Bear squeeze

• CZECHOSLOVAKIA A CORRESPONDENT

The author of this article, a Czech national u•ho has recently returned from a visit to his country, wishes to remain anonymous.

In recent days the two words 'unpredictable consequences' have appeared all too often in the Czechoslovak newspapers, as-well as in de- clarations of politicians generally reckoned to represent conservative, central or even progres- sive ideas in Czechoslovak politics. Why these warnings to the people of imminent catas- trophe? Is Czechoslovakia really in for a storm : are the recent Soviet moves rightly to be seen, as some recent reports have suggested, as 'the last serious warning' to Czechoslovak leaders before the Russian troops would go into action once more to 'restore order' in a country in which the leadership, as they say, has 'lost con- trol of the situation'?

Last August, at the time of the invasion, the most popular and influential Czechoslovak leaders—Svoboda, Dubcek, Cernik and Smrkov-

sky various speeches announcing the Mos- cow Agreement urged their people not to allow 'your emotions to tempt you into actions which could only result in a national catastrophe.' 'Everything.' they said, 'depends on you and your decisions. Take them wisely and like states- men. We know you can do it. We can get our nations out of this difficult situation on one con- dition only : if we remain calm and united.' Nearly eight months have passed. The resist- ance of the Czech and Slovak peoples has earned the admiration of the whole world. A far stronger enemy has not been able to crush a people who decidecito leave it to the invaders to fight with the customary arms of war and to hold on, without recourse to arms, by non- violent, civilian methods, thus demonstrating to the whole world that what they intended AILS only to save 'socialism with a human face.'

No doubt there were, inevitably, several eruptions of popular feelings of hostility to- wards the occupying army and the infiltration of the civilian Soviet 'experts'-who invaded the Country in the wake of the army units. Such was Jan Palach's self-immolation; such was the Smrkovsky affair (which shOwed, incidentally, how the Soviet invasion has transformed the trade unions from a powerless and dogmatic organisation into a mass_political force which acts independently but in close unity with the rest of the nation, and especially the intelli gentsia); and such the fight for direct workers' control of the economy following Yugoslavia's example, and the student sit-ins.

Notwithstanding these incidents, the Russians

and also some Czech and Slovak leaders seemed optimistic, detecting signs of a thaw which gave promise of future collaboration. The Rus- sians, of course, relied on the activities of their conservative collaborators: Jodas, Novy, Indra and Bilak, and their fellow travellers in respon- sible party and government positions, such as Strougal, leader of the Czech party, Grosser, Minister of Interior of the Czech Republic, and Svestka, former editor-in-chief of the party organ Rude Pra►'o and now editor-in-chief of the conservative T ribuna.

The victory of the Czechoslovak team over the Russians in the ice-hockey championship, anachronistic though it may seem, marked the turning-point. But in the light of the past tragic eight months in Czechoslovak history, one won- ders whether three winning goals in the two matches really sufficed to produce a situation in which a nation, having previously shown such great discipline and self-restraint and awareness of the necessity to 'normalise' conditions (to use Soviet terminology), would resort to methods which are not at all in keeping with its char- acter, the policy of its leaders, or the brutal logic of its situation.

The Soviet leaders know full Well that the risk of popular insurrection or armed resistance is now gone. World attention is no longer focused on Czechoslovakia. The powers of the world- have even tacitly- accepted the so-called 'Brezhnev doctrine' by which the Soviets have the right to decide when the common interests of socialism are in danger and to use military force in such cases to forestall the danger—in open defiance of the norms of international law and of the principle of self-determination of nations. Surely, therefore, this was the moment for the Soviets to wipe out the last remnants of feelings of independence and nationalism, to ban journals and magazines critical of the in- vaders, and to get Czech government support for such a policy by threatening to introduce first a military government, and then the old Novotny regime once more, albeit with new leaders, puppets whom they have managed to sew together in eight months of hard work.

Some commentators have predicted that the present crisis marks the beginning of a black- out in Czechoslovakia reminiscent of the first months of 1939, i.e. before the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany. No doubt the seriousness of the situation cannot be under- estimated. Progressive people are losing their jobs, and their places are taken by Novotnyite and new Soviet hard-liners. There is a crack- down on the press and communications media. Inside the Communist party pro-Soviet elements have begun to influence the shaping of policy, In Bohemia and Moravia, as well as in Slovakia, many people are getting tired, militancy is growing weaker, and work in the factories is being hampered by drawn-out political discus- sions which brings no results, to the great dis- pleasure of the trade unions.

But another, more optimistic aspect of this situation should not be overlooked. In many areas (especially in the powerful trade unions) the progressives are strong, and resist every attempt by the conservatives to eliminate the results of the efforts made by the progressive forces in 1967-68. Militancy and unity are weaker: but they are far from dead. This is why I believe the Russians fomented trouble from fear lest a party congress held now chose dif- ferent methods to solve its problems.

The next few weeks will show whether recent events in Czechoslovakia are but a continuation of the unprincipled Machtpolitik which the Soviet Union has been pursuing for two decades now, or whether they are even now prepared to implement that article of the Moscow Agreement of 26 August in which they declared 'that the forces which intervened will be progressively withdrawn, that they will not interfere in in- ternal Czechoslovak affairs and that coopera- tion between the two countries will be developed in mutual observance of equality, territorial in- tegrity, independence and socialist solidarity.'

Much will depend on the attitude of the Nixon Administration to Russian policy in Czecho- slovakia and Europe in general. This is one point realised by the present Czechoslovak as well as by the Soviet leaders.

Dubcek, we are told, has either already visited Moscow this week, or is due there later this month. If so it is only a further proof that the Soviet leaders cannot risk waiting any longer and wish to utilise fully the situation probably created by themselves after the ice-hockey victory. Meanwhile the Hungarian party leader Kadar has been put up in Pravda to play the same role which his predecessor M Rakosi played in the February events in 1948 in Czechoslovakia, as 'faithful friend, mediator and simultaneous agent provocateur' between Moscow and Prague.

Dubcek has two alternatives to choose from. Either he is prepared to act according to Soviet wishes, which means radical changes in the Czechoslovak leadership, and consequently policy, with himself remaining the nominal chief; or he does not give way to Soviet pres- sure and resigns. The central committee meet- ing this week may show which alternative he ha's decided to choose.