Madame and the Secret Treaty
By PHILIP SANDEMAN
N0 subject in English history has been more misrepre- sented by the politically prejudiced than politics and diplomacy in the period after' the Restoration. The traditional view has its classical exposition in Macaulay, its modern home in a hundred schoolboy text books. King Charles II, we are told, though amiable and intelligent, was totally without serious purpose, marred by frivolity and cynicism, ' a mere lounger and voluptuary.' If he had devoted to public affairs one tithe of the energies which he lavished on his mistresses he might have ruled over the destinies of Europe : as it was he saw that his servants, consumed by irresponsible ambition, were destroying his country, but could not be bothered to prevent them. These weaknesses of character, so the story went, were echoed in. England's foreign policy. Charles ignored the simple fact, known to every schoolboy, that France was England's traditional foe and that co-operation with her was ipso facto .bad. ' The independence, the safety, the dignity of the nation over which he presided were nothing to him.' So he suffered himself to be tied behind the chariot of Louis XIV and deserted the path of honour to deceive his councillors, betray his allies and ruin his country. In return for occasional bribes and a handsome concubine in the shape of the Duchess of Portsmouth he entered into the nefarious Secret Treaty of Dover and pledged himself to destroy the country with which he was still nominally allied and to abandon the Protestant Church. Treachery, immorality, blindness to the interests of his country; such were the epithets which the Whig historians lavished on King Charles's diplomatic diversions.
So - naïve an interpretation could not for ever survive. unchallenged. It has long been concluded that Charles II, whatever his faults, was an astute and able negotiator, not likely to be hood-winked by the French or to ignore vital l'eve questions of policy in his pursuit of pleasure. Mr. Cyril d,1, Hughes Hartmann wishes to prove far more than this; that a.' Charles was not only subtle but successful, guided throughout any by rigid principles all tending to the ultimate welfare of ills country. This theme he first developed in 1934 in Charles 11 fte` and Madame where he collected together all that was then available of the correspondence between King Charles and his re sister Madame, Duchesse d'Orldans. Since then fresh papers l‘ ret have come to light and new theories propounded. From these, ' and from his previous works, Mr. Hartmann has now compiled a comprehensive study, The King My Brother.* In his preface Sir Arthur Bryant describes the book as likelY, to remain ' the most definitive work on the mission to England of Henriette-Anne, Duchesse d'Orleans and of her correspon• dence with her brother Charles II.' So far as the collection of material is concerned Sir Arthur will surely be proved right. It is unlikely that fresh documents of importance will now bo, discovered, certainly if they are they will never be arrayea, with greater scholarship or elegance. The technique 01 interspersing letters and comments is one most difficult to employ successfully; the flow of narrative must not be broken by tedious explanations, yet the reader must never be left in doubt about the significance of what he is reading. Mr. Hartmann's sense of proportion is impeccable, his supporting comment illuminating and apt. He is never obtrusive, never tendentious, above all never dull. Every reader will be grateful in for his labours; not all however will agree with his conclusions. ad Mr. Hartmann suggests—if gross over-simplification may be, br forgiven—that Charles II ' with his great knowledge and na experience and his quick and subtle intelligence, may have 13( possessed a far deeper and clearer understanding of foreign fo affairs than did his subjects.' On this hypothesis, Mr. a Hartmann fits all Charles's actions into a consistent pattern; da ' Charles saw England as an island state, a great naval and he maritime power.' At sea therefore we could endure no th challenge and, whereas the French were fully occupied 00, re continental adventures, the Dutch competed with us for naval of supremacy: The moral for Charles was clear; the Dutch must th be destroyed, cost what it might in ruptured alliances and gr broken promises. To that objective everything must be cc subordinated.
Even if it is accepted that so consistent a principle ruled Charles's foreign policy it is hard to admire his diplomatic methods. While still in open alliance with Holland he secretly negotiated with France a treaty designed to destroy his earlier ally. In so doing he deceived his people and all but a handful of his councillors. In exchange for an extra bribe he tossed in a promise openly to profess himself a Catholic, a promise which it appears he cynically intended to keep only if it caused him no inconvenience. By any moral standard, and whatever the motives of the negotiators, the Secret Treaty of Dover wag a most dishonourable proceeding.
The perils of such a course were also great. Mr. Hartmann himself points out: ' if victorious, the power of an ally maY. become so increased that from a friend he turns into a rival and then an enemy.' He suggests that if Louis XIV, having crushed and occupied Holland, proceeded to set France lig as a maritime power Charles could have extricated himself quickly from the alliance. But by then it might have been too late; France would have been the master of Antwerp and Amsterdam. In control of Holland and Belgium, Louis might have proved a rival far more formidable than the Dutch had ever been. It was not as if he had no ambitions outside Europe; in Canada, Gambia, Morocco, the West Indies, French and English interests time and again came into conflict. Only the desperate resistance of the Dutch saved us from what might * The King My Brother. By Cyril Hughes Hartmann. (Heinemann, 21s.) Worse still were the dangers which Charles courted by siPPosing that a Roman Catholic revival was possible in England without serious bloodshed. He himself believed in religious toleration but he must have known his countrymen were not yet so enlightened. The Secret Treaty might not be common knowledge but it could not long be concealed that the dream of a Papal return was in the air. Uncertainty doubled and redoubled the suspicion. The final split between King and Parliament, the fevers of the Popish Plot which for ten }rears was to paralyse government and threaten the throne Its elf, these can be attributed at least in part to Charles's short- sighted irresponsibility in reviving at Dover the chimera of a return to Rome.
Perhaps the most interesting part in the whole story is the Part played by Madame, Duchesse d'Orleans. Younger sister .1.4 Charles II, she married in 1661 Monsieur, Duc d'Orlgans, Louis XIV's only brother, in Feiling's words a rouged mass of jealousy and vice.' After a brief infatuation Monsieur returned to his former devices and lost his heart to the Chevalier de Lorraine, a cynical adventure( ready to pander ueinagnbanished,o Mloogs ieaus r thuen jureswtlya rdu swpaesc teadd eqhuaat teh.i s wLorraine responsible and treated her henceforth with barely conceivable Pettiness and malice. Through it all, 'racked by the disease her was shortly to kill her, Madame retained her charity Sand ner equanimity. Well might Charles love her as he loved., no other. Her charm, her gaiety, her quick intelligence appear in every letter she wrote and even the hard-boiled French court Mourned whole-heartedly at her death.
Between Charles and Louis she was an invaluable inter- mediary, softening the rebukes, embellishing the compliments, advancing always the cause of moderation and reason. Her brother she loved most in the world and England was her native land. To France she owed her loyalties as a wife. 11, etWeen these two poles she steered her way with absolute fortitude and honesty. Yet in the end the reader is left with a prevailing feeling of regret, regret that she should have dabbled in politics at all, regret that she should have lent herself to diplomacy so tainted by treachery and deceit. ' Thus the lady of whom nothing but what was gentle was ever reported . . . set on parties, churches and nations to slay each other and he slain.' Even if one agrees with Mr. Hartmann that the Secret Treaty was in itself desirable one cannot but grieve with Professor Trevelyan that Madame had aided its Conception.
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