of thought ; secondly, as the arbi- trator- and adjudicator between rival claimants in the realm of knowledge; thirdly, as the reconciler of things suid systems apparently, but not really, opposed; and, therefore, fourthly, as a guide to all specialists." This unity in the midst of diversity is the part of his teaching on which the essayist lays most stress. He desires to show to all combatants in the realm of knowledge that "while they may usually be right in what they affirm, they are for the meSt part wrong in what they deny." Not that he imagines for one moment that we can ever attain to uniformity in philosophic opinion, but he does believe that in the near future there will be a far wider recognition of the truth which underlies opposing systems of thought. In the chapter entitled "Nationality as an Element in -the Evolution of Philosophy" Professor Knight, while he declares, that the philosophy of the world is in some . sense an organic whole, believes that there is no such mistake as to endeavour to reduce the different races of mankind to a • dead level of uniformity,—to Europeanise -the Indian or Asiaticise the African, &c. The fact that science bas brought

• • Varia Studies On Problems of Philosophy anti Ethics, By William Knight. Loudon: John Murray. 1:7s. *1.3

the ends of the earth together by means of rapid communi- cation has not induced, he thinks, any real unification of the race. He sees no evidence that intercommunication will ever lead to any real unity of type. Evidently he is more or less opposed to missionary enterprise. Normal development from within should be, he considers, the ideal for every nation. A civilisation which is to endure, he argues, must be educed, not superimposed. His belief is that all violently imposed civilisations relapse into barbarism. He sees no reason to think that the lower races

die out, or ever, so far as we understand him, con- form to the present standards of the higher. He depre- cates any attempt on the part of the European to force his religion or philosophy upon the lower races, pointing out how dangerous it is for the latter to lose a time-honoured standard, and how easy it is to imitate the vices of the European without acquiring his virtues. Each race, he con- cludes, should tolerate the other, and gain from contact with it all that it can healthily assimilate. During the century upon which we have just entered Professor Knight anticipates a great increase in the number of scientific schools still separated by the old line of demarcation,—the real and the ideal. Within these two camps he expects the continuance, in essence, of all the theories of the universe which have hitherto governed men's minds, believing that no theory which had its root in error has ever been powerful or long-lived. As we get nearer to the root of truth we shall be able to cleanse it from those falsehoods or extravagances wherein it has been temporarily entangled. Orthodoxy and hetero- doxy are, he declares, terms which have no philosophic meaning, yet the philosopher is not therefore to confuse right and wrong, or to be led into an agnostic position. That position inevitably leads to pessimism, which cannot, any more than optimism, be upheld by philosophy. Believing, as he does, that philosophy has never been so potent a force as in the past few years, during which not only the greatest poets, historians, and pain-I:Ars, but politicians, and even Cabinets, have been moulded by it, he hopes that the modern spirit of pessimism will soon give way under its influence,—a spirit which is destructive of all that is best in human nature. Already be sees signs that it is more practical than theoretic, from which fact he argues that it will yield to some future moral tonic, of what nature it is impossible to specify.

In "Poetry and Science, their Contrasts and Affinities," the essayist points out that scientific culture, so far from being neglected in the present day, is beginning to be overvalued. The overvaluation of science may, he thinks, become one of the heresies of the future,—meaning, of course, by the word "heresy" merely a sectarian view of things. He disagrees with the late Mr. Lewes, who said, "How insignificant is the exist- ence of a thousand Ciceros in comparison with a single law of Nature," and with all those scientific men who deny that anything is to be done for mankind by another agency than science. Is a knowledge of the earlier forms of life on the earth of more value, he asks, than acquaintance with the thoughts of Aristotle; or is initiation into the laws of electricity better than initiation into the imaginative wealth of Shakespeare or Dante? The world, Mr. Knight considers, owes more gratitude to its poets than to its men of science, because when a scientific man has got his facts and laws together the world requires an explanation of them such as science cannot give. A time comes after the discoveries have been made when the results are best expressed in poetry. One of Professor Knight's most interesting chapters concerns "The Unseen Root of Ethics." While he believes that the moral law would be able to withstand, at least for a time, the total extinction of religion, he finds in religion " the goal, the crown, and, since we must speak in metaphor, the root also of ethics." "The sense of duty, the conviction that we are under a law," he believes to be inherent in our constitution. This sense of living under authority he explains by the existence "of an extra-mundane presence which, as the Bible says, besets us behind and before, and lays its hand upon us." The laws of conduct are, he thinks, the outcome of the divine element in human nature, and in that divine element lies the unseen root of ethics. Professor Knight's belief in human nature is unshakeable, and his moral outlook entirely optimistic. What is often called conversion—that is, a sudden change in a man's moral convictions and conduct—he seems

to regard as a return to a more normal moral condition. "If" as he hopes, "moral excellence, after wiliaCwil is nevertheless an integral part in the nature we inherit, only requiring the removal of existing hindrances a.nd the presence of some magnet to draw it forth, there is a barge amount of good cheer in the prospect " A. criticism of philosophy, is not easy to criticise, and we have endeavoured to analyse rather than to appreciate a very interesting set of articles.