THE NEW TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
TF men's minds had not been so deeply occupied with the Peace Treaty last week, there would have been a great outburst of excitement at the proposed Treaty by which Great Britain, the United States, and France will constitute themselves a defensive Alliance against Ger- many. It is in itself a singular comment on the extra- ordinary importance of the events which are happening every day that such a Treaty should have been received with so little wonder. If the American nation ratifies President Wilson's proposal—and so far there seems to have been no hostility—the United States will have emerged for good and all out of her isolation. She will be as much a European Power as any of us. In our opinion, this proposed pledging of America to the peace of Europe is all to the good. We rejoice in it. The words in which the new Triple Alliance is .proposed are so important that we may repeat them here :—
" In addition to the securities offered in the Treaty of Peace
• the President of the United States of America has pledged him- self to propose to the Senate of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain has pledged himself to propose to the Parliament of Great Britain an engagement, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to go imme- diately to the assistance of France in the case of an unprovoked attack by Germany."
This is a very different Triple Alliance from the old Triple Alliance of evil omen between Germany, Austria, and Italy. That was an Alliance between a domineering State and her "brilliant second "—not so very brilliant after all —and a third party, Italy, who reluctantly acquiesced because she was intimidated, because she knew her frontiers to be strategically indefensible, and because she could not act otherwise.
The first obvious eonsideration when one examines this new Treaty is that it is bound to rob the League of Nations of some of its authority. This must be admitted. It cannot be helped. Clearly, if the League were sufficient in itself to enforce the peace of the world, there would be no need for' special groupings of nations within the League. In so far as nations do group themselves in such a way as to take out fresh insurance policies for their safety, they confess that the League does not give them adequate security. It is well known that France has throughout taken the view that the League in its present form would not sufficiently secure her. She wanted the League to have a sort of General Staff which would be able to concert military plans and mobilize forces against any disturber of the peace. For several reasons the Allies of France could not agree to this plan, and now we see this new Triple Alliance accepted by France as a substitute. We also see in it satisfactory evidence that one great lesson of the war has been learnt by Great Britain. Our front is no longer on our own shores, but lies in the Continent of Europe. Napoleon perceived that truth when he said that from the ports nearest to us on the other side of the Channel he could point a dagger at the heart of England. That is even more true in these days of submarines and aircraft. If ever France were to be attacked again, it would be a mere act of self-preservation on our part to rush to her assistance- Some British people were so blind that they could not see
that in helping France in August, 1914, we were only defending ourselves, and that if Germany overwhelmed France (as she would have done if we had not helped France) our turn to be attacked would have come later.
In that event, at the moment of our greatest need we should not have been able to claim a friend in the world. Moreover, we should have deserved our fate. It may be said that duty and necessity are both so clear now that a Treaty is really unnecessary. We are not so sure. We read in the Manchester Guardian these words : "Beyond doubt, if France were threatened and the League of Nations refused to act, France's neighbours and allies—ourselves and the United States at least—would not stand idly by." Yet there were many Liberal and Radical newspapers which exhorted us in the days before the outbreak of war in 1914 to remain resolutely neutral. " Liberal " Britain coolly considered the possibility of leaving " Liberal " France to be overwhelmed by reactionary Germany. Chief among these newspapers was the Daily News with its unforgettable display of chivalry in recommending that a neutral Great Britain would be able to gather in the trade.
Although, as we have said, this new Alliance must have its reactions upon the authority of the League, its creation does no violence to the thoughts of the authors of the Covenant. Article XXI.* of the Covenant lays it down that nothing in the Covenant shall affect the validity of "international engagements or regional understandings for securing the maintenance of peace." The first nation to act upon that reservation was the United States, who reserved to herself the full operation of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States has thus provided for her security by an expedient that lies outside the League. France is to receive additional security from the new Alliance. What about Great Britain 1 We imagine that the new Triple Alliance would operate in defence of Great Britain and America, if either were to be attacked., as much as it would operate in defence of France, since an attack upon one member of the new Alliance would be for all practical purposes an attack upon the others. We take it that the Treaty could not work in any other way. But something remains to be said. If France is to be secured in the special manner she has chosen, and America is also to be seeuredin another special way of her own choosing, Great Britain must not fail to say that she will choose to be specially secured by her Fleet. There can be no more talk of the so-called freedom of the seas. President Wilson himself admitted that all such talk was made obsolete by the creation of the League and the abolition of neutrality in war. Therefore it is not likely that the demand for the freedom of the seas could be seriously revived. It is just as well, however, to be quite plain about this.
One final reflection. It is not clear why the new insur- ance policies have been taken out only in favour of Great Britain, France, and the United States. There are other Great Powers in our Alliance. Japan, it may be said, is lees directly interested, and for reasons of her own may not have wished to come in. But there is Italy. For all we know, Italy may have been asked to come in, and may not have wished to do so. But if that is not so, she certainly ought to be given the opportunity of membership. The same thing might be said of Belgium, or of any other small State which might conceivably become the prey of a restored Germany, for, as we know, an attack upon a small State, just as much as an attack on a large State, may set the whole world rushing to arms. But to take the case of Italy only : we suppose that thinking Italians—on the assumption that Italy has not been invited to come in— must be saying something of this sort : "Our powerful brothers evidently do not think that the League is a very site guarantee, as they are hastening to provide themselves with other means of protection. If the three most powerful States in the world to-day want this further protection, what about us ? Additional security is even more neces- sary for us than for them." We sincerely hope, then, that this objection will be met. If Italy in the end really had cause—though we are sure that such a mad thing will not happen—to feel that she had been left out in the cold, she would inevitably gravitate into some other Alliance within the League. And if such an Alliance grew and set up a counter-will to the will of the new Triple Alliance, there would be, at the best, difficulty and inconvenience, and, at the worst, mortal trouble for everybody.
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