THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PACT I F the Security Pact is
signed it will be a. document which will probably govern Western Europe for at least half a century. Possibly an agreement will be reached by the time these words are before our readers. In that case the difficulties which we are about to enu- merate will be a record of difficulties most happily over- come. The Pact is an attempt at international pacifica- tion which, less ambitious, indeed, than the Protocol, is yet infinitely bolder and more extensive than any- thing which was conceived of before the War. What are the chances, then, that some document will emerge, bearing the signatures of Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and Italy and committing France and Germany to a peaceable settlement of their disputes ? It is becoming obvious that there remain only three major difficulties. The first difficulty is that Germany seems unwilling to enter the League of Nations (and her entry is rightly considered a pre-requisite for further pacification) unless an exception' is made in her favour with regard to the obligations contained in Article 16. By this Article the signatory Powers agree to allow the passage across their territory of the troops of any other member of the League, when these troops are on their way to attack a common foe who has violated the Covenant. Germany contends that, as she is disarmed amidst armed neighbours, she is not in a status of equality with the other Powers, and should be given sonic exemp- tion from this article, as was done in the case of Switzer- land, when it was agreed that the neutrality and integrity of Switzerland should be observed in all circumstances. The other members of the League, and France in par- ticular, insist that Germany should enter the League without being exempt from any of its obligations. This is the first difficulty. The next one is analogous to it. France, we arc told, is insisting on a text for the Security Pact which will allow her to go .to the assistance of her ally, Poland, in case of attack. She insists that she can enter into no agreement which would forbid her troops to march across Germany on this mission. The Germans, however, object that should the Pact be framed so as to meet France's wishes in this respect, it will, in fact, lose its bi-lateral character. Germany will be forbidden to invade France in any circumstances, but France will be permitted to invade Germany, whenever she can claim that her ally, Poland, is in danger. The third difficulty concerns this country. It is said that Mr. Chamberlain is firmly resolved that Great Britain .shall never consent to enter an agreement which takes away from Parliament the unfettered right of making war or maintaining peace. He will consent to no agree- ment which contemplates " automatic war," as it is called. If this is indeed the case it is difficult to see how an effective Pact can result. The essence of the Western Pact must surely be that should Germany commit an aggression against France, England , is, automatically and by treaty, bound to support France, and vice versa in the case of French aggression against Germany. Should Mr. Chamberlain insist that Parliament must still retain the right to decide whether in fact England will go to War, the Continental Powers may reasonably ask what purpose there is in Mr. Chamberlain's signing the Pact at all. They do not wish to see Britain as a perpetual arbitrator of their disputes; they desire her to guarantee with her armed might some fixed contractual obligation into which they will enter. The distinction is a vital one. We cannot hope both to enter into a solemn international Pact, and still maintain our freedom of action unimpaired. The two things are incompatible. Stated thus baldly, these three difficulties look very formidable, but we have purposely put down the maximum rather than the minimum demands which each Foreign Minister has brought with him. If we were all in agree- ment already there would be no need of a Conference. The whole object of a Conference is to whittle away to vanishing point such differences and difficulties as these. After all, we have only second-hand reports as to the French conception of the Pact. It may be that she is prepared to yield much more than we have represented in this article. At any rate it is impossible to overestimate the importance of an agreement. A Pact which by hook or by crook dispelled the haunting menace of an advance one way or the other across the Rhine would do more than anything else to bring peace to Europe.
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