U.N.O. AND N.A.T.O.
THE Seventh Assembly of the United Nations, which opened in New York this week, may be critical for the future of the Organisation. Its best asset is its President. No statesman has so steadily increased in stature over the past five years as Mr. Lester Pearson. From the day when he joined the Department of External Affairs at Ottawa to the day when he became Canadian Secretary of State twenty years later he has exhibited the same combination of vigour, discernment and common sense. It is not easy to exert leadership in the United Nations Assembly, and the President of such a body is not always in the best position to do that. But so far as it can be done Mr. Pearson can be counted on to do it. The reader- ship will have to be largely negative—away from dangers that must be avoided if possible, such as the pitfalls in controversy on Korea, rather than on to new constructive tasks. Certain discussions in prospect can do the Assembly little good, and may well do it a great deal of harm. On the face of it a body which, in the words of its Charter, " may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security," might seem a proper forum for debate on such questions as the rela- tions between France and Tunisia or the apartheid problem in South Africa. But the word " international " must be given its normal interpretation, and be read in the light of an earlier stipulation, in Article II, that " nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." France in the one case and South Africa in the other have already claimed that this provision applies to the controversies they are engaged in; the United States and India are claiming the contrary with equal vigour. There may be a case for the President to seek a legal ruling. There is very definitely a case for delegates generally to ask themselves how far the application of irritants serves any good purpose.
It need not be pretended that the answer to that question is altogether easy. The United Nations Assembly represents, or should represent, the mobilisation of public opinion, and the expression of considered judgements, even where no positive action can be taken, may, in a healthy international atmos- phere, have salutary results. But where the emotionalist will dash into discussion come what may the responsible statesman will ask himself in a given case not whether discussion is per- missible, but whether there is any prospect that good may come of it. Statesmanship will certainly pot be lacking on the floor of the Assembly when, Mr. Eden and M. Schuman arrive to join Mr. Acheson. All the diplomacy they can exert will be needed if the prestige of the United Nations is not to fall further during this Assembly than it has fallen already. How far it has disappointed hopes its strongest supporters are constrained to recognise. That is due primarily to four factors, none of them within its own control—the division of the world into two antagonistic halves, failure to achieve the universal member- ship originally contemplated, lack of ability to give the covenanted military protection to its member-States and the ruthless misuse by Russia of the power of veto. About three of these nothing can be done at present. In regard to one, the admission of new members, a compromise, unsatisfactory in many ways but better than the present deadlock, ought to be practicable. As things are Russia can and does veto the admis- sion of such candidates as Italy, Eire and Ceylon, and the Allied powers can and do veto Russian satellites like Bulgaria and Rumania. The Allies are technically justified, for to des- cribe the satellites as " peace-loving States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter " is to stretch language inordinately. But Russia has lately proposed that all applicants shall be admitted simultaneously. On balance there is more to be said for that than against it.
The real blow to the United Nations is the transfer of its main function, the preservation of peace, to another body. For Canada, the United States and Western Europe the creation and development of N.A.T.O. has changed the whole situation. Their des with the United Nations have not been relaxed; if they had their Foreign Ministers would not be attending or about to attend the Assembly in a body. But more immediate obligations fill the foreground. To put the measure of loyalty on the lowest level, the N.A.T.O. Powers are spending a hun- dredfold more to make their organisation effective than they are spending on the United Nations; and it must be so. There is no opposition or antagonism between the two bodies. On the contrary, N.A.T.O. falls squarely within that article of the United Nations Charter which recognises " the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence." Its fundamental prin- ciples are those of the United Nations. But for the present support of N.A.T.O. has the first claim on the physical and material resources of its members. It has been created to provide protection, which the United Nations cannot provide, against a real and imminent danger. It has many advantages over the larger body. There are no misunderstandings of any consequence between its members; it is united as the United Nations, despite its name, cannot in present circumstances pretend to be; genuine mutual trust exists between its members; it has substantial military forces in being where the United Nations has none. The relationship between the two bodies is not stereotyped. A day may come when the need for N.A.T.O. will diminish and the authority of the United Nations increase. Meanwhile the situation must be recognised for what it is.
Since, then, first things must come first, the state of N.A.T.O., its strength and its weaknesses, calls for close examination. The essential facts—as for example that fifty N.A.T.O. divisions are under arms in Europe, but that half of them, contributed by Turkey and Greece, are away in the south-east corner of the continent—are to be found in the Chatham House publication Atlantic Alliance, referred to in these columns last week. Such a force is insufficient to discharge the tasks that may fall to it. On that General Ridgway was emphatic in his addresS at the Pilgrims' dinner on Tuesday. The two main speeches on that occasion complemented each other admirably. Mr. Churchill gave reasons for thinking that a Third World War was unlikely. That belief is increasingly widely held, but it is no more than a belief, and to rely on it before it becomes something like certainty would be the shortest way to sheer disaster. It is nowhere near certainty today. So far as the outlook has improved it has improved, as Mr. Churchill pointed out, because the strength of N.A.T.O. has developed so sufficiently to make an attack from the east an increasingly hazardous enter- prise. But the political atmosphere has not improved. If Russia thought it would serve her ends she would, so far as can be seen, be ready to attack at any moment. And though confidence in the potentialities of atomic weapons has grown in the West since it has been known that Britain as well as the .United States possesses them, nothing is known about Russia's strength in this arm. It may be much greater than supposed.
While, therefore, the general situation is substantially better than it was a year ago it is very far from being good enough.
Russia's strength, said General Ridgway, has grown and con- tinues to grow. N.A;T.O. strength is growing too, but not fast enough. One weakness which General Ridgway and Lord Mont- gomery have stressed repeatedly is the lack of properly trained reserves:: Lord Montgomery is emphatic on the inadequacy of a fortnight's refresher course in the year, regarding double that period as imperative. It well may be, in view of the steady development of new techniques and new weapons. What is in some ways worse, in no N.A.T.O. State except Britain is there two-years national service. There are various stresses and strains within the fabric. France's reasonable insistence that arms-production must be planned on not an annual but a three- year basis collides with the fact that the American money on which the programme depends can only be voted annually. The European Defence Community and N.A.T.O. have still to be effectively co-ordinated. That cannot happen till Franco and Germany have ratified the E.D.C. Treaty, and differences about the Saar are jeopardising ratification in both countries. And over all hangs the question whether, and how long, the Western countries can stand the economic strain. The answer is that they must. There are signs that Stalin is shifting the threatened offensive from the military to the economic field, and a decision is as possible in the latter as in the former. Stern sacrifices will still be called for. But the harder the ordeal the earlier the relief from it.
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